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The African continent is many things: a tourist attraction, an investment destination, a 
charity occupation etc. For a lawyer, the continent poses a challenge, which forms the 
principal question of this scholarly exercise - what legal systems, structures and strate-
gies will enable the conversion of Africa’s vast resources and potential to economic 
benefits for her people? Alternatively, how can laws and legal systems be designed and 
deployed for the purpose of driving economic development in Africa? 
Economic development has been described as a phenomenon which combines self-
sustaining growth with structural change in patterns of production, upgrades in tech-
nology, modernisation in society, polity and institutions, and widespread improvement 
in the human condition (Adelman, 2001). A second definition is that economic devel-
opment provides governments and international economic organizations with tools for 
economic transformation (Toye, 2003). The very term development is suggestive of a 
benchmark, or a standard yet to be attained. This benchmark is often put forward as 
the attainment of an industrialized economy. According to the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), the critical importance of industrialization to de-
velopment is made clear through Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 9, which speaks 
to the necessity of technology and infrastructure for economic productivity (United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2016). Also, it is necessary to note that 
economic growth is distinguished from economic development; while the former is a 
calculation of economic performance over a period of time, economic development is 
concerned with the quality of the policies, institutions and activities that direct an 
economy. 
With fifty-four countries and one billion people, the African continent is too vast and 
diverse to be considered as a single entity. Accordingly, this research project concen-
trates on a comparative examination of the relationship between law and economic 
development in the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Republic of Rwanda. During the last 
two decades of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, these countries 
implemented similar economic and institutional reform programs to accelerate eco-
nomic development. The economic structures of both countries are disparate, and 
present an opportunity to investigate the interplay of legal systems and the process of 
economic development in different contexts: Nigeria is categorized as a lower-middle 
income country (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2016), while 
Rwanda is classified as a low income country (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2015). Nigeria and Rwanda represent the western and central/eastern regions of 
sub-Saharan Africa respectively. Also, both countries are similar in that they have heter-
ogeneous populations, a colonial experience, and an average of twenty years maintain-
ing a democratic system of government.  
This chapter serves a dual purpose; firstly, to outline the evolution of law and eco-
nomic development as an academic field of study, and as an area of professional prac-
tice. Secondly, the chapter begins the inquiry into the relationship between law and 
economic development in Nigeria and Rwanda.   
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1.1. Law and Economic Development in Africa 
The multidimensional nature of development renders difficult attempts to find and 
apply a simple definition of Law and Development, or articulate a linear list of the ele-
ments which compose this field of study. Discussing this difficulty, Mariana Mota Prado 
categorizes the work of Law and Development scholars into two groups. The first group, 
whose work she terms ‘Law in Development’ considers how law can play an instrumen-
tal role in achieving development goals. This body of work will form the foundation for 
this study. The other group, which views the rule of law and legal reform as develop-
ment ends in themselves is termed as ‘Law as Development’ (Prado, 2010). For the 
purpose of this study, economic development will be taken as the achievement of eco-
nomic objectives as put forward by national governments’ policies. In this context, the 
purpose of laws and legal systems is to function for the successful actualisation of eco-
nomic agenda, thus placing this study in the law in development group, specifically law 
in economic development.  
The roles, functions and impact attributed to law and legal institutions in the eco-
nomic development of the African continent have morphed several times over the last 
sixty years. Theories of Law and Development abound, ranging from narrow fields of 
study confined to the use of law in improving economic performance, to those expand-
ed to analyse the ways in which legal structures shape social interaction. The common 
denominator of these divergent approaches and objectives is the assertion that the 
formulation and application of laws directly impact upon the evolution and perfor-
mance of economies and societies. 
However, the conceptions, definitions, typologies and utilisations of law vary accord-
ing to the users, which include, but are not limited to lawyers, political scientists, econ-
omists, social activists, investors, and regulators.  It is not the purpose of this study to 
engage in the scholarly debate as to the role of law and institutions in the development 
process. Rather, the study recognizes that it is worthwhile to evaluate theories against 
results, after decades of discourse and disagreement. Law is an instrument amenable to 
divergent purposes, and will create impact dependent on its users, and the environ-
ment in which it is deployed. The trajectory of contemporary African economic devel-
opment is governed by domestic, international and multilateral legal systems which 
legitimize and underpin the political, economic and ideological objectives of their own-
ers. Also, the law is often a weapon in conflicts within African development practice, 
particularly the measurements of economic performance, the choices of strategies to 
deliver improved economic performance, and the methods by which strategies should 
be implemented.    
To illustrate, let us assume that a resource rich developing country in Africa is in 
contract negotiations with a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) regarding a large-scale 
investment into natural resource exploration and production. A government lawyer will 
consider this contract to be evidence of economic development, as he expects the MNE 
Law and Economic Development 
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to benefit the local economy; the MNE will create jobs for citizens, who will pay tax 
from their income, the MNE itself will pay corporate tax, provide linkages with the in-
ternational economy, introduce advanced technology, and catalyze growth for domestic 
enterprises who will sell it goods and services. This lawyer is concerned with interna-
tional agreements- how these impact upon state sovereignty and negotiating power, 
the laws which ensure that the investor contributes to the growth of the business envi-
ronment, as well as investor protection, taxation, technology transfer, amongst other 
issues. The investor’s lawyer on the other side of the table considers his contribution to 
global economic development to be the facilitation of the MNE’s access to natural re-
sources and foreign markets. S/he looks at the agreements to understand what laws, 
national and international, will govern the investment contract, and then s/he reviews 
the domestic regulatory framework which will either provide government support for, 
or frustrate the MNE’s business activities. Also, s/he is careful to assess whether the 
government, through laws and state institutions, upholds property rights which protect 
capital, assets, and intellectual property. Thereafter, s/he insists on certain dispute 
resolution mechanisms and investment guarantees, as well as land and tax concessions. 
Leaving the negotiation meeting, these lawyers may be accosted by yet another lawyer, 
who is an advocate for ‘national development’. This lawyer considers the agreement 
reached between the government and investor deleterious to the environment, local 
economy and citizens. Specifically, s/he objects to the absence of ‘local content’ terms 
requiring the investor to employ citizens and protect the environment, and opposes a 
land concession which displaces communities and infringes on their property rights.  
This simplistic illustration aims to show the various legal elements considered to 
contribute to economic development, and the multiple areas and perspectives at which 
legal systems intersect with economic activity. It is impractical to consider all of the 
issues in Law in Development in a single scholarly study. Also, it is difficult to create a 
hierarchy of legal issues for evaluation, as an individual issue can be of importance to 
different actors for different reasons.    
This study argues for a more nuanced approach of investigation and analysis of the 
interactions and intersections of law in the economic development of Africa. Evidence 
based probing of the relationship between law and economic processes, will allow clear 
understanding of the current functionalities of legal systems for economic develop-
ment. Secondly, the contexts and factors which should be accounted for in the design of 
legal interventions will be outlined and contextualised. This is necessary to design the 
legal systems and interventions which can allow the utilisation of law as an effective 
tool for economic development.  It is important to note that this thesis does not under-
take evaluations of economic policy, nor does it promote specific theories or approach-
es to economic development. The primary concern of this investigation is to observe 
and analyse the interplay of laws and economic systems, and observe economic out-
comes influenced by legal instruments which function as tools of economic manage-
ment. 
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Academic inquiry must take place within a defined field of study. In this case, it is 
necessary to discuss the evolution of the prominent Law and Development theories 
which have influenced economic development policy on the African continent. This 
inquiry begins with the Law and Development movement which emerged in the imme-
diate post-independence period of the 1960s.  
1.2. Contemporary Law and Development: An Overview 
The period immediately following the Second World War (1939-1945) was character-
ised by the disintegration of empires, the creation of newly independent states, and the 
emergence of international institutions to manage global political and economic rela-
tions.  
In 1944, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also known as 
the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were set up to facilitate 
reconstruction and development, promote foreign investment, and promote long-range 
balance of trade (United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, 1944). In 1945, 
the United Nations was established as an international political and economic organisa-
tion to promote peace, cooperation, human rights, and harmonise actions of nations in 
the achievement of common ends (United Nations, 1945). Similarly, The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1948, now the World Trade Or-
ganisation (WTO), is a system of law, supported by a legal institution to regulate inter-
national trade (General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade, 1948). Collectively, these or-
ganisations have shaped guiding the ideologies, and supplied, or withdrawn a significant 
amount of the reputational and financial support used by countries for economic ad-
vancement.  
1.2.1. 1960s-1970s: The Era of State-led Development 
In newly independent countries, laws and legal systems were prescribed as necessary 
tools for economic development. The rationale for law as an instrument of economic 
improvement can be found in the 1961 report of the International Legal Studies Pro-
gram at Harvard University; 
“At this date, there is general awareness of the world-wide importance of the rapid 
and orderly economic development of the newly changing societies of Latin America, 
Asia and Africa. On the record there are good reasons to anticipate that the contribu-
tion of the legal profession can be of major importance, since a legal framework will be 
essential to the task, and its execution will involve legal processes” (Harvard Law School, 
1961, p. 3). 
The Law and Development movement was concerned with bridging the gap be-
tween laws in books, and law in practice. The majority of legal aid projects were fi-
Law and Economic Development 
16 
nanced by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and di-
rected towards training of lawyers and judges. The movement was influenced by the 
economic theory of modernization which promoted economic development driven by 
state or government led investment in capital projects. A principal objective of the 
movement was “to bring about major changes in legal systems and norms in the inter-
ests of efficiency and justice. It involved an effort to create an academic field in legal 
studies that would parallel subfield like development economics and development ad-
ministration. Law and development had a happy life, then faded from the scene” 
(Trubek, 1996, p. 223).   
In 1974, Trubek and Galanter (1974, p. 1063), leading proponents of Law and Devel-
opment declared the movement as failed, and explained that “law and development 
studies originated largely as by-products of “development assistance” activities by the 
United States government, international agencies, and private foundations working with 
governments and institutions in the Third World”. They went on to posit reasons for the 
limited effectiveness of the law and development movement in driving economic devel-
opment, or modernisation to: the absence of a theoretical framework, a lack of cohe-
sion amongst different strands of thought, weaknesses in assumptions of the ethnocen-
tric models of law, the possible irrelevance of law in economic development, and the 
amenability of laws to be used for negative outcomes.  
1.2.2. African Approaches to Law and Economic Development 
In the 1960s and 1970s, African Governments relied upon legal instruments to chal-
lenge the international economic system, and entrench governments in national econ-
omies. At international level, the United Nations General Assembly, in which these 
countries had a numerical majority, was the stage for political and economic assertion. 
In 1962, the General Assembly of the United Nations issued a Resolution titled ‘Perma-
nent Right to Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (PSNR). S1 of this Resolution states 
“The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of 
the well-being of the people of the State concerned” (United Nations General Assembly, 
1962). A decade later, in 1974, the United Nations General Assembly (1974) adopted a 
Resolution on a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The articles of the NIEO 
sought to increase the powers of developing countries to regulate foreign investment, 
and expropriate or nationalise foreign owned investments on terms dictated by host 
countries.  Also, the NIEO contained a revision of the terms of international trade, par-
ticularly tariffs, and the removal of conditions attached to economic and technical assis-
tance. Like the PSNR 1962, the NIEO was an instrument of ‘soft law’, which expressed 
the aspirations of signatory countries, but was not enforceable as an international trea-
ty or agreement.  
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From the mid-1960s, dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank asserted 
that industrialised countries, had through colonialism, structured the international eco-
nomic system to keep former colonies in a state of underdevelopment through a sys-
tem of resource extraction (Frank, 1966). While scholarly interest in the relationship 
between legal systems and economic development waned, the economic theory of 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) gained prominence. This theory which 
emerged during the late 1960s directed that developing countries could move towards 
industrialization through the domestic production or manufacture of goods which were 
previously imported (Alexander, 1967). African countries which adopted ISI include 
Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Algeria, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Guinea, and Benin Republic, amongst others (Babatunde, 
2012).  ISI, as interpreted during this period placed the state as the lead agent and driv-
er of economic development, and influenced the Governments of African countries to 
deploy laws as instruments of economic assertion, particularly over the ownership of 
natural resources, and the direction of economic activities.   
As a result, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) gained popularity: by the end of the 
1970s, on the average, SOEs accounted for up to 17 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in African countries (Nellis, 2005). Often backed by legislation, these enterprises - 
government owned, controlled and managed, enjoyed monopolies of industries. SOEs 
were underpinned by the belief that:  
“publicly owned firms would be better—i.e., more rational and socially beneficial—
investors, that they would fill “entrepreneurial gaps,” gain access to international con-
cessionary and commercial credit denied to small local business-people, provide ser-
vices the private sector either would not or could not (or even, to some, should not), 
and generally serve as training centers where Africans would acquire the technical and 
administrative skills required in a modern economy” (Nellis, 2005, p. 13).  
According to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Managing Director of the World Bank and 
Minister of Finance of Nigeria, during the 1960s and 1970s, African Governments con-
sidered themselves to be the primary drivers of economic development, and providers 
of critical infrastructure and services to support economic activity. Also, she notes that 
due to the relative weakness of the private sector after independence and limited avail-
ability of private capital, these governments participated actively in many sectors of the 
economy, especially as government spending was expected to produce ‘multiplier ef-
fects’ (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012). Through SOEs, African governments sought to direct and 
manage the process of economic development. This approach was maintained until the 
implementation of structural economic reforms programs in the 1980s, which was 
caused by the international debt crisis of the early 1980s.  
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1.2.3. 1980s: Reforms to Enable Investor-led Economic Development 
Law and Development as a field of study and area of practice re-emerged during the 
debt crisis of the 1980s. The debt crisis was triggered by the inability of developing 
countries to service loans which were obtained during the period of economic boom 
(high prices for petroleum products and commodities) in the 1970s. The IMF provided 
assistance towards economic recovery in the form of loans, which were contingent on 
economic re-structuring, as well as the reform of legal systems and state institutions 
(See Chapter 2 for extensive discussion). These reforms were concerned with the reduc-
tion of government participation in the economy and the creation of an enabling envi-
ronment for private investors.  Importantly, these reforms shifted the lead role in eco-
nomic development to the private sector, and international investors in particular: 
“from 1979 to 1989, the World Bank approved, worldwide, 98 structural adjustment 
operations with SOE-related components. Most of these were supported by parallel 
technical assistance loans or credits. African cases accounted for 70 per cent of the total 
World Bank SOE-related adjustment universe in the 1980s” (Nellis, 2005, p. 11). 
Through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the functions of government were 
reduced to regulation and investor protection. International investors, typically originat-
ing from western countries were considered to possess the efficient systems, as well as 
the technology, resources, experience and expertise necessary to drive economic 
growth.  Legal systems were often a practical impediment to international investment, 
which generated the need for legal reform, and the establishment of legal systems 
based on best practices. These best practices were often modelled on the laws of eco-
nomically advanced countries (World Bank, 2000).  
1.2.4. 1980s-1990s: Economists Enter the Fray 
The late 1980s and early 1990s brought an institutional approach to development dis-
course and practice, which was led by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) school of 
thought. Economists further expanded the law and development field based on the 
argument that the governance structures which manage economies, otherwise known 
as institutions, are central to economic performance. Douglass North argued that “the 
institutional framework dictates the kinds of skills and knowledge perceived to have the 
maximum pay-off..If the institutional matrix rewards piracy (or more generally redis-
tributive activities) more than productive activity, then learning will take the form of 
learning to be better pirates” (North, 1995, p. 21). North defined institutions as “the 
rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interactions. They are composed of formal rules (statue law, common 
law, regulation), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, and self-
imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both” (North, 1995, 
p. 23).  
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In similar vein, and during the same period, the Legal Origins school of thought 
emerged. Legal Origins scholars hold that economic performance is determined by the 
national legal system, itself the consequence of historical evolution. Legal Origins, put 
forward by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV), began as an analysis 
of share-holder protection laws in Europe, but was expanded, then used to explain 
comparative economic performance. LLSV put forward theoretical, and empirical evalu-
ations of legal systems to argue firstly, that better legal protection of investors will lead 
to more investment: “legal protection of outside investors limits the extent of expropri-
ation of such investors by corporate insiders, and thereby promotes financial develop-
ment” (La Porta, et al., 2008, p. 285).  Secondly, national legal systems, and their treat-
ment of investors are dependent on the historical factors and evolution of law, i.e., the 
origins. The operation of these legal systems as related to investor protection are a 
strong determinant and indicator of financial development.  
According to LLSV, the historical evolution of legal systems in France and England in 
the 12th and 13th centuries has shaped the present day structural differences in the 
functionalities of legal systems of both countries. The common law is evolutionary, with 
disputes resolved by an argumentative and trial-based judicial system. In contrast, the 
more authoritarian French civil law system is code-based, reliant on investigations and 
documentation. LLSV found that the “French civil law system exhibits systematically less 
protection for minority shareholders, which is in turn correlated with concentrated 
share ownership; and corporations in common law countries (with stronger shareholder 
protection) pay out more dividends and have higher share prices than firms in civil law 
countries” (Armour, et al., 2009, p. 583). The English common law system is associated 
with (a) better investor protection, which in turn is associated with improved financial 
development, better access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion, (b) lighter 
government ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less corrup-
tion, better functioning labour markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and (c) less 
formalized and more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with 
more secure property rights and better contract enforcement” (La Porta, et al., 2008, p. 
298). These differences are said to extend to those countries which derive their legal 
systems from England and France as a result of conquest and colonialism. The implica-
tions for former African colonies is thus: francophone African countries will have inher-
ited legal systems which have inherently designed to offer weak protection to investors. 
Conversely, former British colonies are notionally better equipped to offer good protec-
tion to investors.   
LLSV and NIE are similar in approach, which is to posit a correlation between the 
quality of laws and economic performance: NIE scholars assert the notion of causation, 
i.e., that laws have a direct and measurable effect on economic performance. In compa-
rable fashion, Legal Origins claims that the treatment of investors by legal systems de-
termines financial development, and ultimately economic development. To explain the 
current workings of institutions, both schools of thought look to historical factors; legal 
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origins attributes the functions and operations of legal systems to historical evolution. 
Similarly, NIE scholars have argued that institutions established by colonists were inten-
tionally designed to support resource extraction, rather than sustainable systems for 
national economic development (Acemoglu, et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
Also, the use of econometric tools by LLSV and NIE have integrated a quantitative or 
statistical element to the analysis of the relationship between law and economic devel-
opment.  
1.3. The New Law and Development: Governance and Law Reform 
In 1989, the World Bank reported a ‘crisis of governance’ in sub-Saharan Africa (World 
Bank, 1989). In its 1992 Governance and Development document, the World Bank de-
fined governance as the “exercise of authority, control, management, power of gov-
ernment” (World Bank, 1992, p. 1). In the context of development, governance is con-
cerned with the “management of a country’s economic and social resources for devel-
opment” (ibid). Governance conditionality was attached to loans provided by Interna-
tional Finance Institutions (IFIs) in order to induce the adoption of good policies and 
institutions which would enhance the effectiveness of development finance. In 1980 the 
average number of good governance conditions per loan stood at 21, rising to 55 by 
1990, which reduced to 33 conditions per loan in 2000 (World Bank, 2001). Between 
1996 and 2015, using the World Governance Indicators, the World Bank reported the 
quality of individual and aggregate governance indicators in 215 economies for six di-
mensions of governance; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
ruption (World Bank, 2017). 
The fall of communism and the breakup of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (USSR) rekindled the interest of international institutions and scholars in law and 
development, especially the capabilities of laws to be deployed as instruments of eco-
nomic and social engineering. The new Law and Development movement birthed the 
impetus and rationale for a wave of legal reform; multilateral agencies adopted govern-
ance agendas and re-introduced law to development practice. The ‘Rule of Law’ 
emerged as the dominant theme, to be deployed as an instrument to achieve two com-
plementary objectives; firstly, an enabling market environment through the “protection 
of property rights, third party enforcement of contracts, and a stable, crime-free in-
vestment environment” (Barron, 2005, p. 9). Secondly, the rule of law in the political 
environment would facilitate good governance and democratisation. This approach is 
reminiscent of the instrumental view of law adopted by the Law and Development 
movement of the 1960s. However, the new Law and Development movement differed 
from its predecessor in its reduction of the role of governments in the economy, and its 
ideological backing drawn from the work of NIE.  
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The term ‘rule of law’ is somewhat unwieldy, and has been used to capture a range 
of ideals and outcomes. Tamanaha (1995, p. 476) has opined that the rule of law “has 
always consisted more of a bundle of ideals than a specific or necessary set of institu-
tional arrangements”. Ibrahim Shihata, General Counsel of the World Bank between 
1983 and 1998 conceptualised the rule of law as a system of abstract rules applied 
appropriately by functioning institutions (Shihata, 1995). This definition has been de-
scribed as “purely economic: to create a stable, predictable legal environment in which 
economic actors came come together and transact, free from the arbitrary interference 
of government” (Barron, 2005, p. 15). In 2002, General Counsel Ko-Yung Tung of the 
World Bank expanded this definition, and provided metrics which speak to the quality, 
effect and purpose of the rule of law: 
(1) The government itself is bound by the law;  
(2) every person in society is treated equally under the law;  
(3) the human dignity of each individual is recognised and protected by the law; and  
(4) justice is accessible to all. The rule of law requires transparent legislation, fair laws, 
predictable enforcement, and accountable governments to maintain order, promote 
private sector growth, fight poverty, and have legitimacy. (Tung, 2002) 
It has been argued by senior staff of the World Bank that “improving the functioning of 
legal institutions is an essential part of economic development”, especially in the provi-
sion of three necessary ingredients of a well-functioning legal system in a market econ-
omy: the supply of market friendly laws, supportive institutions and demand for laws 
(Gray, 1997, p. 14).  The effectiveness of national legal systems for the functioning of 
market economies is measured by a range of indices, including the ‘Doing Business 
Reports’ (World Bank), which are “a series of annual reports measuring the regulations 
that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing Business presents 
quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights 
that can be compared across 189 economies—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe—and 
over time” (World Bank, 2016). These indicators measure the ease of starting a busi-
ness, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts, and resolving insolvency (ibid). In a bid to improve rankings on the Doing 
Business Index, “between June 2014 and June 2015, 189 economies worldwide docu-
mented 231 business reforms, with 71% of reforms aimed at reducing the complexity 
and cost of complying with business regulation, and 29% of reforms aimed at strength-
ening legal institutions. Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounts for 30% of the regulatory 
reforms making it easier to do business in 2014/15, followed closely by Europe and 
Central Asia” (ibid). The Doing Business Index has been hailed by scholars affiliated to 
NIE and the World Bank as a tool which enables informed policy debate on institutional 
reform, and an index which promotes economic inclusivity as it measures economic 
success on the basis of rules, not connections and corruption (Acemoglu, et al., 2013).  
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Similarly, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is a “diagnostic tool 
that is intended to capture the quality of a country’s policies and institutional arrange-
ments—i.e., its focus is on the key elements that are within the country’s control, rather 
than on outcomes (such as growth rates) that are influenced by elements outside the 
country’s control” (World Bank, 2014).  The CPIA rates countries “against a set of 16 
criteria grouped in four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for 
social inclusion and equity, and public-sector management and institutions” (World 
Bank , 2015). The World Bank provides two reasons for this evaluation exercise: firstly, 
good policies and institutions are expected to lead to favourable outcomes, including 
growth and poverty despite possible fluctuations caused by internal and external fac-
tors. The thinking is that country-led development efforts are more successful than 
transplantations or importations. Also, CPIA ratings help determine the relative sizes of 
the Bank’s concessional lending and grants to low-income countries” (World Bank, 
2014).  
Governance and the Rule of Law remain as dominant themes in economic develop-
ment, emphasized in international development agenda through the work of multilat-
eral institutions at international level, and at national level through governments which 
seek to align with this agenda. Thus, this study concentrates on the interplay of govern-
ance, laws and institutions as can be examined in the trajectory of African economic 
development.  
1.4. Rationale for Study 
The centrality or importance of law to economic development is the common thread 
flowing from the Law and Development movement of the 1960s to the contemporary 
thinking about Institutions and Development. However, in the context of African eco-
nomic development, it is imperative to understand how economic systems interact with 
these legal concepts, in order to build legal systems which can enable economic devel-
opment. The work of NIE, legal origins, and reform efforts led by IFIs have not yet deliv-
ered robust and effective models for legal reform; despite two generations of reforms, 
African economies and institutions remain on the lower rung of governance and eco-
nomic indices. Thus, it is necessary to identify the factors that have limited the efficacy 
of the institutions approach. 
Firstly, NIE assumes a model of economic development which is investor-centric. As 
a result, the legal issues which are considered important are those which touch on in-
vestor protection, e.g., the rule of law and property rights, as well as investor-
government relations. In a 1997 report, the International Monetary Fund argued for a 
broader range of institutional reforms to enable countries “establish and maintain pri-
vate sector confidence and thereby lay the basis for sustained growth” (International 
Monetary Fund, 1997, p. V).  This perspective does not account for the multiplicity of 
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trajectories of economic development. Importantly, it does not build models which 
consider or integrate other actors, for example the informal sector, government-led or 
government supported investment projects, into mainstream economic development.  
Davis and Trebilcock (2008, p. 903) argue that 
“many of the implications of NIE for legal reform resemble the ones advanced by 
modernisation theory a decade earlier. In terms of substantive law, from this 
perspective, core priorities should be attached to well-defined and alienable pri-
vate property rights; a formal system of contract law that facilitates impersonal 
contracting, a corporate law regime that facilitates the capital investment 
through ease of incorporation and limited liability of small and medium sized en-
terprises and minimises agency costs faced by shareholders in general in the 
case of non-owner managed firms with controlling shareholders a system of se-
cured lending that makes it easy for creditors to take a broad range of assets as 
collateral, identify competing claims to those assets as collateral, identify com-
peting claims to those assets, and seize and sell the assets in the event of de-
fault; a bankruptcy regime that induces the exit of inefficient firms and rede-
ployment of their assets to higher-valued uses; and a non-punitive, non-
distortionary tax regime. In order to ensure the enactment and enforcement and 
administration of these substantive laws, priorities include designing law making 
institutions that are transparent and stable in their commitment to basic legal 
norms and inclusive in the stakeholders to whom they are responsive and law 
enforcement and administrative institutions that are competent, non-corrupt, 
free of undue political influence, procedurally transparent, and effectively re-
sourced.”  
Secondly, institutional thought is expansive and does not mark clear boundaries be-
tween legal practice and other fields. Chang (2007, p. 17) observes that “one funda-
mental difficulty involved in the study of the relationship between institutions and eco-
nomic development is that there is no widely accepted definition of institutions”. Aca-
demic studies have presented econometric evidence which shows strong correlation 
between the quality of institutions and laws, and economic performance. Within the 
institutions and development sub-field, the elements of law required for economic 
development include wide-ranging and far-reaching concepts, including the rule of law, 
property rights, regulation, courts, and more. Institutional development scholars are yet 
to agree upon a defined scope of inquiry. It remains a herculean task to identify the 
primacy, and order by which legal elements and institutions should be embedded within 
developing African economies. IFIs have attempted to catalyse change in African econ-
omies through conditionalities and the implementation of legal reform programmes. 
After two decades of study, it is not yet clear what institutions have the most impact on 
economic performance. Also, these studies do not provide an effective roadmap for 
institution building, which has resulted in limited success of reform efforts: recent stud-
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ies show that 40%-60% of recent attempts at institutional development appear to have 
had no effect on government effectiveness (Andrews, 2013). Similarly, Thomas Ulen 
argues that it is not possible to show causality, i.e. direct contribution of law to econom-
ic performance, as government power and political will are useful substitutes for a legal 
system (Ulen, 2011).  
Thirdly, there remains a debate as to whether institutions are the pre-requisites for, 
or result of economic development. Hernando de Soto argues that the legal system is 
the main differentiator between industrialised and developing countries (De Soto, 
1989). He holds that “the law is the most useful and deliberate instrument of change 
available to people” (De Soto, 1989, p. 187). Conversely, Ha-Joon Chang argues that 
institutional development will occur in tandem with economic performance: “today, it is 
widely accepted even by many orthodox economists that policies directly derived from 
the experiences of the developed countries- or even worse, from economic textbooks- 
are likely to fail in developing countries, where certain institutions whose existence 
these policies take for granted (e.g., well-defined property rights, a developed govern-
ment bond market) simply do not exist” (Chang, 2007, p. 2). Furthermore, the rise of 
China as an economic super-power has diminished the robustness of the proposition 
that the rule of law and property rights, as advocated by mainstream schools of 
thought, are necessary to create the conditions for improved economic performance. 
Julian Du argues that China achieved its impressive economic growth record in absence 
of adequate legal institutions; China is rated below average on various measurements 
of rule of law, property rights protection, contracting institutions etc. (Du, 2011). Chang 
and Du seem to argue that rather than law birthing development, increased wealth will 
stimulate the emergence of strong institutions, and a modern legal system will be the 
result of economic development, not a pre-requisite.  
Fourthly, IFI-led legal reforms have been criticised for their attempt to recreate fea-
tures of western legal systems in other economies: discussing the Legal Origins litera-
ture, Curtis Milhaupt posits that “the tendency to place great analytical weight on quan-
tifiable but extremely thin legal variables is the major weakness of the law and finance 
literature” (Milhaupt, 2009, p. 480). In the opinion of Mathias Siems, LLSV “follow the 
US model, implicitly benchmarking how similar legal systems are to the US one, and 
whether this makes a difference in terms of financial development” (Siems, 2011, p. 6). 
This approach is reminiscent of modernisation theory advanced by Rostow in the 1960s, 
in its encouragement of newly independent countries to imitate western advanced 
economies in a sequential manner (Rostow, 1960). Riegner (2016, p. 6) suggests that 
the benchmarks for measuring the quality of laws and institutions imply “normative 
assumptions and value judgments which decide social conflicts of interest in one direc-
tion or the other”. Milhaupt argues that legal reform efforts have suffered from poor 
benchmarking, and the focus should move from “standardisation to functionality, re-
sponsiveness and adaptability” (Milhaupt, 2009, p. 844). 
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Fifthly, the limitations of the econometric approach of NIE to analysis of laws and le-
gal institutions are well discussed; NIE scholars have been described as economists, who 
are self-professed ‘wannabe lawyers’ (Michaels, 2011), and have not paid adequate 
attention to legal scholarship. Conditionalities and indices of multilateral agencies have 
been widely criticised; conditionalities have proved contentious, and are challenged for 
their imposition on the sovereignty of national governments. IFIs seem to flout their 
own message of good governance and democracy through their insistence on economic 
and systemic reforms which are not mandated by consent of the citizenry of countries 
in which they are implemented (See Chapter 2 for discussion on conditionalities). To 
illustrate, discussing the capacity of the CPIA to influence the economic trajectory of 
countries, Riegner (2016, p. 14) observes that the questionnaire used is “issued by the 
bank in an internal procedure that does not, in principle, involve other organs or state 
representatives. This is based on an interpretation of the Articles of Agreement that 
grants management the power to conduct the ordinary business of the organisation”.  
The various schools of thought in the field of law and development present ideal 
features and typologies of laws and legal institutions to enable improvements in eco-
nomic performance. These features are indicators used to measure the nature and 
quality of services which are provided by national legal systems for economic govern-
ance, or an argument for the reforms of institutional structures to support the delivery 
of the objectives of economic development. Legal reform programs were intended to 
re-engineer economic development, as laws were introduced to assign and supervise 
functions to institutions, and provide the requisite tools, normative values and profes-
sional capacities necessary for good government management of economies. It is not 
yet evident that these reforms have integrated the values, processes or systemic 
changes to enable the emergence of legal frameworks which facilitate the achievement 
of economic objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. However, upon inquiry, it may be the case 
that laws and legal systems do function and serve as instruments for developmental 
objectives which have not been considered in mainstream law and economic develop-
ment discourse. For the purpose of building legal systems which adequately support 
economic development, it is necessary to properly understand approaches, rationale, 
and consequences of law-making and institution building in contemporary Africa.  
1.5. Which Way Forward: Law and Economic Development 
This study is based on the premise that laws and legal systems do manage and influence 
the developmental processes of economies. In this regard, the state, or government is 
considered the most important institution in the developmental process, as it establishes 
and enforces the law, policies, conditions and processes for economic activity and social 
interaction. Chang describes the role of the state as coordination for change, provision of 
vision, conflict management and institution building (Chang, 1999).  The developmental 
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trajectory of African economies over the last 60 years suggests that it is necessary not 
only to explain the effects of legal systems on economic performance, but crucial to 
understand the ways in which legal systems interact with economic activity. 
Laws and legal systems are tools by which governments manage economies; law has 
been described as a political resource, an object of capture, of evasion or of manipula-
tion alongside customary norms in pluralist regulative systems (Harris-White, 2003). 
Legal documents, such as constitutions and legislation express development agenda as 
determined by the state, and institutions are responsible for the implementation of 
these agenda, and for economic management. The legality of a venture or undertaking 
is determined by laws, which also determine the prerequisites for participation in eco-
nomic activity, and establish dispute resolution mechanisms. According to Howard 
Stein, state economic management strategy and principles are implemented by regula-
tory systems through state and public entities which are “embedded in even the most 
rudimentary markets. These entities provide infrastructure, licensing, regulations and 
an array of related bodies such as the legal and financial systems. These are not simply 
supporting mechanisms but constructs that are internalized in the operation of mar-
kets” (Stein, 2003, p. 161).     
For the purpose of this study, i.e., understanding how legal systems interact with in-
stitutions and govern economies, there is limited benefit in evaluating the functions of 
legal systems of African countries against standardised benchmarks, e.g., the Doing 
Business index; the differences in political and economic contexts necessarily generate 
divergent functionalities for legal systems. The quantitative method of analysing legal 
systems is restricted, and has, so far focused on a narrow set of issues, the majority of 
which have been determined within IFIs.  
To avoid the difficulties of selecting an appropriate benchmark, and the restrictions 
of quantitative evaluation of legal systems, this study will pursue a functionalist ap-
proach, in which a hypothetical question may be posed to examine how a problem 
would be solved in different systems, as suggested by Mathias Siems (Siems, 2011). This 
method of inquiry assumes the same type of problem exists in all legal systems exam-
ined. As recommended by Milhaupt (2009), the case method enables the investigator to 
disentangle the operation of a complex system by means of systematic inquiry.  
Accordingly, this investigation of the relationship between law and economic develop-
ment in Africa is undertaken through a comparative case-study of Nigeria and Rwanda, 
in their attempts to reform laws and legal institutions to obtain relief on external debt. 
Both countries obtained debt relief from international creditors in 2005, on debt obliga-
tions acquired in the 1970s and 1980s. Debt relief was predicated on the implementa-
tion on reforms of the legal and institutional mechanisms for public finance manage-
ment. Thus, the evaluation of the relationship between law and economic development 
will be undertaken through an examination of the approaches to, and outcomes of 
these reform programs in Nigeria and Rwanda. These programs required the enactment 
of legislations, as well as the amendment of the functionalities of legal systems and 
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public institutions. Furthermore, the effects of legal and institutional reform are tangi-
ble and can be subjected to evaluation.  
1.6. Research Questions 
This study will undertake an investigation of the relationship of legal systems and eco-
nomic development of Nigeria and Rwanda through the following questions; 
1. Why did the governments of Nigeria and Rwanda seek and obtain debt relief in 
2005?  
2. In what ways did the governments of Nigeria and Rwanda deploy laws and insti-
tutions as instruments to obtain debt relief? 
3. To what extent, have legal reforms contributed to the achievement of the objec-
tives of debt relief? 
The purpose of this investigation is to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the 
nature of the interplay between legal systems, institutions and economic development 
in different contexts in both countries. The study will present the difficulties and con-
flicts that arise in attempts to deploy the law towards the function of economic govern-
ance, and as an instrument of economic management. The case-study will show the 
multiplicity and diversity of interpretations of a single legal concept in these two African 
countries. These divergent interpretations result in peculiar objectives and methodolo-
gies of legal reform. Furthermore, this investigation will highlight the gaps which have 
limited the successes of previous reform efforts, and emphasise the necessity of contex-
tual reform, i.e., design of legal interventions to suit specific economic systems, objec-
tives, and capacities.  
1.7. Chapter Outline 
In addition to this introduction this thesis consists of five chapters (2-6) of which the 
main objectives can be summarized as follows: 
2. The Context of Debt Relief 
This chapter states the objectives of the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda in seeking 
debt relief in 2005, as it provides a detailed overview of the economic and institutional 
arrangements which allowed the acquisition and escalation of public debt by the gov-
ernments of both countries. The nexus of laws/legal systems and institutions for eco-
nomic management are presented through case studies of the policies and operations 
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of governments and IFIs. Furthermore, the contractual agreements between the gov-
ernments and creditors are outlined, as well as the various arguments put forward for 
debt relief. The chapter also undertakes an analysis of the relationship between laws, 
institutions and economic development.  
3. Reforms for Debt Relief 
Through case studies, the reforms implemented by IFIs and governments towards pub-
lic debt management are examined. This chapter discusses the mechanisms by which 
Nigeria and Rwanda obtained debt relief, i.e., the implementation of programs to re-
structure their economies, as well as legal reforms. Budgetary legislations- the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 2007 in Nigeria, and the Law on State Finances and Property 2013 in 
Rwanda, introduced to regulate government management of public debt are presented. 
An analysis of the provisions of these legal instruments in undertaken to extract the 
intended objectives of legal reform. Also, the dynamic interactions of law and institu-
tions of government are outlined.  
4. Reform Effectiveness: Laws to Regulate Government Management of Public 
Debt and Foster Debt Sustainability 
This chapter interrogates the usefulness of law as an instrument for economic devel-
opment through an investigation of the effectiveness of legal reforms in Nigeria and 
Rwanda. Two questions guide this investigation, i.e., 1) do the debt management provi-
sions of budgetary legislations regulate government behaviour? 2) To what extent does 
regulation (by laws) of government behaviour contribute to the sustainability of public 
debt? Laws introduced accounting, predictability and monitoring of public debt portfo-
lios. However, these have not addressed the utilisation of debt finance, or prevented 
the accumulation of heavy debt portfolios in both countries. Additionally, the chapter 
addresses the benchmarking of legal reforms, even as it discusses the ideological basis 
of reforms, i.e., the governance agenda of NIE, as it has influenced the policies of IFIs, 
which maintain an emphasis on ‘correct’ macroeconomic policies and quantitative indi-
cators of development.  
5. Discussion: Laws, Institutions and Economic Development 
The dimensions of law as an instrument of economic development are presented; 
budgetary legislations serve as mental constructs which determine the approach of 
government to the management of public debt. Also, the laws are the terms of refer-
ence for the functions of government institutions, even as they reshape political econ-
omy of relationships and power structures. This chapter presents the contributions of 
this thesis to the field of law and development through an evaluation of its findings 
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against the criticisms of the NIE-influenced approach to legal and institutional reforms. 
In addition, the chapter presents propositions to render ‘generic’ legal reforms more 
suitable to the contextual needs and challenges of developing countries. Furthermore, 
the chapter discusses the opportunities for refinements to the operation of budgetary 
legislations in Nigeria and Rwanda.  
6. Conclusion 
This chapter ends the study with a restatement of findings and contributions of the 
thesis. The intellectual and geographical limitations of the study are presented, even as 
potential opportunities for future research are explored.  
1.8. Contribution of Study to Field of Law and Development  
The investigation is categorised into three chronological periods; firstly, the accumula-
tion of public debt between the 1970s and 1980s, secondly, the campaign for debt 
relief in the 1990s-2000s, and thirdly, post-debt relief era of 2005 to 2015. In each peri-
od, the investigation covers four thematic areas, namely: 
• The nexus of law, institutions, governance and economic development; 
• Governance: the role of the state in economic development; 
• The dimensions and dynamics of law as an instrument of national economic devel-
opment; and 
• External debt: relationships between creditors and debtors, legal dimensions and 
instruments which underpin public borrowing and debt relief.  
 
The interaction and interplay of laws and institutions is considered through an examina-
tion of the ways that governments respond to obligations arising from budgetary legis-
lation between 2005 and 2015. This examination yields the argument that legal reforms 
can be made relevant, suitable and effective to contexts if they are: 
1) Concerned with, directed to, and measured by the achievement of outcomes of 
economic development within countries and;  
2) Evaluated through the behaviours and practices of institutions, and the effect of 
these on the economy.  
 
These propositions are explored through the case-studies in chapters 2-4, and discussed 
in chapter 5.  
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1.9. Importance of Study  
Legal reforms are often prescribed as interventions, which, when inserted, will correct 
anomalies in economic systems, and unlock the solutions- behaviours, resources, and 
institutional functions which lead to economic development. Measurements and com-
parative evaluations of the quality of laws and legal systems influence the adoption of 
‘ideal’ laws and legal interventions to trigger improvements in economies.  
In the context of debt obligations acquired by governments, i.e., public debt, many 
African countries continue to accumulate debt burdens, despite budgetary legislation to 
regulate government management of debt portfolios. Typical economic measurements 
of economic health and debt sustainability consider the size of national debts compared 
to GDP. In this sense, the level of debt obligations is calculated as a percentage of the 
entire output of the country’s economy (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2016). According to the World Bank, in 2015, the debt to GDP ratios of 
Japan and the United States of America, two of the largest economies globally, stood at 
198% and 97%, respectively (World Bank, 2017).  
Government borrowing is not necessarily problematic. Indeed, it can be reasonably 
expected that governments of developing economies will borrow to finance undertak-
ings and investments to improve economic performance and social services. The prob-
lem, as has been experienced by many African countries, is that high levels of borrowing 
create obligations on current and expected financial resources, without the delivery of 
tangible economic and social benefits for the population. Crucially, it often is the case 
that African countries are unable to repay debts: as a result of debt burdens which were 
acquired in the 1970s and 1980s, 35 African countries implemented the IMF and World 
Bank debt relief mechanism, i.e., the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process 
between 2000 and 2014. This process typically stipulated the introduction of reforms to 
manage public finances, often underpinned by legislation (International Monetary Fund, 
2016). Through the PRSP process, economic, institutional and legal reforms were 
adopted by these countries seeking debt relief. Also, PRSPs incorporated evaluations of 
parliamentary systems, in order to identify opportunities for legislation to underpin 
reforms, and integrate legislative supervision of implementation of reforms and pro-
grams (Hubli & Mandaville, 2004). Furthermore, assessments of ‘good’ debt policy on 
the CPIA index consider the extent to which “debt management strategy is conducive to 
minimising budgetary risks and ensuring long-term debt sustainability” (World Bank, 
2016). This approach measures debt sustainability against ‘ideal’ policy frameworks, and 
does not necessarily look to the utilisation of debt finance for national development. 
Thus, it is necessary to reconsider the ‘institutional’ approach to law as a tool for eco-
nomic development. Also, the dynamic interaction of law and institutions should be 
better understood to conceptualise and frame laws for effectiveness.  
In summary, how can law contribute to the economic development of the African 
continent? How does law work, what effect has it had on economic performance, and 
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how can it be further formulated towards the achievement of economic objectives? 
Chapter 2 commences this investigation with a presentation of the context of debt 
relief obtained by Nigeria and Rwanda in 2005.  
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The Context of Debt Relief  
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Debt relief (debt forgiveness or debt cancellation) is rooted in the idea that obligations 
to creditors should not require borrower countries to make extreme sacrifices (Moss, et 
al., 2004). When the debtor is unable to service obligations without the sacrifice of basic 
living standards, it becomes necessary to re-evaluate the terms of the original transac-
tion, payment arrangements, as well as the debtor’s circumstances. In the context of 
international law, debt relief is underpinned by the premise that a primary obligation of 
governments and international financial institutions is the delivery of developmental 
outcomes.  
This chapter address the first question of this research project, i.e., why did the 
Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda seek and obtain debt relief in 2005? These objec-
tives were two-fold; firstly, to remove huge debt burdens, and secondly, to rectify the 
institutional weaknesses which had allowed the accumulation of public debt owed to 
international creditors. The relationship between laws and institutions, as well as their 
functions for the purpose of economic management is presented through a compara-
tive study of Nigeria and Rwanda. Several observations are highlighted through this 
study; firstly, governments express the agenda of economic development through legal 
instruments. However, legal instruments are amenable to the purpose of government, 
and as such, the objectives of economic development are of greater importance than 
the form of legal system or institutions. Furthermore, the nexus of legal systems, insti-
tutions and economic performance is critical for the management of economic devel-
opment- laws and regulations are implemented by institutions, which require sufficient 
power and capacity to function for purpose. Finally, institutions are created, and func-
tion within specific political, social, economic and cultural contexts. Thus, the peculiari-
ties of the environments in which institutions function must be accounted for in the 
design of reform programs. 
In 2005, Nigeria and Rwanda obtained relief from creditors for public debt which 
had accrued from the 1970s and 1980s. Both countries implemented significant legal 
and institutional reforms to substantiate their arguments that amounts previously spent 
on servicing debts would be redirected towards national development.  This chapter 
presents the economic and policy positions, at national and international level, which 
enabled the rapid escalation of the debt portfolios of Nigeria and Rwanda. Thereafter, 
the ideological and institutional changes which enabled Nigeria and Rwanda to obtain 
significant debt relief from private, government and institutional creditors in 2005 are 
outlined. Finally, the chapter examines the relationship between legal systems and 
economic management at national and institutional levels.  
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2.1. The Context of Debt Relief in 2005 
In the 1970s, the sale of commodities on international markets formed the principal 
source of revenue for many African Governments, including the Governments of Nigeria 
and Rwanda. In 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted by the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), noted that African economies were over-dependent on the export of basic 
raw materials and minerals. It followed that African countries were ‘extremely suscepti-
ble’ to external factors, with the resultant deleterious effects on economic stability 
(Organisation of African Unity, 1980). This economic model found its origins in the ex-
tractive institutional and economic systems which were operated during the colonial 
era (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu, et al., 2001). During the same period, 
state-led industrialization and government management of the economy were the pre-
ferred strategies for driving economic development (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012; See 1.2.2.). 
The Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda established public enterprises in almost every 
sector, and managed the economy through subsidies, price controls and commodity 
boards. This expansion of the state was aided by high commodity prices on the interna-
tional market, which delivered high levels of income for the governments of commodity 
exporting countries. Nigeria was a crude oil exporter, and Rwanda an exporter of coffee 
and tea. However, following the crash in commodity prices in the late 1970s, both Nige-
ria and Rwanda experienced severe economic contractions, and sought international 
assistance, by way of credit facilities from commercial, government and institutional 
creditors to sustain government spending. From the late 1970s, Nigeria and Rwanda 
amassed significant debt profiles, which impacted upon their political, economic and 
social arrangements, as well as developmental outcomes. While the larger share of 
Nigeria’s debts was owed to the Paris Club of Creditors, the majority of Rwanda’s obli-
gations was owed to International Finance Institutions (IFIs).  
Towards the end of the 1990s, the alignment of several schools thought caused em-
phatic changes in international development discourse and policy. Firstly, despite nearly 
two decades of direct interventions by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) into the governance structures of developing countries through economic 
and institutional reforms, the majority of African countries continued to perform poorly 
on economic and governance indices. Indeed, it appeared that these interventions had 
enabled unfavourable outcomes, such as social dislocations, higher rates of poverty and 
unemployment, as well as weak economic growth. These outcomes called into question 
the usefulness and veracity of these reform programmes. Secondly, the Jubilee 2000 
debt campaign attributed poor economic performance to the unsustainable terms upon 
which loans had been provided to borrower developing countries. This campaign pro-
vided the intellectual and emotional arguments for debt relief, and contributed to the 
rise of the global development movement.  
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In 2005, Nigeria obtained debt relief from the Paris Club, while Rwanda obtained 
debt relief from IFIs. The next section outlines the international financial organisations 
and institutions to which the governments of Nigeria and Rwanda were indebted.  
2.1.1. Creditor Institutions and Organisations  
The institutional structures for the management of international economic relations 
were established in the closing stages of the Second World War (1939-1945). This peri-
od was characterised by profound changes in international political and economic sys-
tems; empires disintegrated, and new nation-states emerged globally. The war was 
preceded by intense economic protectionism and political rivalry which escalated into 
military conflict. The Allied Powers, i.e., the western countries which won the War, 
became the architects of the post-war era. These countries pursued an agenda of inter-
national cooperation, and established institutions to manage international political and 
economic relations. Also, the winning countries were concerned with the repair and 
rebuilding of the economies and infrastructure of several of those states which had 
been battered during the war. Thus, in 1944, the United Nations Monetary and Eco-
nomic Conference, or the Bretton Woods Agreement established the World Bank, and 
the IMF as international financial institutions to manage the new international econom-
ic and monetary systems.  The World Bank Group and the IMF were instituted on the 
basis of shareholder membership (International Monetary Fund, 2017), in which coun-
tries gain voting power in proportion to the quantum of shares acquired (Bretton 
Woods Project, 2016). Shares and voting power were allocated based on the computa-
tion of the economic strength of member countries. As a result, western industrialised 
countries held the greater proportion of shares; at inception, the United States of 
America alone held 35 per cent of stock in the World Bank (Griffith-Jones, 2002). How-
ever, as at 2015, reforms within the World Bank Group and the IMF have assigned 
greater shares and voting powers to Developing and Transition countries, which now 
hold 47.24 per cent of stock in the World Bank (World Bank Group, 2015).  
Over the last seventy years, the World Bank and IMF have evolved into the two larg-
est international creditor institutions globally, and have amassed a repository of intel-
lectual resources, alongside an armoury of economic resources. Thus, they have shaped 
the emergence of what may be termed the practice of development finance, as they 
spearhead the formulation and execution of international development policy, and 
dominate the development discourse.  
2.1.2. The World Bank Group  
The Bank expanded after 1944, and now comprises five institutions, of which the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Devel-
opment Association (IDA), form the World Bank (World Bank, 2017). The IBRD provides 
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loans and development assistance to middle-income countries and creditworthy lower-
income countries, as well as loans to borrowers guaranteed by member countries. The 
IDA provides low-interest loans and other services to the poorest countries. Private 
sector engagements are led by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) which fi-
nances private sector ventures in developing countries, in partnership with private in-
vestors. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides guarantees 
against non-commercial risk to foreign investors. The International Centre for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is a facility for dispute resolution for interna-
tional investment (World Bank, 2001). The table below presents the lending and opera-
tions of the World Bank Group. 
Table 1: The World Bank Group Lending and Operations 
The World Bank Group 
Engagements with Governments of Member Countries and Private Sector 
Sources of Finance 
• IBRD: Income from Loan Repayments, Investments (World Bank, 2014) 
• IDA: Contributions from Donor Members Countries, the IBRD and the IFC  (World Bank, n.d.) 
1. Financial 
Instruments (World 
Bank, 2015)  
IBRD Loans   
Front-end fee:  1.00% of the loan amount, payable upon loan effectiveness. 
Lending rate:  Product and Currency-Specific 
Commitment 
fee:  
0.85% in the first four years, on undisbursed 0.75% thereafter. 
balance: for other loans: 0.75%. for all loans: a partial waiver may 
apply. 
Interest waiver:  Partial waivers can be applied on disbursed and outstanding loan 
balances for those borrowers which service obligations as required. 
Maturity:  Up to 25 years, including a grace period. 
 IDA Credits  
 Service charge:  0.75% 
 Commitment 
fee:  
0.0–0.5% on undisbursed balance 
 Maturity:  40 years  
35 years for countries that receive a combination of IDA credits and 
IBRD loans, with a 10-year grace period. 
Facility Modalities 
2. Investment Project 
Financing  
IBRD Loan, IDA 
Credit/Grant and 
Credit Guarantee to 
Governments 
 
Specific 
Investment 
Financing 
Support for the technical, financial, economic, environmental, and 
institutional viability of a specific investment. Also, support for policy 
reform in the area of investments.  
Sector 
Investment and 
Maintenance 
Loan 
Support for public expenditure programs in particular sectors, and 
institutional capacity development for the management of 
investment program.  
Adaptable 
Program Loan 
Support (phased) for long-term development programs. Loan 
disbursement is accompanied by review of outcomes of previous 
disbursements.  
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Learning and 
Innovation Loan 
Support for small pilot-type investment and capacity-building 
projects. Maximum amount is US$5 million, into which is integrated 
effective monitoring and evaluation systems over a period of 2-3 
years.  
Structural 
Adjustment Loan 
Support for macroeconomic reforms that promote growth, efficient 
use of resources, and sustainable balance of payments over the 
medium and long term.  
Special 
Structural 
Adjustment Loan 
Support for structural and social reforms undertaken by 
creditworthy borrowers faced with crisis and exceptional external 
financing needs. Contingent upon an existing IMF program, and 
usually part of an international support package of multilateral 
donors, bilateral donors, and private lenders and investors.  
• 5-year maturity period with a 3-year grace period 
• No waivers of interest or commitment charges 
3. Development Policy 
Financing   
IBRD loan, IDA 
Credit/Grant and 
Guarantee Budget 
Support Program for 
Policy or Institutional 
Action  
 
Technical 
Assistance Loan 
Support to build institutional capacity in the borrower country. 
Technical Assistance Loans are contingent on specific action 
programs to build organizational strength, and on terms of reference 
for the appointment of consultants and local counterparts. 
Sector 
Adjustment Loan 
Support for policy changes and institutional reforms in a specific 
sector concerned with the incentive and regulatory frameworks for 
private sector development, institutional capability, and sector 
expenditure programs 
Programmatic 
Structural 
Adjustment Loan 
Support for multiyear framework of phased medium-term 
government program of policy reforms and institution building.  
• 3 to 5year period, with annual disbursements tied to specific 
targets and indicators.  
• Guided by analytic and advisory work, loans are blended with 
capacity building and public sector reform programs in the areas 
of expenditure management, governance resource allocation, and 
public service delivery.  
Rehabilitation 
Loan 
Support for government policy and macroeconomic reform 
programs aimed at creating an environment conducive to private 
sector investment. Commonly used in transition economies and 
post-conflict situations, where the structural reform agenda has not 
been determined. 
Debt Reduction 
Loan 
Assistance to eligible highly indebted countries for the reduction of 
reduce commercial debt and debt service in the context of a 
medium-term financing plan in support of sustainable growth.  
Often utilised alongside adjustment loans. 
4. Programs for 
Results 
Disbursement of Funds linked to delivery of results in country-designed and implement 
programs 
5. Trust Funds and 
Grants 
• Immediate assistance in crises 
• Situations in which lending ability is limited 
• Pilot innovations 
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6. Private Sector 
Options  
 
 
The International Finance Corporation (International Finance Corporation, n.d.) 
Loans to companies, intermediary banks and financial institutions for 7 to 12 years 
Equity: 5% to 20% equity stake in companies or private equity funds 
Trade and Supply Chain Finance: risk mitigation on transaction basis for banks 
Syndications: capital mobilization for private sector projects 
Treasury Client Solutions: provides companies with long term currency solutions and 
facilitation to capital market 
Venture Capital: early and late stage venture financing through direct investments and 
funds 
Advisory: technical and financing knowledge, expertise and tools 
 
Asset management:  connecting investors with investment opportunities globally (IFC 
Asset Management Company, n.d.) 
7. Technical Assistance  
• Technical Assistance: professional technical advice to support reforms 
• Reimbursable Advisory Services  
• Economic and Sector Work: data collection and evaluation in collaboration with governments 
• Business Advice  
• Donor Aid Coordination for regular interaction between multiple donor groups  
(World Bank, 2015) 
2.1.3. The International Monetary Fund 
The IMF was established as a permanent institution to promote international monetary 
cooperation, the growth and expansion of balanced international trade, promote ex-
change stability, to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments 
between members and the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions, and to give 
confidence to members through the provision of general resources to correct malad-
justments in their balance of payments (International Monetary Fund, 1944). These 
objectives are to “shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the 
international balances of payments of members” (ibid). The table below presents the 
institutional overview of the IMF.  
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Table 2: IMF Lending and Operations 
The International Monetary Fund 
Engagements with Governments of Member Countries only 
(Article V, Section 1, Articles of Agreement, International Monetary Fund, 1944) 
Sources of Finance:  
• Shareholder subscriptions, Loan Repayments, and Income from Investments  
• Borrowing from member countries through General Arrangements to Borrow and New Arrangements to 
Borrow (International Monetary Fund, 2016) 
Financial Instruments: Non-Concessional and Concessional Loans to member states experiencing Balance of 
Payments Problems (International Monetary Fund, 2016) 
1. Non-Concessional Loans at market-related interest rates, and large loans subject to surcharges 
Facility Modalities 
Standby Arrangements • 12-24month Disbursement Period to address Short-term Balance of 
Payments Problems 
• Conditionality-Based 
• Repayment over 3 ¼ to 5years  
Flexible Credit Line 
(countries with strong 
fundamentals, policy and 
implementation) 
• 1- 2year Disbursement Period 
• Not based on Conditionality 
• Repayment over 3 ¼ to 5years 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line 
(countries with strong 
fundamentals, policy and 
implementation) 
• 6 months to 2-year disbursement duration. Loan to address Moderate 
Vulnerabilities  
• Qualification and Conditionality-Based 
• Repayment over 3 ¼ to 5years 
Extended Fund Facility • 3-4year disbursement duration. Loan to address Medium to Long Term 
Balance of Payments Problems 
• Conditionality-Based. Contingent on Implementation of Reforms 
• Repayment over 4 ½ to 10 years 
Rapid Financing Instrument • Emergency Assistance to address Urgent Balance of Payments Problems 
• Conditionality Based 
2. Concessional Lending to Low Income Countries to support efforts towards achieving macroeconomic 
standing which enables poverty reduction and growth 
Facility Modalities 
Extended Credit Facility • Medium Term Support to tackle Protracted Balance of Payments 
Problems 
• 0% interest rate 
• 5 ½ year grace period 
• 10year maturity period 
Standby Credit Facility • Short-Term of Potential Balance of Payments Problems 
• 0% interest rate 
• 4year grace period 
• 8year maturity period 
Rapid Credit Facility • Intervention to address Urgent Balance of Payments Problems 
• Conditionality Based 
• 5 ½ year grace period 
• 10year maturity period 
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2.1.4. The African Development Bank Group 
In the 1960s, after the first wave of independence in Africa, the dominant political sen-
timent was that of self-actualization and self-determination. At international and na-
tional levels, economic management was concerned with ownership, and government 
control over economic systems (See 1.2.2). These sentiments and policies are echoed 
through instruments such as the 1962 United Nations Resolution on the Permanent 
Sovereignty over National Resources.  During this period, African political leaders spoke 
to the necessity of African-led development. In furtherance of this objective, the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) was founded in 1964 to promote economic development and 
social progress of the African continent, through the provision of financial resources, 
policy advice and technical assistance to regional member countries. The Group com-
prises the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund which disburses 
concessional loans to countries, and the Nigeria Trust Fund, which disburses conces-
sional financing to projects undertaken by the poorest countries. The AfDB Group is 
instituted on a membership-shareholding basis by 54 African countries and 27 non-
African countries. The institutional overview is outlined below in the table below. 
Table 3: Institutional Overview and Lending Operations of the African Development Bank Group 
The African Development Bank Group 
Finance and Technical Support to Governments, Private Sector and Development Institutions  
Funding Sources 
 
• Shareholder Subscriptions 
• Loan Repayments 
• Borrowing on International Markets  
• Income from Investments 
(African Development Bank Group, 2011)  
• Capital Increases by the African Development Fund and the Nigerian Trust Fund 
(African Development Bank Group, n.d.) 
Financing Instruments (African Development Bank Group, n.d.) 
Loans • Senior Debt: • Up to 20 years (5 years’ grace period). 
• Foreign or local currencies, risk priced 
• Guarantees • Partial risk, partial credit (long tenors) 
• For specific credits or commercial bank SME programs, risk 
priced. 
• Subordinated Debt 
 
• Subordinated loans or bonds. 
• Local currency possible, maximum 15 years (10+5), risk priced 
Equity • Direct investments in banks, development financial institutions (DFIs), micro-finance 
institutions, etc. 
• Up to 25 per cent with or without Board seat, planned exit, commercial returns 
Technical Assistance • Grants for studies 
• Up to US $1 million for institutional capacity building programs 
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2.2. Economic Policy Reforms 
From the late 1970s, Nigeria and Rwanda amassed huge debt burdens which occurred 
within the framework of global economic trends; in 1973, the Organisation of Petrole-
um Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased the price of crude oil on the international 
market (Fattouh, 2007). Increases in the price of oil caused pressures in industrialised 
countries, and a period of economic boom for oil-rich developing countries, such as 
Nigeria. Excess funds and savings obtained from the sale of oil were domiciled in banks 
in western countries, which in turn offered credit to developing countries on variable or 
floating interest rates. Interest rates began to rise in 1979, which increased the 
amounts borrower countries required to service loans (Cline, 1983). Furthermore, in 
response to the oil shocks, and economic recessions which followed, industrialised 
countries had imposed monetary policies, which led to crashes in the price of primary 
goods sold by non-oil developing countries. To manage the losses in revenue brought 
about by the combination of higher payments required for debt servicing and lower 
prices of primary goods on the international market, developing countries resorted to 
further borrowings from IFIs and industrialised countries. A debt crisis erupted in 1982 
when Mexico, followed by other countries stopped servicing their debt obligations. To 
manage the crisis, the IMF led the institutional response directed at solving the crisis 
(Forum on Debt and Development, 1992).   
An important part of crisis management was the identification of the factors, such as 
policy and institutional weaknesses which allowed the deep impact of external shocks 
on borrower countries, and limited their ability to service debt obligations. The World 
Bank in 1989 reported that “we have come to appreciate that fundamental structural 
change is needed to transform African economies and make them competitive in an 
increasingly competitive world. The adjustment efforts must be continued, and the 
reforms broadened and deepened. The journey will be long and difficult, and special 
measures are needed to alleviate poverty and protect the vulnerable” (World Bank, 
1989, p. xi). The report attributed economic problems in Africa to poor governance, 
specifically the failure of public institutions. The Bank further stated that private sector 
and market mechanism must be supported by efficient public service systems, reliable 
judicial systems, and accountable administrations (World Bank, 1989).  
To rectify economic problems, the IMF recommended reforms commonly known as 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). According to the World Bank, these pro-
grams “consist of policy reforms aimed both at stabilizing the macro economy to bring 
aggregate demand more in line with available resources and at eliminating the gaps 
between prices and social marginal costs at the sectoral level” (World Bank, 1992, p. 8). 
In substance, SAPs were policy and institutional reforms intended to correct the struc-
tural weaknesses of the economies of borrower countries. Williamson (1990) identifies 
ten ‘standard’ policy prescriptions which the Washington Consensus, i.e., the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund, considered to be necessary for economic re-
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form; fiscal discipline, streamlined public expenditure, increased tax revenue, market-
determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, import liberalization, foreign 
direct investment and privatization, deregulation and property rights. These prescrip-
tions were directed towards the reduction of state participation in the economy, and 
the creation of an economic environment in which the private sector would lead eco-
nomic growth. The role of the state was confined to regulation and supervision.     
Following the debt crisis of the early 1980s, Nigeria and Rwanda both implemented 
SAPs led by the IMF and World Bank. The SAPs, their effects on economic performance, 
and impact on debt profiles of both countries are outlined in the next section.  
2.2.1. Structural Adjustment Programs in Nigeria  
Nigeria, an oil producing and exporting country, benefited from the increase of the 
price of petroleum products by the OPEC in the 1970s. The regulatory structure govern-
ing the oil sector placed the Central Government and the National Oil Corporation, a 
government agency, as the legitimate authorities able to engage in international oil 
trade at all segments of the value chain. It followed that during the ‘oil boom’ of the 
1970s, government receipts from sale of petroleum products grew exponentially.  This 
period of heightened prosperity was immediately followed by a sharp economic down-
turn in the 1980s. Nigeria’s National Centre for Economic Management and Administra-
tion explains the economic downturn of the 1980s thus: 
“the economic policy orientation during the 1970s left the country ill prepared 
for the eventual collapse of oil prices in the first half of the 1980s. Public invest-
ment was concentrated in costly, and often inappropriate, infrastructure pro-
jects with questionable rates of return and sizable recurrent cost implications, 
while the agricultural sector was largely neglected. Nigeria’s industrial policy was 
inward-looking, with a heavy emphasis on protection and government controls, 
which bred an uncompetitive manufacturing sector” (National Centre for Eco-
nomic Management & Administration, 2004, p. 3). 
Politically, the 1970s were characterised by the end of the three-year civil war in 1970, a 
military coup which ousted General Gowon and ushered in Brigadier General Murtala 
Muhammed as Head of State in 1975. In 1976, General Muhammed was killed in an 
attempted coup by Lieutenant Colonel Dimka, General Obasanjo became the Head of 
State, and then transferred power to a civilian administration led by President Shehu 
Shagari in 1979. The first coup of the 1980s was led by Major General Buhari who top-
pled President Shagari and seized power through a coup in 1983. His administration was 
truncated by another coup led by Major General Babangida in 1985. It was during the 
period of political turbulence, particularly between 1978 and 1982 that the first wave of 
significant external debt obligations was obtained, mostly from the International Capital 
Market.  
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The Central Bank of Nigeria reports that “between 1971 and 1981, Nigeria wit-
nessed the era of big borrowing. Loans were acquired by various tiers of government, as 
Nigeria embarked on major development and reconstruction projects in the aftermath 
of the civil war. The borrowing continued as the Federal Government embarked on 
guaranteeing many unviable loans taken by Private Banks, State Governments and Para-
statals” (Okoro, 2013, p. 8). In a bid to manage the country’s debt profile, the Federal 
(Military) Government, through Decree 30 of 1978 lifted the ceiling for its external bor-
rowing from N1.0 billion, and capped it at N5.0billion (Ijeoma, 2013). However, this 
ceiling was often ignored, and did not limit the ability of State Governments to seek and 
obtain external loans guaranteed by the Federal Government. Two ‘jumbo loans’ total-
ling US$1.75 billion dollars were incurred in 1978. By 1983, up to 90 or so new loans 
had been procured, 22 by the Obasanjo military regime, 59 by the Shagari civilian ad-
ministration and 8 by Buhari military regime (Aluko, 2001). The table below shows the 
number of loans obtained by successive Nigerian Governments between 1975 and 
1982. 
Table 4: Nigerian Government Borrowing 1975-1985 
Period Type of Administration Number of Loans 
1975-1979 Military 22  
1979-1983 Civilian 59 
1983-1985 Military 8 
 
The fall in global oil prices in the early 1980s severely reduced government revenue, 
and by extension government spending. Also, the country’s debt profile had risen signif-
icantly. The Debt Management Office Nigeria summarises the escalation of Nigeria’s 
debt profile by 1985:  
“The debt stock therefore increased with leaps and jumps, even when no new 
loans were contracted. Nigeria’s external debt stock till 1977 was less than 
US$0.8 billion. Beginning from 1978, the external debt stock began to grow as-
tronomically, rising from US$0.763 billion in 1977 to US$5.09 billion in 1978 and 
U$8.855 billion in 1980, an increase of over 73.96 per cent between 1978 and 
1980. By 1985 the debt profile had deteriorated seriously due to persistent ina-
bility of the country to meet its external debt service obligations. This resulted in 
mounting arrears and unmanageable growth of the debt stock relative to availa-
ble resources. The external debt stock, which was about US$8.855 billion in 
1980, grew to nearly US$19 billion by 1985. Correspondingly, the debt stock as a 
percentage of total export earnings and GDP rose to uncomfortable levels of 
154% and 24 %, respectively. In that year, the debt service payment due was a 
little above US$4 billion, which was about 33% of the total export earnings. 
However, the actual debt service payment for the year was about US$1.5 bil-
lion.” (Debt Management Office, n.d.).  
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The figure below presents the increase in Nigeria’s external debt stock between 1977 
and 1985: 
 
 
Figure 1: Nigeria's External Debt Stock 1977-1985 
In 1984, Nigeria’s projected income stood at US$10billion, 95 per cent of which was to 
be realised from the sale of oil. In the same year, it was estimated that up to 
US$5.5billion was to be spent on the servicing of external debts (May, 1984). The Gov-
ernment had hoped to reschedule debts owed to IFIs, particularly US$2billion owed to 
the IMF, and a US$300million Structural Adjustment Loan taken from the World Bank 
(ibid). Also, in 1983, the Shagari administration had applied to the IMF for a bridging 
loan of US$2.5billion (Agbese, 2016). The conditions attached to the loan by the IMF 
were negotiated by the Shagari administration, the Buhari regime (1983-1985) and the 
Babangida regime from 1985. However, by 1986, following worsening economic condi-
tions, and the refusal of creditors to open new credit lines for imports, the Babangida 
regime convened a public debate to discuss the terms of the IMF facility. This IMF loan 
was vehemently rejected by labour unions, as well as student and professional groups. 
Nonetheless, in view of economic contractions, the Government was compelled to 
adopt a SAP, which was a condition for a World Bank/IMF loan (Omame, 2016). Gov-
ernment revenue had dropped from 24 per cent to 12 per cent of GDP between 1980 
and 1985. Also, this period witnessed increased political and social discontent, caused 
by economic hardship. The Government was faced with three options: (i) to maintain 
the status quo, i.e., austerity without structural reforms, (ii) accept the IMF loan with its 
conditions, or (iii) reject the IMF loan and prosecute a SAP designed and implemented 
by Nigerians (National Centre for Economic Management & Administration, 2004). In 
the end, the Babangida administration adopted an IMF SAP in July 1986 (Anyanwu, 
1992). This SAP, originally intended to last for two years, was supported by a World 
Bank US$450million trade policy and export diversification loan (National Centre for 
Economic Management & Administration, 2004).  
It has been argued that the Babangida regime adopted the SAP from a desire to re-
dress the external debt crisis of the country (Nwagbara, 2011). According to the World 
Bank, the objective of the SAP programme of 1986 was “to help promote economic 
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efficiency and private sector development as a basis for improving prospects for long-
term growth” (World Bank, 1994, p. vii). The SAP implemented by Nigeria combined 
exchange rate and trade policy reform which aimed at kick-starting non-oil sectors of 
the economy, policies for the stabilization of balance of payments and prices, efforts to 
downsize the public sector and improvements of the management of publicly owned 
assets. Additionally, the country “eliminated import licenses and agricultural marketing 
boards, lifted price controls, launched a program of privatization, and took steps toward 
the deregulation of the banking system” (ibid). 
From the perspective of Nigerian observers, the SAP years (1986-1992), delivered 
negative outcomes for the economy and citizenry: 
•  “Inflation has assumed a doomsday scenario since the inception of the SAP in July 
1986 (from 5.4% in 1986 to 40.9% in 1989), and is threatening to destroy the very 
fabric of Nigerian society. It is the principle price of Babangida's SAP measures, 
which include external debt management strategies, SFEM/FEM/IFEM, removal of 
subsidies on petroleum products and fertiIiser, privatisation and commercialisation, 
trade liberalisation, and interest rate deregulation” (Anyanwu, 1992, p. 5).  
• “In fact, SAP came at a time when Nigeria was beset by a charged political atmos-
phere fueled by the biting economic hardship that hit most families. Cognizant of 
the situation, the Government in power still went ahead to implement the IMF con-
ditionality that led to many unpleasant consequences such as workers losing their 
jobs through retrenchment, many people not being able to afford most of the ne-
cessities of life due to wage cuts and withdrawal of subsidies, skyrocketing inflation-
ary situation occasioned by currency devaluation, high rates of unemployment, etc.” 
(Nwagbara, 2011, p. 31). 
• “The civil service remains the hope of the vast majority of Nigerians and it has direct 
impact on the success or failure of any administration. But in just eight years, the 
Structural Adjustment Programme instituted by the Babangida administration de-
stroyed the values, dignity of civil service which have painstakingly been built since 
1934″- Mr. Liyel Imoke, former Governor of Cross River State, Nigeria (Daily Post, 
2013).  
The World Bank explained these outcomes on the basis that the SAP was not followed 
as prescribed: “from 1987 to 1990, Government's stop and-go fiscal policies under-
mined the SAP's stabilization objectives. Subsequently, runaway extra budgetary ex-
penditures caused skyrocketing inflation. Yet, despite these reversals, overall growth 
performance under the SAP was good” (World Bank, 1994, p. 3). In the area of public 
debt management, the SAP “included a plan for selective external borrowing-with some 
increase in indebtedness at a lower rate than that projected for export growth. Nigeria's 
creditworthiness was to be restored over time. But actuality did not exactly follow this 
plan” (World Bank, 1994, p. 3). Anyanwu (1992) gives the four debt management strat-
egies under SAP as refinancing, rescheduling, the provision of new loan facilities and 
debt-equity swaps: 
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1. Refinancing, or the transformation of short-term debt obligations into long-term 
obligations, which are subsequently super-imposed on existing long-term debt. 
2. Rescheduling, in which the terms of relevant maturities change: the result is a dif-
ferent duration for debt service, while outstanding liabilities remain.  
3. New loan facility, or the procurement of new external loans for trade support, ex-
port development or as a standby facility 
4. Debt-equity swap, by which institutions, corporate bodies and persons to whom 
Nigeria was indebted (externally) exchange the debt for equity or shares in Nigerian 
enterprises.  
The SAPs did not ameliorate Nigeria’s debt burden. The Central Bank of Nigeria stated 
that in 1986, 1989 and 1991, the Government rescheduled payments of US$7.0 billion, 
US$6.0 billion and US$3.0 billion debts respectively to the Paris Club of Creditors (Oko-
ro, 2013). Also, the Government continued to acquire debt: in 1987, Decree No 30 of 
1978 was repealed in order to allow the Government to raise another jumbo loan 
(Ijeoma, 2013). Politically, the Nigerian situation remained unstable; General Abacha 
overthrew the regime of General Babangida in 1993. While the Abacha regime (1993-
1998) did not acquire new debt, the country ceased repayments due to the Paris Club. 
As a result, “arrears accumulated, while new disbursements came from the multilateral 
creditors” (Okoro, 2013, p. 9). In 1998, following the death of General Abacha, the re-
gime of General Abubakar (1998-1999) conducted elections, and handed over to the 
civilian administration of President Obasanjo. This administration (1999-2007) priori-
tised the repair of Nigeria’s image globally, as well as the improvement of the country’s 
economic situation, of which the debt burden was a critical and crippling element. 
By the early 2000s, Nigeria’s debt obligations had skyrocketed to the extent that the 
Government embarked on an aggressive debt relief campaign. In 2005, the then Nigeri-
an Minister of Finance, Dr. Okonjo-Iweala, who led the campaign for debt relief, pre-
sented the country’s debt profile; 
“Nigeria 's external debt stands presently at US$34 billion. About $28 billion or 
85% of the debt is owed to the Paris Club of 15 creditor nations. Only 8% of the 
debt is owed to multilateral institutions such as the African Development Bank 
and the World Bank whilst the balance of 7% is owed to the London Club of 
commercial creditors and holders of Promissory Notes. Nigeria does not owe the 
IMF any money. The first fact therefore is that Nigeria's debt problem is really "a 
Paris Club debt problem” (Okonjo-Iweala, 2005, p. 5).  
The figure below shows the composition of debt owed by Nigeria to external creditors 
in 2005: 
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Figure 2: Nigeria's External Debt and Percentages Owed to Creditors in 2005 
Okonjo- Iweala went on to argue that “If Nigeria were to fully service its external debt 
every year, annual debt service would amount to approximately US$3 billion - $2.3 
billion to the Paris club, and $0.7 billion to the multilateral and commercial creditors. 
The ownership structure of the debt is such that the Federal Government pays 75% of 
the debt service whilst 25% approximately is serviced by the states. Therefore, fully 
servicing the $3 billion every year would mean that the Federal Government would 
have very little left for the capital budget over the next 5 to 7 years as the Federal Gov-
ernment ’s portion of such debt service would virtually eat up all of the capital budget, 
especially when it is considered that we also have domestic debt service amounting to 
about $1.4 billion a year”.  (Okonjo-Iweala, 2005, p. 1).  
The increase in Nigeria’s debt obligations between 1985 and 2005 is presented in 
the table below: 
Table 5: Increase in Nigeria's Debt Obligations 1985-2005 
Element 1985 2005 Percentage Increase 
External Debt Obligations US$19billion US$34billion 79% 
Annual External Debt Service US$1.5billion US$3billion 100% 
 
In summary, SAPs did not prevent the worsening of Nigeria’s debt, as during the SAP era 
(1986 -1992), the Government rescheduled its payments to the Paris Club of Creditors, 
resulting in increased liabilities, even as it acquired more debt. While it was the reck-
lessness of successive governments which created the debt burden, SAPs did little to 
impose fiscal discipline, reduce government corruption, or substantially improve gov-
ernment policy in the area of debt management.   
85%
8% 7%
Nigeria's External Debt and Creditors
Paris Club
Multilateral Institutions
London Club and Holders of Promissory Notes
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2.2.2. Structural Adjustment Programs in Rwanda  
In the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda’s main sources of revenue were exported cash crops, 
particularly coffee, tea and tin. The Central Government was led by President 
Habyarimana, who had come to power through a coup in 1973. While the length of this 
administration (1973-1994) provided stability in the political arena, it did little to douse 
the economic and social tensions which existed from the colonial era.  
During the ‘Scramble for Africa’ (1884), Rwanda was partitioned into German East 
Africa. After the First World War (1914-1919), the League of Nations granted Belgium 
an administrative mandate over the territory, which evolved into a trustee-ship granted 
by the United Nations in 1946, after the Second World War (Baker, 1970).  During the 
colonial era, the Tutsi ethnic group favoured by the Belgian Government gained political 
and economic influence over the Hutu ethnic group. It has been argued that the em-
phasis of race and ethnicity by the Belgian Colonial Government, particularly as these 
factors affected political and economic opportunities, polarised perceptions and rela-
tions between Tutsi and Hutus (Hintjens, 1999; Kumar & Tardif-Douglin, 1996). Between 
1959 and 1961, a Hutu-led revolution reconfigured the political, economic and social 
systems of Rwanda. As a result, United Nations states that “by 1962, when Rwanda 
gained independence, 120,000 people, primarily Tutsis, had taken refuge in neighbour-
ing states to escape the violence which had accompanied the gradual coming into pow-
er of the Hutu community” (United Nations, n.d.). The exile of the Tutsis did not neces-
sarily reduce the tensions which sparked the conflict: “the Hutu, enforcing a one-party 
regime in which the Tutsi had no voice, lived from then on with the spectre of counter-
revolution. The hostilities between the two groups were exacerbated by the Cold War, 
as the Communist countries helped arm the counter-attacks of the Tutsi refugees, while 
the Western countries provided support to the Hutu regime” (Gasana, 2002, p. 26).  
Rwanda’s debt profile expanded during the late 1980s and early 1990s with loans 
obtained by the Habyarimana Government from the World Bank, the IMF and Bilateral 
Creditors. While Rwanda had not suffered during the first oil crisis in the mid-1970s, the 
second crisis of 1979 caused a rise in interest rates, and the country struggled to both 
pay off old loans and get new ones approved (Chirwa, 2015). As its debt profile rose, the 
economic situation of Rwanda was further compounded by a severe shock in the late 
1980s, i.e., the drop in global prices for Rwanda’s main export crops, i.e., coffee, tin and 
tea which resulted in reduced revenues for the country. Chossudovsky (1995) explains 
the situation: “in 1987, the system of quotas established under the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA) started to fall apart. World prices plummeted, the Fonds d’egalisation 
(the State coffee stabilisation fund) which purchased coffee from Rwandan farmers at a 
fixed price started to accumulate a sizeable debt”. After the 1989 meeting of the Inter-
national Coffee Association, the global price of coffee fell by more than 50 per cent 
(ibid).  
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In a bid to mitigate the shortfall in its revenue, the Government implemented an 
IMF SAP in November 1990 (Toussaint, 2004). This SAP incorporated wide-ranging 
policy reforms including a reduction in the role of the state in the economy through 
privatisation and the removal of state-guaranteed prices for coffee producers, and the 
removal of coffee subsidies. Also implemented were policies on import liberalisation 
and a freeze on public sector wages. A social safety net, through a Social Action Plan 
was integrated into the SAP in a bid to mitigate the adverse effects of economic restruc-
turing on the poor. However, this Plan did not prevent the resultant economic and so-
cial problems which emanated directly from the SAP (Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda , 1996). According to Chossudovsky (1995), these economic and 
social problems included the following: 
• A 50 per cent devaluation of the Rwandan Franc, which caused a spike in the prices 
of consumer goods, and a reduction in real earnings. This devaluation occurred a 
month after the entry of the SAP, in November 1990. 
• External debt, which had doubled between 1985 and 1989, increased by 34 per cent 
between 1989 and 1992. 
• Weakening of the state and the collapse of public services such as health and educa-
tion. The introduction of fees for primary school pupils led to a reduction in enrol-
ment rates. 
• IMF control of public finances: the Government was unable to transfer finance to 
the Fonds d’egalisation (State Coffee Stabilisation Fund). 
• A second devaluation, in the middle of the civil war, caused further increases in the 
price of fuel and consumer goods. 
• Coffee production reduced by another 25 per cent, alongside a second currency 
devaluation ordered by the IMF in 1992.  
 
Crucially, economic pressures brought about by the terms of the SAP exacerbated un-
derlying social tensions within, and between ethnic groups. In 1990, Tutsi refugees 
grouped under the umbrella called the Rwanda Political Front (RPF) had begun to 
launch military attacks into Rwanda, which escalated into a three-year civil war. Funds 
obtained from World Bank and IMF loans were diverted towards the procurement of 
weapons by the Hutu-dominated Government. Chossudovsky & Galand (2004) state 
that despite the SAP, the Government obtained IMF approval to grow the size of the 
army: “following the “green light” given by the IMF in November 1990, the army sud-
denly swelled from 5,000 to 40,000 men, thus supposing external financing despite 
budgetary austerity. Juvenile delinquents, resulting from an impoverished society were 
enrolled by the thousands into civilian militia, responsible for the genocidal killings and 
massacres”.  
In the midst of the economic crisis, a civil war, and peace negotiations between the 
RPF and the Government of Rwanda, IFIs insisted on political reforms, specifically a 
multi-party democratic system of governance (Andersen, 2000). In spite of these re-
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forms, Hintjens (1999) suggests during the period of economic crisis and reforms, a 
section of the Hutu elite began to prepare plans for a genocide of Tutsis. In 1990, Kagu-
ra Magazine published The ‘Ten Commandments of the Hutu’, which stated “The Batut-
si are bloodthirsty and power-hungry and want to impose their hegemony on the peo-
ple of Rwanda using armed force” (Rwandafile, n.d.)”. The Commandments allude to 
strategies employed by the Tutsi to dominate the country, and outline measures 
through which Hutus could contain, and eventually thwart Tutsi domination (ibid). In 
1993, the Arusha Peace Accords, brokered by the OAU, France and the United States of 
America, were signed between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF. These Accords 
established a transitional Government which included representatives of the RPF and 
five political parties, even as it spoke to changes in the political, economic and military 
structures of Rwanda.  On 6 April 1994, the Rwandan genocide, in which more than 
800,000 people died, was triggered when the plane carrying President Habyarimana of 
Rwanda was shot down near Kigali airport. Following the plane crash and death of Pres-
ident Habyarimana, the BBC reports that “within hours a campaign of violence spread 
from the capital throughout the country, and did not subside until three months later” 
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011).  
While it was underlying ethnic and social problems which fostered violence, and ul-
timately the genocide, it can be argued that insensitivity to and minimal consideration 
of these problems by the IMF and the World Bank in the prescription and implementa-
tion of the SAPs, contributed to the economic conditions which enabled the escalation 
of conflict. Specifically, the loans Rwanda obtained prior to the SAPs have been de-
scribed as irresponsibly conceived and disbursed. Chossudovsky & Galand (2004) state 
that “the debts of the former Government (1990-1994) were mainly used to finance the 
armed forces and civilian militia”. This position is corroborated by Toussaint (2004) who 
argues that; 
“At the beginning of the 1980s, when the Third World debt crisis broke out, 
Rwanda (like its neighbour Burundi) had an extremely low level of indebtedness. 
Elsewhere, the World Bank and the IMF jettisoned their policy of active lending, 
preaching austerity instead. In Rwanda, however, they adopted a different ap-
proach, and began to lend large sums. Rwanda’s foreign debt increased twenty 
fold between 1976 and 1994. In 1976, it stood at 49 million dollars; by 1994, it 
was more than a billion dollars. Most of this growth took place after 1982. The 
country’s main lenders were the World Bank, the IMF and related institutions”. 
The table below shows the increase in Rwanda’s debt obligations between 1976 
and 1994. 
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Table 6 Rise in Rwanda's external debt obligations between 1976 and 1994 
1976 1994 Percentage Increase 
US$49,000,000 US$1,000,000,000 1941% 
 
In July 1994, the RPF in coalition with four political parties formed a Government of 
National Unity. The new Government also assumed the responsibility of debt obliga-
tions of up to US$1billion. Toussaint (2004) notes that the World Bank and IMF refused 
to cancel debts incurred by the Habyarimana regime, but promised debt relief for the 
future.  Instead, the Government undertook SAP II (1998-2001), comprising macroeco-
nomic policy and structural reforms which were developed and implemented in “close 
consultation with” the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund, n.d.).   
In summary, the purpose and design of the SAPs were flawed in the sense that in in-
sisting on political reform, the IMF did not account for evident and relevant socio-
economic factors, such as the displacements to power structures of the elite and result-
ant reactions, as well as the open conflict between the Rwanda Patriotic Front and Gov-
ernment of Rwanda. Furthermore, the IMF was able to direct the flow of SAP funds; for 
example, it was able to prevent the transfer of state funds to the Coffee Stabilisation 
Fund, but it either did not observe or effectively prevent the diversion of funds towards 
the purchase of armaments.  
2.3. The Failures of Structural Adjustment Programs  
Nigeria and Rwanda undertook SAPs to address economic contractions, which were 
exacerbated by debt problems. These Programs were intended to rectify perceived 
faults in macroeconomic, regulatory, and administrative systems which were consid-
ered impediments to positive economic performance and effective economic manage-
ment. However, it was the case that the SAPs, in both countries, weakened economies, 
and resulted in deleterious effects on large sections of the population. Crucially, SAPs 
did not prevent, and may have aided the rapid increase of the debt profiles of Nigeria 
and Rwanda.  
SAPs have been criticised for many reasons, including the ‘standard-form’ approach: 
in Nigeria and Rwanda, these Programs eroded the policy-making and economic man-
agement capacities of governments, in favour of market-driven mechanisms. The Wash-
ington Consensus (the World Bank and the IMF), which developed SAPs sought to pre-
scribe a set of policies without due consideration for the subjective contexts of imple-
mentation. Stiglitz (2008) explains this approach: “whatever, its original content and 
intent, the term “Washington Consensus”, in the minds of most people around the 
world, has come to refer to development strategies focusing around privatization, liber-
alization, and macro-stability (meaning mostly price stability); a set of policies predicat-
ed upon a strong faith – stronger than warranted --in unfettered markets and aimed at 
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reducing, or even minimizing, the role of government” (Stiglitz, 2008, p. 41). In both 
Nigeria and Rwanda, market mechanisms were not developed to the extent that they 
could replace government or state-backed administrative systems. Additionally, in deal-
ing with borrower countries, the reluctance of IFIs to adequately consider the political 
and social consequences of economic changes has been evidenced as problematic.  
Furthermore, reforms led by the World Bank and IMF are often interpreted as impo-
sitions which infringe upon state sovereignty (Soludo & Ogbu, 2004). The World Bank 
and IMF often attached conditionalities to the provision of finance, such as reforms 
discussed in Sections 2.2.1 (Nigeria) and 2.2.2 (Rwanda). The IMF defines conditionali-
ties as “both the design of IMF-supported programs—that is, the macroeconomic and 
structural policies—and the specific tools used to monitor progress toward the goals 
outlined by the country in cooperation with the IMF” (International Monetary Fund, 
2016). Reforms and conditions reconfigure the structures of national economies and 
societies, and erode upon the power and authority of the state. Importantly, the extent 
to which IMF credit-worthiness improves social capital with other financial institutions is 
highlighted by the 2006 report of the European Network on Debt and Development 
which states: “the IMF’s ‘gatekeeper’ role makes the conditions the Fund attaches to its 
program hugely potent. If a poor country does not fulfil the conditions that the IMF 
attaches to its lending, then not only does it forfeit IMF development finance, it will also 
potentially forfeit all other sources of much-needed donor finance” (European Network 
on Debt and Development, 2006, p. 5). However, the IMF has justified conditionalities 
on the assertion that borrower countries are made to adjust their policies to tackle the 
problems which created the need for financial assistance in the first place (International 
Monetary Fund, 2016). Similarly, the World Bank has justified conditions on the premise 
that these are necessary for development effectiveness, and forestall the misuse of 
resources (World Bank, 2005). The governance structures of the World Bank and the 
IMF give greater voting and decision making powers to the largest shareholders, which 
are the Group of Seven (G7) of industrialised countries. It follows that reforms are often 
viewed with suspicion, and met with resistance in borrower countries. To illustrate, in 
Nigeria, the military dictatorship of General Babangida thought it necessary to put 
terms attached to an IMF loan facility to a public debate. While the World Bank and IMF 
are empowered by their respective articles of agreement to determine the terms upon 
which finance is provided to borrower countries, it can be argued that conditionalities 
reflect the inequalities of bargaining power between a borrower country and institu-
tional creditors. In 2005, the World Bank acknowledged that conditions have been “per-
ceived as overly excessive or intrusive”, and highlighted the need for reforms to ema-
nate from the domestic agenda of countries (World Bank, 2005, p. 1). Following reviews 
of policy effectiveness, and in response to growing criticisms, conditionality policies 
were amended towards country-led design of reform programmes. The debt-related 
policy changes of the World Bank and IMF are discussed extensively in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis.  
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By the mid-1990s, the economic situation of borrower countries provoked a global 
campaign for debt relief. The implication of rising debt profiles was that developing 
countries spent the greater share of their resources on servicing debt, rather than na-
tional development. Towards the end of the 1990s, the debt burden on developing 
countries came to be seen as largely the invention and responsibility of creditors, 
whether international institutions or industrialised countries. The campaign for debt 
relief was implemented by a coalition of academics, activists, borrower countries, and 
celebrities. This movement put forward the intellectual, moral, economic and policy 
arguments for the outright removal or significant reduction of debt burden of borrower 
countries.  These arguments are examined in the next section. 
2.4. The Debt Relief Movement  
From the mid-1990s, a concerted and loud campaign which sought debt relief for de-
veloping countries fused into a movement. Jubilee 2000 debt campaign, as the global 
movement was known, ultimately led to the cancellation of US$100billion worth of 
debts owed by poor countries (Advocacy International, 2000). This movement, which 
drew on Old Testament principles to argue for debt forgiveness to coincide with the 
new millennium (Denny & Elliot, 1999), organised a successful public information cam-
paign opposing the costs of debt to developing countries. The campaign integrated 
arguments and reasoning put forward in favour of debt forgiveness or debt relief by 
academics, policy makers, borrower countries, charitable organisations, and other in-
terest groups. These arguments for debt relief can be organised into three main sec-
tions, i.e., the notion of odious debt, the joint responsibility of borrowers and creditors 
in building debt profiles and liability of developing countries, and the idea that the im-
perative of development supersedes the repayment of debt obligations. 
2.4.1. Odious Debt 
By the late 1980s, the amounts required by borrower countries globally, for the purpose 
of debt servicing had assumed immense proportions. As borrower countries struggled 
to achieve economic growth, they repeatedly rescheduled payments to creditors. These 
reschedulings postponed the period of debt maturity, and increased the liabilities of 
borrower countries through increased interest rate payments. The outcome on national 
economies was that, in national budgets, debt servicing was often allocated a greater 
proportion of resources than development-related activities or social services provided 
by the state. During this period, the notion of odious, or repulsive debt emerged.   
Odious debt is premised on the principle of international law that debt can be repu-
diated if it is not obtained or utilised in the best interests of the state. Odious debt is 
rooted in the same legal principle which protects individuals when credit is obtained in 
their name, but without their consent. In the same way, international law holds that 
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sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the people as odious, and there is a 
persuasive argument that such debt should not be transferred to successor govern-
ments, especially if creditors are aware of the circumstances of debt acquisition (Kre-
mer & Seema, 2002). According to the United Nations Conference and Trade and De-
velopment, the concept of odious debt seeks to provide moral and legal support to 
sever in whole or in part, debt obligations incurred by a previous government (Howse, 
2007).  
From the mid-1980s, borrower countries began to seek debt relief, as their debt 
burdens had expanded to the extent that countries were compelled to choose between 
development-related spending, or satisfying obligations owed to creditors. In 1987, at a 
conference of the OAU, Thomas Sankara, then President of Burkina Faso stated “debt 
cannot be repaid, first because if we don’t repay, lenders will not die. That is for sure. 
But if we repay, we are going to die” (Sankara, 1987). Academics and development 
professionals also provided intellectual arguments in favour of debt forgiveness. Writing 
in 1990, Paul Krugman emphasized the necessity of debt relief for borrower countries 
on the premise that ‘debt relief is cheap’. Krugman estimated that the total value of 
debt owed by borrower countries amounted to less than one-third of 1 per cent of the 
national incomes of creditor countries (Krugman, 1990). In 1994, Kevin Watkins argued 
that debt reduction and cancellation was necessary to reverse developmental decline 
and kickstart recovery of the African continent. Watkins noted that a significant propor-
tion of aid finance was directed towards satisfying debt obligations (Watkins, 1994). He 
went further to propose reforms for creditor management of debt stock including; the 
recommendation that the Paris Club write-off between 70 per cent and 100 per cent of 
debt stock owed to governments, the increase of the amounts of debt eligible for re-
duction and rescheduling, the establishment of debt repayment ceilings compatible 
with social and economic recovery, and support for more debt-for-development swaps, 
especially on national programmes connected to welfare improvement. In the case of 
the IMF, Watkins recommended that the institution acknowledge its mismanagement 
of the debt situation of African countries, and commit its own resources towards paying 
off debt obligations through the sale of gold stocks or a new issue of special drawing 
rights (ibid). 
In Nigeria and Rwanda, debt burdens increased even after the contracting govern-
ment or administration had exited office. The extent to which debt burden constricted 
the economies and populations of borrower countries is displayed in the cases of Nige-
ria and Rwanda discussed in the sections below.  
2.4.2. Nigeria’s Debt Burden 
In the case of Nigeria, successive governments attempted to repudiate debt incurred by 
previous administrations and regimes. Under the Abacha regime, Nigeria requested 
debt relief from the Paris Club, and ceased its loan repayments when its request was 
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not granted. A decade later, the administration of President Obasanjo obtained debt 
relief from the Paris Club.  President Obasanjo explained the necessity of debt relief 
thus: “Fellow Nigerians, how did we get to the point where our debt burden became a 
challenge to peace, stability, growth and development? Without belabouring the point, 
we can identify political rascality, bad governance, abuse of office and power, criminal 
corruption, mismanagement and waste, misplaced priorities, fiscal indiscipline, weak 
control, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and a community that was openly 
tolerant of corruption and other underhand and extra-legal methods of primitive accu-
mulation” (Teniola, 2013).  
The larger share of Nigeria’s debt was incurred during the 1970s and 1980s under 
the Obasanjo regime, Shagari administration and Buhari regime. Nevertheless, debt 
obligations ballooned due to high interest rates, and poor economic performance, 
which led to debt reschedulings. In 2000, President Obasanjo stated “all that we had 
borrowed up to 1985 or 1986 was around US$5 billion and we have paid about $16 
billion yet we are still being told that we owe about US$28 billion. That US$28 billion 
came about because of the injustice in the foreign creditors' interest rates. If you ask 
me what is the worst thing in the world, I will say it is compound interest” (Shah, 2005). 
Rieffel (2005) supports the assertion that compound interest escalated Nigeria’s debt 
profile, by stating that the ballooning of Nigeria’s debt is attributable ‘exclusively and 
directly’ to the refusal of commercial creditors (Paris Club) to restructure its claims on 
Nigeria. Rieffel goes further to note that between 1985 and 2005, Nigeria serviced its 
debt obligations to international finance institution-creditors without economic restruc-
turing. Simultaneously, the country met its obligations to other bilateral creditors in 
return for debt relief, even as it successfully negotiated the exchange of bank debt for 
bonds at a discount of 60 per cent with non-Paris Club commercial creditors (Rieffel, 
2005).  
Nonetheless, the country’s debt obligations continued to increase. By December 
2004, Nigeria’s total debt obligations stood at of US$35.994 billion, or 4.82 trillion Naira, 
converted at the rate of N134 Naira to $1. This amount spread across the population of 
130million people, yielded a debt of 37million Naira per person. At the same time, the 
GDP Per Capita or average annual income of Nigerians was estimated at N3,379.50. In 
2005, the Debt Management Office estimated that it would take 22 years to pay off the 
debt to the Paris Club, if each Nigerian saved half (N1,689.75) of their total annual in-
come. (Debt Management Office, 2005). 
2.4.3. Rwanda’s Debt Burden  
The greater proportion of Rwanda’s debt was acquired after the fall in coffee prices on 
the international market. Faced with economic pressures and civil strife in the 1980s, 
the Habyarimana regime obtained credit facilities from the IMF and the World Bank, as 
well as Bilateral Creditors. By 1994, after a three-year civil war, a genocide, and with a 
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new government, the country’s debt had climbed to over US$1billion. 84 per cent of 
this amount was owed to multilateral creditors- the World Bank (55 per cent), the Afri-
can Development Bank (25 per cent) and other institutions (4 per cent). The remainder 
16 per cent of Rwanda’s external debt was owed to Bilateral Creditors, of which France 
held 8 per cent (UK Parliament Select Committee on International Development, 1998). 
The country’s external debt was equivalent to 85 per cent of its GDP (Kayigamba, 1997), 
and the net present value of the debt to exports ratio was calculated at 550 per cent, 
expected to rise to 732 per cent by 2000 (UK Parliament Select Committee on Interna-
tional Development, 1998).  The composition of debt owed to external creditors is 
shown through the figure below:  
 
 
Figure 3: Rwanda's External Creditors in 1994 
For Rwanda, the argument that a country was liable for its sovereign debt, however 
acquired or utilised, proved more compelling than the notion of odious debt. It was 
often the case that borrower countries accepted liability for sovereign debt in a bid to 
maintain creditworthiness; the 1998 report of the UK Parliament Select Committee on 
International Development notes the example of Kenya which declined to apply for 
debt relief in order to demonstrate its ability to “stand on its own two feet” (UK Parlia-
ment Select Committee on International Development, 1998). In 1997, the then Minis-
ter of Finance and Economic Planning of Rwanda, Donald Kaberuka stated that the 
country accepted responsibility for debt acquired by the Habyarimana regime. He went 
further to state that while Rwanda was committed to servicing sovereign debts acquired 
under the Habyarimana regime, the country had applied to be considered under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the IMF and World Bank (Kayigam-
ba, 1997). As a result, the country agreed to undertake a second SAP to qualify for debt 
relief in 2005.  
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2.4.4. Joint Responsibility of Borrowers and Creditors 
In the 1970s, creditors often provided loans without proper due diligence. The prevail-
ing economic conditions of the time, i.e., high levels of savings by oil exporter countries 
and high commodity prices made it possible for creditor institutions to provide large 
credit facilities to borrower countries without corresponding levels of scrutiny. Borrow-
er countries were not required to provide justification as to the necessity or use of cred-
it. Importantly, credit was often provided at variable interest rates, which rendered 
indeterminate the total amounts payable by borrower countries. The IMF has noted 
that much of the credit provided during the 1970s took the form of ‘national interest’ 
lending, by which Creditor Governments sought to stimulate exports, generate domes-
tic employment and foster friendly relations with borrower countries. The implicit risk 
that debts would not be repaid was accepted by creditor countries (International Mone-
tary Fund, 1999).  This position is corroborated by a 1992 report of the Forum on Debt 
and Development (FONDAD) which highlights ‘thoughtless’ and ‘irresponsible’ over-
lending by private and official creditors during the commodity boom of the 1970s, as a 
factor which exacerbated the debt obligations of borrower developing countries. Addi-
tionally, the report points to other factors including, ‘poor’ and ‘impractical’ advice 
provided by IFIs, punitive terms attached to debt reschedulings and the egregious ar-
rears which followed, as well as protectionist policies of industrialized countries (Forum 
on Debt and Development, 1992). By the late 1980s, the combination of institutional 
policy, economic shocks and SAPs served to create a difficult debt situation for borrow-
er countries.  
IFIs recognised that debt repayments often created onerous burdens on borrower 
countries, and therefore developed mechanisms by which borrower countries could 
obtain debt relief. Successive mechanisms, including the Venice Terms, Toronto Terms, 
London Terms, Naples Terms and Lyons Terms offered a combination of moratorium 
and grace periods, debt cancellation, and debt consolidation to borrower countries. 
Debt relief was predicated on three conditions, the first of which was documentary 
demonstration of its macroeconomic situation, balance of payments and debt burden. 
Secondly, the country would present a request for debt relief, stating its debt stock and 
scheduled debt service. Thirdly, the country would be required to implement a SAP 
supported by the IMF (Villanova & Martin, 2001). The IMF provided the intellectual 
underpinning for the conditions associated with debt relief mechanisms of the Paris 
Club, by stating that debt relief amounted to a temporary measure in the absence of 
rectification of the underlying conditions which created a debt burden. Also, the IMF 
argued that outright debt cancellation or forgiveness would be unfair to poor countries 
which maintained good policies and had manageable debt. Furthermore, the IMF 
stressed the reality of the financial cost of debt cancellation to itself and creditor coun-
tries, as well as the necessity of ensuring continued flows of financing to borrower 
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countries (International Monetary Fund, 2000). The debt relief mechanisms of the Paris 
Club, as aggregated by Villanova & Martin (2001) are outlined in the table below: 
Figure 4: Debt Relief Mechanisms of the Paris Club 
Debt Relief Mechanism Year Relief Measures 
1. Venice Terms for Poorest 
Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
(Lewis, 1987) 
1987 • US$500million annually in extra direct aid from Western 
countries 
• Debt relief measures 
• US$500million in new IMF Loans 
2. Toronto Terms 1988 • Official Development Assistance Debt: rescheduled to 25year 
maturity period, with 14year grace period. Moratorium 
interest rate as low as original interest rate.  
• Non-Official Development Assistance Debt 
a) Partial Write-Off: Cancellation of 33.3% of consolidated debt. 
Outstanding debt rescheduled for 14year period on the basis 
of market interest rates.  8year grace period. 
b) Concessional Interest Rates: consolidated debt rescheduled 
for 14year period using below market interest rates (less than 
½ or 3.5% of market value-depending on which calculation 
gave the lower rate). 8year grace period.  
c) Longer Repayment Period: Consolidated debt rescheduled for 
25year period at market rates of interest. 14year grace 
period.  
3. London Terms 1991 • Official Development Assistance Debt: rescheduled to 30year 
maturity period, with 12year grace period. Moratorium 
interest rate as low as original interest rate. 
• Non-Official Development Assistance Debt 
a) Partial Write-Off: Cancellation of 50% of consolidated debt. 
Outstanding debt rescheduled for 23year period on the basis 
of market interest rates.  6year grace period. 
b) Interest Rate Reduction: 100% of consolidated debt 
rescheduled for 23year period. Interest rates low enough to 
reduce present value of debt service by 50%. No grace 
period.  
c) Combination of Reduction of Interest Rate with Partial 
Interest Payment Capitalization: Consolidated debt 
rescheduled for 23year period at market rates of interest. 
Interest not charged on capitalized interest. 5year grace 
period.  
 
Additional mechanisms, i.e., the Naples and Lyons terms provided further debt relief to 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries who had benefited from debt relief under the Toronto 
or London Terms (Villanova & Martin, 2001).  
However, the notion of joint responsibility did not positively impact upon the ap-
peals of Nigeria and Rwanda for debt relief. The larger part, i.e., 85 per cent of the ex-
ternal debt of Nigeria was owed to the Paris Club. The primary factors which enabled 
the rapid and unsustainable escalation of Nigeria’s debt were the original terms of cred-
it, particularly variable and high interest rates, which did not anticipate the economic 
conditions which altered the country’s income, and therefore its ability to service its 
obligations to creditors. Thereafter, the liabilities of the country increased through 
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repeated reschedulings which served to simultaneously postpone and increase its debt 
obligations. Subsequently, during the regime of General Abacha, the country unsuccess-
fully sought debt relief, and ceased payments to the Paris Club, which further escalated 
its external debt profile. Crucially, the country’s high levels of indebtedness caused it to 
have a poor credit rating. Moss et al, (2004) noted that in 2003, none of the major in-
ternational rating agencies gave Nigeria a sovereign commercial credit rating. Simulta-
neously, IMF and World Bank assessment of Nigeria’s creditworthiness rendered it 
ineligible for IBRD assistance. Nigeria was unable to access the IDA-only list of the World 
Bank which made countries eligible for concession loans, grants and debt relief pro-
grams. As a result, the country was excluded from the HIPC initiative of the IMF, and the 
soft Paris Club Terms, e.g., Naples terms which would have reduced its debt obligations. 
Nigeria was the only poor country in the world which was not placed on the IDA-only list 
(ibid). It followed that the country embarked on several rounds of negotiations, and 
adopted a custom-designed range of economic, legal and structural reforms with the 
Paris Club and IFIs towards obtaining debt relief in 2005.  
In the case of Rwanda, IFIs, specifically the World Bank and IMF have been held re-
sponsible for the country’s high level of indebtedness in 1994 (Toussaint, 2004; Chossu-
dovsky & Galand, 2004). Debt obligations increased rapidly during the SAP implemented 
by the Habyarimana Government, even as conditionalities imposed by the IMF did not 
prevent the diversion of finance towards improper uses. Importantly, creditor institu-
tions did not sufficiently consider the effects of economic contractions and institutional 
changes on the political context. Chossudovsky & Galand (2004) conducted an investi-
gatory visit to Rwanda at the end of the genocide and civil war, after which they rec-
ommended reparation by multilateral and bilateral creditors in the form of uncondi-
tional and total cancellation of debt incurred between 1990 and 1994. However, credi-
tor institutions (IFIs) refused to grant debt relief to the Post-Genocide Government, and 
insisted upon the implementation of SAPs as a prerequisite. In 2005, Rwanda obtained 
debt relief after it undertook a second SAP in 1998, financed by its Bilateral Creditors, 
the World Bank, the IMF and the AfDB (African Development Bank Group, 2001). 
2.5. Development, not Debt Burdens  
A central argument of the Jubilee 2000 movement was that debt burdens constituted a 
constraint on resources of poor countries, and inhibited investments towards develop-
ment. Greenhill (2002) gives the central point of the Jubilee 2000 campaign as thus: 
money rights should not be superior to human rights. In other words, poor countries 
should not be hindered from the pursuit of development by the claims made upon their 
resources by rich country creditors. The Jubilee 2000 debt campaign estimated that for 
every US$1 low-income countries received in aid, they paid back up to US$2.30 in debt 
service (Jubilee Debt Campaign, n.d.).   
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Jubilee 2000 movement benefited from a change in the ideology of IFIs. The 1990s 
witnessed the reintroduction of governance into the development agenda through the 
rise of the NIE school of thought, which attributed the failures of the 1980s reforms to 
the absence of requisite institutions within developing countries (See 1.3). This position, 
i.e., that there is a direct correlation between the quality of governance and develop-
mental outcomes was adopted by IFIs. As a result, governments were again, as in the 
1970s, considered the primary drivers of economic and social progress, and the institu-
tions responsible for the formulation and implementation of development outcomes. 
There were several manifestations of this ideology, including indexes to measure the 
quality of governance (CPIA, Doing Business), and technical assistance interventions 
which sought to reform governance systems, and improve the capacities of public ser-
vice institutions. Furthermore, the notion that governments should deliver develop-
mental outcomes was expressed through several mechanisms, the most notable of 
which is the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted by the governments of 
189 countries at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2000. The MDGs 
outlined a comprehensive global development agenda, organised into 8 actionable and 
targets to cover poverty, hunger, basic education, gender equality, health, environment 
and technology (United Nations Millennium Project, 2006). These goals were intended 
to guide each country in the formulation and implementation of development policy, as 
well as the utilisation of resources.  
The World Bank and IMF accepted the achievement of development goals as justifi-
cation for debt relief. To illustrate, the IMF now posits that debt relief unlocks resources 
which are directed towards social services, such as health and education, even as coun-
tries are better equipped to manage public debt (International Monetary Fund, 2016). 
As the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda sought debt relief, they adopted the devel-
opment-related arguments put forward by the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign, and em-
braced the MDG agenda. In 2005, a committee of the Nigerian Senate (upper legislative 
house), presented some of the country’s development-related arguments for debt re-
lief, particularly that the country’s debt stock severely limited programs in support of 
economic and human development, and threatened the country’s ability to meet the 
MDGs by 2015. Also, the committee argued that Nigeria was a poor country, and its oil 
revenues which equated to 50cents per day for each citizen. As such, the annual debt 
service obligation of US$3billion, which was 13 times and 5 times its spending on health 
and education respectively, only served to perpetuate a vicious cycle of austerity and 
poverty (Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2005). In the case of Rwanda, the 
Post-Genocide Government accepted responsibility for sovereign debt incurred by the 
previous regime in exchange for international recognition (Chossudovsky, 1995). There-
after, IFIs structured aid finance towards repayment through several mechanisms, in-
cluding a Multilateral Trust Fund of US$55.2million, which was accessible by the Gov-
ernment of Rwanda, (but directed towards service of debts owed to the World Bank), 
the AfDB and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The outcomes 
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of continued debt service included a drastic fall in wages for civil servants, the sale of 
state-owned assets, and the collapse of per capita income from US$360 before the war 
to US$140 in 1995 (ibid).  
Nigeria and Rwanda leveraged on the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign, and the refocus 
within IFIs on government delivery of economic and social improvement. Both countries 
integrated the achievement of the development objectives, particularly the MDGs into 
requests for debt relief. It followed that debt relief obtained by both countries in 2005 
was contingent on the achievement of clearly specified and measurable developmental 
goals.  
2.6. Analysing the Relationship between Law and Economic 
Development through the Debt Burden Experiences of Nigeria and 
Rwanda 
This chapter has presented the evolution of the economic, policy, and institutional ar-
rangements of Nigeria and Rwanda which led to the acquisition and escalation of debt 
obligations in the 1970s and 1980s. Also, the chapter discussed the arguments which 
were put forward for debt relief by borrower countries, and the coalition which cam-
paigned for debt relief in the 1990s and early 2000s. An examination of the political and 
institutional arrangements of Nigeria and Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s gives cre-
dence to the school of thought which holds that there is a direct correlation between 
the quality of governance and development outcomes. The arguments of institutional 
economists, i.e., North, Acemoglu, Robinson, De Soto and others are validated (See 
Sections 1.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, and 1.3).  
The Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda prosecuted developmental agendas which 
were interpreted by, and reflective of the ideological systems which underpinned the 
models of governance of both countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, Nigeria and 
Rwanda were governed by military dictatorships (apart from five years of civilian admin-
istration in Nigeria between 1979 and 1983). These dictatorships consolidated state 
power at the highest level of government, from whence they determined and imple-
mented the national development agenda. As explained by Okonjo-Iweala (2012), in the 
1970s, many African Governments placed the public sector as the primary driver of 
activities related to economic development (See 1.2.2).  Nigeria and Rwanda typified 
this approach, in that loans obtained by Governments were often justified on the basis 
of the pursuit of nationalistic developmentalist visions. Following the debt crisis, IFIs 
encouraged borrower countries to adopt policies which expressed a particular vision of 
development, particularly the pursuit of measurable economic development, led by the 
private sector. Thus, SAPs, supported by lending, sought to reduce the power and influ-
ence of the state in some areas of the economy and in social welfare. However, follow-
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ing the failures of SAPs, and the rise of NIE, governance re-entered the international 
development discourse.  
Thus, while it is clear that there is a correlation between governance and develop-
ment, the preceding study of Nigeria and Rwanda suggests that economic development 
is dependent on the vision and outcomes desired, as well as the model of governance 
which drives the implementation of this vision.  This study concurs with the assertion of 
Chang (1999), that the state is the most important actor in development, especially as it 
is the coordinator for change. The dictatorships which governed both countries in the 
1970s and 1980s pursued nationalistic development agendas, such as the establishment 
of state-owned enterprises, and to some extent, were successful in implementation. It 
can be argued that the private sector agenda pursued by SAPs did not effectively take 
root due to the absence of political will and the weak adoption of this vision by govern-
ments. Indeed, IFIs often attributed the failures of SAPs to the abandonment or feeble 
implementation of reforms by governments (World Bank, 1994). The experiences of the 
1970s to the mid-2000s, i.e., commodity boom, debt crisis, SAPs, debt burden, and debt 
relief, were largely shaped by policy positions and institutional arrangements. As such, 
the argument that governance is critical for development is reinforced. However, what 
becomes evident is the necessity of objectives which are crafted with a robust and clear 
understanding of the political and social contexts, and directed by a vision that truly is in 
pursuit of beneficial and tangible results. Governments are imbued with the power and 
authority to direct and determine economic activity, and thus are able to design politi-
cal, economic, institutional and social systems towards the realization of the objectives 
of economic development.  Furthermore, several observations can be made on the 
relationship between legal systems and economic development can be gathered from 
the experiences of Nigeria and Rwanda: 
Firstly, the experiences of both countries clearly emphasise the centrality of law to 
economic development. At a simplistic level, debt finance was obtained, and debt obli-
gations created by the contractual agreements which were made between creditors, 
and Nigeria and Rwanda. These agreements were governed by international law, and 
upheld by international institutions. In a similar vein, the interventions of international 
institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were 
supported by the Articles of Agreement which establish both institutions. Similarly, in 
both Nigeria and Rwanda, legal frameworks served as instruments of economic man-
agement in military dictatorships and civilian administrations. To illustrate, in Nigeria, to 
obtain loans from international creditors, the military dictatorships of General Obasanjo 
and General Babangida both repealed substantive legislation which stipulated the na-
tional debt ceiling. In Rwanda, the Government was constrained, to some degree, by 
the terms of the IMF SAP which controlled the use of government finance.    
Secondly, the relationship between law and economic development is shaped by the 
vision of development, and model of governance operated by countries. Specific politi-
cal-economic-social contexts determine the nature of interaction between laws, institu-
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tions and economic systems. The perception and deployments of laws and institutions 
are dependent on the fundamental ideology of the governance system. To illustrate, in 
Rwanda, the Government was able to provide the military with resources during a SAP 
which contracted economic resources and negatively impacted upon social conditions. 
Legal instruments, e.g., policies, legislations or regulations reflect and underpin the 
vision, agenda, objectives and assumptions of governments. The powers and capacities 
of institutions which supervise and implement the vision of governments, are to a signif-
icant degree determined by the ideals and priorities of the governance system. 
Thirdly, the effectiveness of laws is dependent on the existence of strong and inde-
pendent institutions for enforcement. While it is accepted that a plurality of factors that 
contributed to the economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s, it is clear that govern-
ance systems in Nigeria and Rwanda were instrumental to the rapid economic decline 
suffered by both countries. To illustrate, IFIs deployed considerable political, intellectual 
and economic resources towards the enforcement of contractual agreements. It fol-
lowed that the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda were held accountable and liable 
for financial obligations accrued under international law. Conversely, at national level, 
state and social institutions did not possess the requisite strength or independence to 
judiciously utilise debt finance, manage the developmental process, or hold govern-
ments to account. While the terms of SAPs implemented by the World Bank and IMF 
attempted to control the use of funds obtained from creditors, the mechanisms of do-
mestic legal systems were not sufficiently robust to adequately govern the disburse-
ment of funds. Thus, the debt problems of Nigeria and Rwanda highlight the critical 
importance of well-functioning legal systems and supporting institutions for economic 
management.  
Fourthly, while it is necessary to have laws and legal instruments to underpin the in-
stitutions which function for economic development, the political economy in which 
these institutions function is of equal importance. Political, economic, social, and cul-
tural factors must be accounted for in the design or reform of institutions. These factors 
form the realities and the environment in which institutions will function. As such it is 
important not to rely upon assumptions, but to properly interrogate the dynamics of 
environment to identify challenges and opportunities which can determine the func-
tions and operations of institutions.  
2.7. Summary  
This chapter has attempted to outline the objectives of Nigeria and Rwanda in the pur-
suit of debt relief. Both countries sought relief for the debt burdens which had built 
from the 1970s, and to rectify the institutional weaknesses which enabled the accumu-
lation of debt. The experiences of Nigeria and Rwanda show that there is an important 
nexus between legal systems, institutions and economic development. The debt crises 
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of the 1980s which followed the commodity boom of the 1970s were triggered by the 
interplay of policies, policy responses and institutions at international and country lev-
els. In recognition of the role of governance in driving economic development, towards 
the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda under-
took significant reforms of the legal mechanisms of economic management, through 
the repeal or enactment of legislation, and the establishment of institutions to manage 
economic activities. Also, with the emergence of a global development agenda, as ex-
pressed through the MDGs, the importance of governance in delivering development 
has been reinforced.  
At international level, IFIs revised the procedures by which they undertook interven-
tions in national economies. From the mid-1990s, the burden of design and implemen-
tation of reform programs shifted to borrower countries, as the institutions were more 
concerned with supervision of reform implementation and the provision of technical 
assistance. The next chapter examines the reforms undertaken by governments and 
multilateral institutions in the area of debt management.  
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The rapid increase in the debt profiles of Nigeria and Rwanda in the 1970s and 1980s 
can be attributed to a multiplicity of institutional factors at international and national 
levels. The changes in the international economic system, and the policies prescribed by 
multilateral agencies established the framework for the provision of debt finance, and 
dictated economic and institutional reforms intended to improve the economies of 
borrower countries. At domestic level, it was the political, economic and social ar-
rangements of borrower countries that determined the sources, composition and utili-
sation of debt finance. These arrangements, or governance systems encouraged the 
irresponsible acquisition of debt and the misuse of debt finance in the 1970s and 1980s. 
By the 1990s, outstanding debt obligations accumulated to the extent that the bulk of 
public resources were directed towards the repayment of debt. As a result, Nigeria and 
Rwanda sought and obtained relief on external public debt in 2005.  
This chapter seeks to answer the second research question, i.e., in what ways did 
the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda deploy laws and institutions as instruments for 
debt relief? The adoption of the good governance agenda and the MDGs by IFIs, as well 
as the successful Jubilee debt campaign led to a wave of policy and institutional reforms 
within IFIs and the governance systems of developing countries. Policy reforms were 
centred on the integration of developmental objectives and good governance into the 
agenda of the IMF, the World Bank and governments of developing countries. Also, 
institutional reforms were prescribed by IFIs to enhance the capacity of governments to 
deliver developmental outcomes. Naturally, reforms underpinned by the ‘governance 
agenda’ extended to the introduction of laws to manage public finance, particularly the 
debt management systems of governments. Furthermore, these laws function as tools 
for economic management, as they stipulate debt management functions to be adopt-
ed and implemented by government institutions.  
Thus, this chapter begins with an overview of the policy reforms undertaken within the 
IMF and World Bank in support of debt relief for developing countries. Thereafter, reforms, 
as prescribed by these IFIs, and implemented by the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda to 
obtain debt relief are outlined. Specifically, budgetary reforms underpinned by legislation, 
and the resultant institutional systems for managing public finance are presented. Economic 
outcomes are the result of numerous and dynamic variables, which cannot be attributed 
solely to reforms or government intervention in the economy or policy environment. As 
such, this chapter concentrates on those reforms of public finance, particularly debt man-
agement, which sought to use law as a tool to supervise government functions, regulate 
government behaviour, and create policy environments conducive to the pursuit of stated 
economic objectives. The examination of reforms implemented in Nigeria and Rwanda re-
veal the influence of World Bank and IMF policy on the economic performance of borrower 
countries. Also, the reforms present the ideological agenda of the Bank and the Fund, and 
how these are manifested in the institutional and legal systems of borrower countries. Final-
ly, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the ways by which laws and institutions were 
placed to interact with, and regulate governments in the management of public debt.  
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3.1. International Finance Institutions and Policy Reforms for Debt 
Relief  
In the 1990s, the work of NIE and the adoption of the governance agenda by IFIs posi-
tioned governments as the drivers of economic development. Concurrently, the suc-
cessful Jubilee 2000 campaign for debt relief was premised on the argument that debt 
burdens impeded development. The campaign argued that developing countries were 
faced with a choice: to either service debt obligations, or to spend on critical infrastruc-
ture and social services. This decade also birthed the MDGs (2000-2015), which articu-
lated the shared global objectives of poverty eradication and improvements in the qual-
ity of social conditions.  Additionally, the Goals were set as a development benchmark, 
i.e., the economic and social progress of countries were measured against the MDGs. 
Furthermore, the MDGs fostered cooperation between governments, multilateral agen-
cies and social sectors as they served to harness resources, and coordinate efforts of 
these actors towards common goals (See 2.5).  
The World Bank and the IMF are the institutions which manage the international fi-
nance system, even as they spearhead discourse and policy approaches within interna-
tional development practice (See 2.1 and 2.2). According to Oxfam, “the Fund's view of 
what defines the macroeconomic stability of a country is the authoritative one for all 
development partners. Given this, the Fund could and should be playing a dynamic, pro-
active role in establishing the financing conditions for achieving the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals” (Oxfam, 2003). Joseph Hanlon goes further to describe the World Bank as 
an international debt collector, and states that “all foreign aid and all debt relief is condi-
tional on countries that have Bank and Fund programmes” (Hanlon, 1998, p. 489).  
The World Bank and IMF recognised that debt burdens were an impediment to the 
progress of developing countries, and that debt relief was necessary to release re-
sources for investment into development needs. From the late 1980s, both institutions 
provided technical assistance and endorsement for debt relief mechanisms offered by 
commercial creditors, e.g., the Toronto terms (1988), London Terms (1991), Naples 
terms (1994), and Lyons terms (1996) (See 2.4.4.). To qualify for debt relief under these 
mechanisms, borrower countries were required to implement an IMF SAP. In 1996, the 
World Bank and IMF further expanded debt relief mechanisms through the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.   
3.1.1. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative  
The HIPC Initiative was launched by the IMF and World Bank “with the aim of ensuring 
that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage” (International Monetary 
Fund, 2016, p. 1). The achievement of this aim requires that debt is reduced to sustain-
able levels, measured by the capacity of a country to satisfy current and future debt 
obligations in full, without resort to rescheduling, accumulation of arrears, or compro-
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mise of its economic growth (International Development Association and International 
Monetary Fund, 2001). In 1997, the then General Counsel of the World Bank, Ibrahim 
Shihata, stated that the HIPC was intended for the resolution of external public debt 
owed to official creditors. The World Bank had identified 20 countries suffering from 
unsustainable debt. 80 per cent of this debt was owed to official creditors, 58 per cent 
of which was owed to foreign governments and government agencies (bilateral debt), 
and the remainder 22 per cent to international financial institutions (multilateral debt) 
(Shihata, 1997).  
In practice, the HIPC Initiative retained features of SAPs, i.e., borrower countries 
were required to demonstrate good policies as determined by the IMF and World Bank, 
and implement structural reforms to be eligible for concessional loans from the IMF and 
World Bank. Isar (2012) states that reforms were contingent on the ability of borrower 
countries to:  
1) Secure a flow-rescheduling agreement with Paris Club Creditors, which would be 
applicable when there was a reduction in stock-of-debt over a 3year period; 
2) Maintain a good track record of meeting IMF arrangements and rescheduling 
agreements; 
3) Seek comparable debt terms from private and bilateral creditors outside the Paris 
Club; 
4) Seek bilateral debt relief in form of official development assistance. 
 
Also, the SAP emphasis on good macroeconomic performance, as assessed by the IMF, 
was retained in the HIPC Initiative. Countries reached the decision point, i.e., eligibility 
to participate in the Initiative after they maintained macroeconomic policies supported 
by IMF programs and loans for 6 years. To reach the completion point, at which they 
would receive a permanent reduction in debt stock, countries were required to main-
tain good policies for a further 3 years (Birdsall, et al., 2002). While up to 80 per cent of 
the Net Present Value (NPV) of a country’s external debts could be relieved by Paris 
Club Creditors, exact amounts to be relieved were to be decided on a case by case basis 
(Isar, 2012). According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), NPV is an 
estimate of all annual debt payments in the coming years and valuation according to 
current rates (United Nations Development Program, 2003). Debt sustainability analysis 
was conducted using a framework which incorporated elements including: an NPV of 
debt-to-exports ratio in the range of 200-250 per cent, a debt service ratio in the range 
of 20-25 per cent. Countries with a large export base were assessed on the additional 
indicators of: a revenues-to-GDP ratio above 20 per cent, an exports-to-GDP ratio above 
40 per cent and an NPV of debt-to-revenues ratio of 280 per cent (International Devel-
opment Association and International Monetary Fund, 2001). The criteria and indices by 
the World Bank and the IMF assessed debt sustainability under the HIPC Initiative are 
presented in the table below.  
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Table 7: Debt Sustainability Analysis of the HIPC Initiative 
Element  Assessment  
Debt Relief Up to 80% of NPV of External Debt (Exact value decided on case-by-case 
basis) 
NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 200-250% 
Debt service ratio 20%-25% 
Revenues- to-GDP ratio Above 20% 
Exports to-GDP Above 40% 
NPV of debt-to-revenues ratio 280% 
 
However, a few years after the launch of the Initiative, it was evident that the original 
framework would not enable the permanent exit of HIPC countries from repeated debt 
reschedulings (G-24 , 2003). The IMF stated that “early progress with the Initiative did 
not meet public expectations, with seven countries qualifying for assistance in the first 
three years” (International Monetary Fund, 2000). In response, the Enhanced HIPC, or 
HIPC II, was launched in 1999 to provide deeper and broader relief, faster relief, and a 
stronger link between debt relief and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2004). The En-
hanced HIPC introduced ‘interim debt relief’ between decision point and completion 
point, in order to reduce debt service costs from the commencement of participation in 
the Initiative. Also, completion points were made ‘floating’- to be determined by im-
plementation of reforms to aid poverty reduction and growth, rather than by specific 
duration (International Monetary Fund, 2000).  
Importantly, the Enhanced HIPC addressed poverty reduction through the inclusion 
of the requirement that countries present a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).  
PRSPs describe how “macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs can 
promote growth and reduce poverty, and outline external financing needs and the 
associated sources of financing” (International Monetary Fund, 2017). Also, develop-
mental issues are addressed: country PRSPs speak to poverty diagnostics, targets and 
indicators, monitoring and evaluation, as well as priority public actions, and planned 
improvements in public expenditure programs and public expenditure management 
systems (International Monetary Fund, 2016). In addition, the PRSP provides operation-
al frameworks for domestic policies and development assistance (International Labour 
Organization, 2006). The PRSP is supported by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facili-
ty (PRGF), also introduced in 1999 and which replaces the Enhanced Structural Adjust-
ment Facility (ESAF), which had supported the original HIPC. Through the ESAF, the IMF 
provided concessional loans to low-income countries up to a maximum of 140 percent 
of its IMF quota over 3 years. These loans were provided at the rate of 0.5 per cent, 
repayable over a period of 5 to 10 years (International Monetary Fund, 2004). In con-
trast, while it retains the rate of 0.5 per cent and the repayment duration of the ESAF, 
the PRGF dispensed with the quota requirement. Instead the facility is directly linked to 
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the provisions of the PRSP submitted by countries, (International Monetary Fund, 
2009).    
In 2005, the World Bank and IMF, introduced an additional mechanism- the Multi-
lateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) to alleviate debt burdens and assist countries as 
they worked towards the achievement of the MDGs. Through the MDRI, the IMF, World 
Bank and African Development Fund offered 100 per cent relief on eligible debt (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2016). 
To obtain debt relief under the HIPC and MDRI mechanisms, borrower countries 
pass through two milestones. Firstly, at the decision point, the World Bank and IMF 
determine whether countries are eligible for debt relief under strict criteria, which the 
International Monetary Fund (2016) sets out as:  
1) Eligibility to borrow from the IDA 
2) Face an unsustainable debt burden 
3) Have a track record of reform and sound policies through IMF and World Bank sup-
ported programs 
4) Have developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
 
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), under the Enhanced 
HIPC, the evaluation of debt sustainability is simplified and calculated on the basis of 1) 
whether NPV of external debt exceeds 150 per cent of export revenues, or 2) whether 
NPV of external debt exceeds 250 per cent of budget revenue (in the event that exports 
of goods and services exceed 30 per cent of GDP and budget revenues exceed 15 per 
cent of GDP) (United Nations Development Program, 2003).  
If a country satisfies these criteria, the international community commits to levels of 
debt relief, some of which may be provided upon commencement of the HIPC program. 
Also, the recipient countries commit to the implementation of policy reforms intended 
to improve economic standing and reduce poverty. Bhattacharya (2004) observes that 
in addition to debt relief, the HIPC Initiative seeks to support policy and institutional 
reforms which should form the foundation for sustained growth and accelerated pov-
erty reduction. Secondly, countries reach a completion point, at which they exit the 
program, and receive the balance of debt relief promised by the international commu-
nity at the decision point. Countries exit the HIPC Initiative if they present a 1) further 
track record of good performance under programs supported by loans from the IMF 
and the World Bank, 2) satisfactory implementation of key reforms agreed at decision 
point, and 3) adoption and implementation of the PRSP for a minimum of one year 
(International Monetary Fund, 2016). By 2014, of the 39 countries eligible for debt relief 
through the HIPC, 36 received full debt relief worth US$99billion after reaching comple-
tion points. 3 countries are yet to reach their completion points (World Bank, 2014; 
International Monetary Fund, 2016). The HIPC, Enhanced HIPC and MDRI are the mech-
anisms by which the majority of developing countries obtained relief on public debt 
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between 1996 and 2014. The table below outlines the different mechanisms of the 
three systems:  
Table 8: IMF and World Bank Debt Relief Mechanisms 1999-2014 
 HIPC Enhanced HIPC MDRI 
Objective Reduce external debt to 
sustainable levels 
To ensure deep, broad and fast 
debt relief and thereby 
contribute toward growth, 
poverty reduction, and debt 
sustainability in the poorest, 
most heavily indebted countries. 
To provide additional 
support for HIPC countries 
to achieve the MDGs 
Qualification  IDA-only IDA-only HIPC countries which have 
reached completion point 
Extent of and 
Prerequisite for 
Debt Relief 
• Up to 80 per cent of the 
Net Present Value (NPV) 
external debts 
• Interim Debt Relief between 
decision point and completion 
point 
• Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper 
100 per cent debt relief on 
eligible debt 
Finance Facility Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility 
Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility 
 
Decision Point • Debt sustainability 
analysis by IMF and World 
Bank 
• Good macroeconomic 
policies and IMF programs 
for 6 years 
• Debt sustainability analysis by 
IMF and World Bank 
• PRSP 
 
Completion of Enhanced 
HIPC cycle 
Completion Point Implementation of IMF-
supported macroeconomic 
policy programs and loans 
for 3 years 
Floating:  
• Good economic policies and 
performance  
• Successful implementation of 
reforms agreed at decision point 
Implementation of PRSP for 1 
year 
Completion of Enhanced 
HIPC cycle 
Beneficiary 
Countries 
7 countries  36 Post-decision HIPC countries 36 Post-HIPC completion 
countries 
Debt Eligible for 
Relief  
Up to 80 per cent of NPV of 
external public debt owed 
to official and multilateral 
creditors 
External public and publicly 
guaranteed debt is reduced to 
the HIPC Initiative thresholds, as 
calculated at the time of the 
decision point 
Debt disbursed before end-
December 2004 (IMF, AfDF 
and the IADB) and end-
December 2003 (IDA) and 
still outstanding at the time 
of qualification (after HIPC 
Initiative debt relief) is 
cancelled 
Participating 
Creditors 
Bilateral, official and 
multilateral creditors.  
All multilateral, official bilateral 
and commercial creditors 
International Development 
Association (IDA), 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), African 
Development Fund (AfDF), 
and Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) 
Source: (World Bank , 2016) 
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The HIPC and MDRI can be described as reforms of instruments used by the World Bank 
and IMF in their engagements with borrower countries. These instruments display the 
change in rationale and objective of these institutions in the area of debt management, 
and are a response to the criticisms levelled at SAPs. In the 1970s and 1980s, technical 
assistance was premised on the objective of debt repayment, and structural adjustment 
programs sought the correction of weaknesses in developing economies, as determined 
by IFIs. These programs were criticised for their interference in the economies and 
political arrangements of sovereign states, and for their blanket approach to economic 
liberalization, which did not consider the particular circumstances and capacities of 
borrower countries (See 2.3). Importantly, the focus on debt repayment and rectifica-
tion of economic imbalances did not account for social problems which emanated from 
the reduction of government participation in the economy (See 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Con-
versely, the Enhanced HIPC and MDRI support the capacity and commitment of coun-
tries towards the achievement of developmental goals, particularly the MDGs. Also, 
these instruments can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce impositions by IFIs on 
borrower countries. The IMF states that PRSPs are intended to enable country-driven, 
results-oriented, comprehensive, partnership-based and long-term approaches to the 
achievement of developmental objectives (International Monetary Fund, 1999). This 
approach is a means to ensure that strategies are tailored to the present realities and 
ambitions of countries. Additionally, debt relief, rather than structural adjustment is an 
incentive which steers countries towards completion, rather than abandonment of the 
program.  These reforms notwithstanding, criticisms of the World Bank and IMF persist, 
often from international nongovernmental organizations and the scholarly community. 
These criticisms range from arguments that reforms of instruments are insufficient to 
achieve developmental impact, to allegations that the World Bank and IMF actively 
impede the development of poor countries. These criticisms are outlined in the next 
section.  
3.1.2. Criticisms of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
The IMF claims that HIPC eligible countries spend on the average, up to 5 times more on 
social services, than they do on debt service payments (International Monetary Fund, 
2016). However, Todd Moss has argued that this claim is not tenable in light of the fact 
“aid inflows average nearly 60 per cent of total public expenditure in 14 sub-Saharan 
African countries” (Moss, 2006, p. 289). Also, Moss noted that in 2004, 14 African HIPCs 
paid, on average, US$19million to the IDA, while they received US$204million in new 
IDA credits, and US$959million in total aid. Additionally, he asserted that the MDRI does 
not deliver financial windfall to countries, as savings from forgiven debt are subtracted 
from future IDA flows (Moss, 2006). Similarly, in a 2004 publication, FONDAD noted that 
savings from debt relief under the HIPC mechanism are subject to negotiations with the 
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IMF and World Bank, and thus may not necessarily be directed towards poverty reduc-
tion (Martin, 2004).  
Country-ownership of the debt relief process is successfully challenged on several 
fronts; firstly, country ownership is limited to the preparation of the strategy document, 
i.e., the PRSP. It is the World Bank and IMF that establish the thresholds by which coun-
tries qualify for debt relief, and the extent of relief to be provided. Secondly, the HIPC 
has resulted in increased surveillance of political and economic processes of borrower 
countries, thereby increasing the depth of conditionality. Harrison Graham alleges that 
“conditionality based structural adjustment lending has been replaced with another 
reform agenda, perhaps best summarised as governance” (Harrison, 2004, p. 125). HIPC 
status is dependent on external, i.e., donor evaluations of indebted countries, and given 
only to those countries eligible to borrow from the IDA (Harrison, 2004). The PRSPs are 
a comprehensive presentation of the ‘as-is’ political, economic, social arrangements of 
countries, and a statement of undertaking for planned reforms of these arrangements.  
Furthermore, the metrics by which debt sustainability is assessed does not bear any 
direct correlation with poverty reduction. Jeffrey Sachs argues that it is possible for a 
country to have sustainable debt as defined by the IMF and World Bank, and its people 
affected by very high levels of hunger and disease. He states that “with creditors de-
termining what was or was not sustainable, the flagrantly excessive demands on the 
impoverished debtor nations could not be challenged in the corridors of power” (Sachs, 
2002, p. 277). Also, NPV calculations are based on forecasts of future economic posi-
tions that are impossible to know. Hanlon (1998) criticises the metrics by which debt 
relief is assessed and granted under the HIPC, on the argument that IFIs are insincere 
about debt relief, and have constructed the international financial system to ensure 
that borrower countries remain in perpetual debt. He refers to the work of economists 
such as Charles Kindleberger to surmise that lenders do not want debt repaid. Instead, 
lenders want for debt to remain on the books, and to be serviced if possible. If debts 
will not be serviced, then lenders try to organise an orderly exit. Importantly, he asserts 
that lenders prefer for debt to persist, in order to exert maximum leverage over debt-
ors. As an example, Hanlon presents the case of Mozambique under the HIPC process:  
pre-and post HIPC, its average annual debt service payment was US$113million 
(Hanlon, 1998). Pettifor and Greenhill corroborate this position as they argue that the 
term debt relief, as used by the IMF and the World Bank, is a simply a euphemism for 
debt-rescheduling. They go further to claim that the HIPC Initiative is a failure which 
does not seek development, but a mechanism to force countries to adopt IMF condi-
tionality in order to ensure the transfer of assets from debtor countries to creditor 
countries (Pettifor & Greenhill, 2002). The table below summarises the arguments 
against the HIPC Initiative: 
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Table 9: Criticisms of WB/IMF HIPC Claims 
IMF/World Bank Claim Criticism 
HIPC releases resources for development in 
borrower countries 
• Debt relief sums are not significant when considered against 
other sources of inflow, i.e., aid and credit.  
• Use of resources or savings gained from debt relief is 
determined by IMF/World Bank. Resources can be retained in 
IFIs or spent on other projects.  
HIPC allows borrower countries own 
reforms implemented for debt relief 
• Benchmarks are determined by IMF/World Bank. Country 
qualification for HIPC are assessed by staff according to criteria 
set.  
HIPC reduces debt to sustainable levels • Sustainable debt analysis does not impact upon poverty 
reduction.  
• Multilateral agencies do not seek debt sustainability, but debt 
rescheduling at best, and permanent indebtedness at worst.  
 
These criticisms notwithstanding, the HIPC Initiative is an influential mechanism, which 
has served as the system by which many developing countries obtained relief on external 
debts. For the preparation of PRSPs, the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda undertook 
comprehensive evaluations of their economies, and identified weaknesses which inhibit-
ed the capacity of the public sector to deliver developmental benefits. Thereupon, the 
PRSPs guided the adoption and implementation of wide-ranging reforms in both coun-
tries.  The following sections outline reforms adopted and implemented by the govern-
ments of Nigeria and Rwanda in the area of public debt management.  
3.2. Institutional and Legal Reforms driven by the Poverty 
Reduction and Strategy Papers 
During the debt crisis of the 1980s, IFIs attributed the debt burdens of Nigeria and 
Rwanda to poor governance, particularly the weak capacity of the governments of both 
countries to manage economic systems (See 2.2). This position is validated in the con-
text of external debt, as it can be argued that it was weaknesses in the public sector 
that, at country level, caused the accumulation of debt. It can be argued that both 
countries did not possess the requisite policies and well-functioning institutions to drive 
the development of their economies through debt finance, or to effectively manage 
reductions to national income which originated in the international economic system.  
PRSPs can be considered as mechanisms utilised by the Governments of Nigeria and 
Rwanda to execute reforms which would change the ‘rules of the game’ (See 1.2.4), or the 
environment in which economic activities would be undertaken, and establish a system to 
ensure that outcomes were achieved. The PRSPs developed by the governments of Nige-
ria and Rwanda reflected the good governance agenda and institutional thinking which 
had come to dominate development economics from the middle of the 1990s.  
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Furthermore, the role of government in ensuring macroeconomic stability was em-
phasized in PRSPs. To ensure macroeconomic stability, the Governments of Nigeria and 
Rwanda undertook a number of reforms to improve the management of public finance. 
National budgets, underpinned by legislation and managed by public sector institutions 
became the system for determining the sources of, and utilisation of government reve-
nue. Through budget-related reforms, the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda sought 
to introduce transparency, predictability and accountability into public finance systems.  
The use of legal instruments to manage public finance is a model adopted from 
budgetary legislations and regulations used by western economies, particularly those of 
federal systems, i.e., where public finances are managed by several hierarchies and 
units of government. A common feature of these budgetary legislations are reference 
values, or benchmarks by which economic health and debt sustainability are measured. 
For example, the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Union was established in 
1997 to uphold fiscal responsibility, which is considered fundamental (by EU countries) 
for the sustainability of public finances and for financial stability in the European Union 
(European Commission, 2015). The Pact is underpinned by Article 136 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (2007), which empowers the Council to adopt 
measures to coordinate and conduct surveillance on budgetary discipline of, and pro-
vide economic policy guidelines, to those Member States which have adopted the Euro 
currency. Sustainable debt is presented as critical to financial stability: Article 126(1) of 
the Treaty states that Member States shall avoid excessive deficits. Compliance is calcu-
lated with reference to a matrix, which measures public debt levels against GDP. This 
matrix also prescribes actions for individual, and all member states in the event of nega-
tive changes in the financial position of a Member state. Collignon (2012) gives these 
reference values as  i) ratio of planned or actual government deficit at a maximum of 3 
per cent of GDP, and b) ratio of government debt to GDP is capped at a reference value 
of 60 per cent.  
Fiscal Rules, particularly limits and constraints on debts, borrowing and fiscal deficits 
as used in federal systems, particularly India, Brazil and the USA, are thought to contrib-
ute to transparency and accountability in the management of public finances (Yelwa, 
2010). The PRSPs implemented in Nigeria and Rwanda embrace the necessity of fiscal 
rules, embedded in the form of legislation. According to Ighodaro Omoigui of the World 
Bank, budget laws and tax reforms of the HIPC process were used to prevent the build-
up of unsustainable debt situations (Omoigui, 2017). Similarly, Ushie (2010) states that 
Fiscal Responsibility Acts (FRAs) are intended to subject governments to rules which 
stipulate transparent fiscal and budget practices. She goes further to discuss two types 
of FRAs, i.e., numerical rules which guide and benchmark performance against quantita-
tive indicators, and procedural rules which establish transparency, coverage and ac-
countability requirements (ibid).  
The following sections present budget-related reforms implemented by the Gov-
ernments of Nigeria and Rwanda. It is important to note that is difficult to evaluate the 
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effect of reforms on economic outcomes, as these are the result of a variety of factors. 
However, the effect of reforms on the functionality of government institutions and 
processes of economic management can be investigated. Also, it is possible to evaluate 
the effects of reforms in the transformation of the policy environment and behaviour of 
economic actors. In this case, the effectiveness of legislation and institutions in regulat-
ing government behaviour in the area of public finance will be examined.  
3.3. Nigeria Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
While Nigeria did not satisfy the IDA-only criterion, and thus could not participate in the 
HIPC program, its debt relief process was modelled closely on the HIPC. In 2003, the 
Federal Government adopted a 4year development plan titled National Economic Em-
powerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (Peterside, 2003). The NEEDS Strategy 
Paper, titled ‘Meeting Everyone’s Needs’ was modelled on the PRSP, and served to artic-
ulate Nigeria’s process of development anchored by a clear vision, sound values and 
enduring principles. NEEDS was the first time that a development plan was based on an 
“investigation of how ordinary Nigerians live, and underpinned by a “sound knowledge of 
the causes of poverty” (Nigerian National Planning Commission, 2004, pp. xii-xiii). NEEDS 
proposed bold steps to achieve macroeconomic stability and more efficient use of re-
sources to grow the economy (Nigerian National Planning Commission, 2004).  
In devising an economic strategy for Nigeria, the National Planning Commission 
acknowledged that the root of Nigeria’s economic problems lay in the Import Substitu-
tion Industrialization model embraced in the 1970s. This model expanded the role of 
government in the economy, which fostered corruption and mismanagement: “for 
decades, Nigeria’s economy was characterised by the growing dominance of the public 
sector, over reliance on a single commodity (oil) and the pursuit of a high import de-
pendent, import substituting industrial strategy” (Nigerian National Planning Commis-
sion, 2004, p. 52). Also, the Commission attributed the weaknesses of government insti-
tutions to military dictatorships.  NEEDS was intended to correct these foundational 
problems through a three-pronged reform agenda which would 1) Empower People 2) 
Promote Private Enterprise and 3) Change the Ways by Which Government Worked. 
The developmental thrust was emphasized through budgetary allocation; sectors key to 
poverty reduction- health, education, electricity, roads and water received highest pri-
ority of resource allocation, which amounted to over 60 per cent of the capital budget 
for 2004. The implementation of NEEDS was estimated to cost up to US$4.5billion, to be 
financed by the Nigerian Government, and supported by Official Development Assis-
tance which the government sought from IFIs. The NEEDS model was designed to re-
ward success of reforms, as the government expected development agencies to direct 
their interventions into areas of good performance. Additionally, the government ex-
pected private-sector related reforms to attract up to US$1.5billion in foreign direct 
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investment. Through reforms, the Nigerian Government expected to foster economic 
and social development, even as it avoided previous mistakes of direct interventions in 
the economy (Nigerian National Planning Commission, 2004).  
NEEDS was described by the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo as a 
home-grown reform program. According to President Obasanjo, the characteristic of 
national ownership, combined with results already visible would ensure sustainability 
beyond 2007.  The document presented Nigeria’s case for debt relief, which was prem-
ised on the argument that “only substantial debt relief will allow Nigeria to pursue a 
meaningful development programme” (Nigerian National Planning Commission, 2004, 
p. 116). This assertion was based on a 2002 investigation of the IMF, which found that 
the resolution of Nigeria’s debt problem would necessitate the rescheduling of up to 67 
per cent of NPV of debt, followed by a reduction of the NPV of up to 67 per cent of 
stock-of-debt. The country’s annual debt service was estimated at US$3billion which 
was made at an immense cost to social development: debt service payments made 
between 2001 and 2003 were 5 times as high as the recurrent Federal Government 
budgetary allocation to education, and 6 times as high as the recurrent budgetary allo-
cation to health. The document affirmed the correlation between reforms and debt 
relief through its optimistic assertion that reform implementation, policy consistency, as 
well as improvements in the management of public resources would result in substan-
tial reduction in external debt service payments. Debt relief would then allow increased 
spending in the social sectors, particularly health, education, water and infrastructure 
(Nigerian National Planning Commission, 2004). Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the then Minister 
of Finance notes that Nigeria was the first country to have a home-grown program 
articulated as a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) approved by the IMF board (in 2005). 
NEEDS was the first time that the IMF had served as an institutional monitor for a re-
form program conceived, designed and implemented by a borrower government. She 
states that the reform program was implemented for 15 months, after which the gov-
ernment approached the Paris Club for debt relief (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012). In 2005, the 
Paris Club welcomed the ambitious reforms implemented by Nigeria and entered into a 
debt relief agreement with the government of Nigeria. Under the agreement, the Paris 
Club provided debt reduction under the Naples Terms, and allowed Nigeria to buy back 
the remainder of eligible debts. This was implemented in two (2) stages:  
1) The government of Nigeria cleared its arrears (US$6.3billion) with the Paris Club on 
all debts, and obtained a 33 per cent cancellation of eligible debts; and  
2) After a review of implementation of the PSI, i.e., NEEDS in 2006, the government 
cleared amounts due (US$6.1billion), obtained relief on further 34 per cent on eligi-
ble debts, and the bought back the remainder of debts.  
 
Through this agreement, Nigeria obtained debt cancellation estimated at US$18 billion 
(including moratorium interest) which represented an overall cancellation of about 60 
per cent of its debt to the Paris Club of around US$30 billion. The Paris Club stated that 
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its ‘exceptional’ treatment of Nigeria’s debt offered a “fair, sustainable and definitive” 
solution to Nigeria and her Paris Club Creditors (Paris Club, 2005).  
In 2007, the IMF published a progress report on NEEDS, in which it noted that im-
plementation had been remarkable, and that results had surpassed expectations. How-
ever, the report noted that the government had not yet reached the goals it set out in 
the areas of poverty reduction and employment generation (International Monetary 
Fund, 2007). This position is corroborated by Eze (2014), who argues that living condi-
tions worsened as a result of NEEDS. Similarly, Ogundele et al (2011) assert that upon 
termination of the program in 2007, there was little to show in terms of targeted 
achievement. However, the IMF identified areas of success, including macroeconomic 
stabilisation, budgetary process improvements, banking consolidation, civil service re-
forms, emergence of the non-oil sectors, enactment of new legislations and some im-
provements in development indicators (health and education) (International Monetary 
Fund, 2007). 
3.3.1. Implementation of the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy  
An implementation, monitoring and evaluation framework which reflected the political 
and administrative architecture of governance in Nigeria was integrated into NEEDS. 
The three levels of Executive Government- Federal, State and Local, were responsible 
for direct implementation of NEEDS. Also, the implementation framework required 
cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Arms of Government as outlined 
below;  
a) Executive: 
i. State and Local Governments were encouraged to create State Economic Em-
powerment and Development Strategies (SEEDS), and Local Economic Empow-
erment and Development Strategies (LEEDS) respectively. Local Governments 
especially were encouraged to develop “medium-term development pro-
grammes, specifying programmes, benchmarks and targets, deliverables, time-
lines, and implementation guides” (Nigerian National Planning Commission, 
2004, p. 103). Note that in the federal system of government in Nigeria, the 36 
State Governments control over half of national revenue (Yelwa, 2010), and re-
tain independence to determine expenditure priorities and accumulate debt 
(Ushie, 2010). Public revenue, from all sources, e.g., sale of crude oil and taxes, is 
distributed from the Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) to the Feder-
al, State and Local Governments according to an agreed formula. In 2016, public 
revenue was allocated as follows: the Federal Government was allocated 54 per 
cent, State Governments (36) were assigned 26 per cent, and Local Governments 
(774) shared 20 per cent (Salaudeen, 2016).  
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ii. NEEDS-related activities were formulated and overseen by the Federal Executive 
Council, (composed of the President, Vice-President and Cabinet Ministers), and 
the National Economic Council (comprising State Governors, the Central Bank 
and the Vice-President). Both Councils were required to present periodic reports 
to the National Assembly.  
iii. The National Planning Commission (Federal Agency) was the designated secre-
tariat of NEEDS, and supervised the Service Delivery Unit. Similarly, the Central 
Bank and Federal Ministry of Finance were responsible for mobilization and su-
pervision of Federal Agencies responsible for the implementation of aspects of 
NEEDS. 
iv. An Independent Monitoring Committee, was established to monitor and evalu-
ate progress. This committee, chaired by the Secretary to the Government of the 
Federation, comprised representatives of the Private Sector and Government 
Agencies. On a quarterly basis, this Committee was mandated to inform the Na-
tional Assembly (legislature) of its findings, and report to the Presidency and Na-
tional Economic Council, even as it coordinated a Peer-Review Mechanism which 
incorporated the private and social sectors into the monitoring and evaluation 
process. 
 
b) Legislature:  
The National Assembly, i.e., the House and Representatives (lower chamber) and 
Senate (upper chamber), was to contribute to the implementation of NEEDS 
through: 
i. Enactment of relevant laws necessary for the implementation of NEEDS, and re-
sponsibility to ensure that budgetary appropriations are consistent with objec-
tives of NEEDS;  
ii. Supervision of relevant Agencies to ensure that NEEDS is implemented; and  
iii. Public awareness as to NEEDS and mobilization of public support 
3.3.2. Budget Reform in Nigeria: The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 
The PRSP states that budgeting process had “reached the point of near collapse” prior 
to the transition to civilian government in 1999 (Nigerian National Planning Commis-
sion, 2004, p. 17). To correct this, the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 was enacted to 
achieve a three (3) fold purpose:  
1) Provide for prudent management of the nation's resources, ensure long-term mac-
roeconomic stability of the national economy,  
2) Secure greater accountability and transparency in fiscal operations within a medi-
um-term fiscal policy framework, and  
3) Establish the Fiscal Responsibility Commission to ensure the promotion and en-
forcement of the nation's economic objectives; and for related matters.  
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Nigeria’s budgetary legislation introduced both quantitative and procedural rules for 
the management of public finances. Quantitative rules include the oil-based rule, the 
size of fiscal deficit, limits of public debt, and conditions/qualifications for public bor-
rowing. Procedural rules cover government adherence to medium-term fiscal frame-
work, governance of the budget process, savings and asset management, provisions on 
audits and reporting requirements for government, and transparency and accountabil-
ity standards (Ushie, 2010). Organized into 13 Parts and 57 Sections, the Act seeks to 
establish the formulae and framework by which the Federal Government manages 
financial resources. An independent institution, the Fiscal Responsibility Commission 
was created by this legislation to supervise budget creation and implementation, even 
as it was empowered to monitor government compliance with the provisions of the Act. 
Additionally, the Act assigns functions to and creates obligations for other Agencies of 
Government and the National Assembly. To illustrate, S44(5) FRA 2007 mandates the 
Debt Management Office to “maintain comprehensive, reliable and current electronic 
database of internal and external public debts, guaranteeing public access to the infor-
mation”. Similarly, S30(1) of the FRA 2007 obligates the Budget Office to “monitor and 
evaluate the implementation of the Annual Budget, assess the attainment of fiscal tar-
gets and report there on a quarterly basis to the Fiscal Responsibility Council and the 
Joint Finance Committee of the National Assembly”. The Fiscal Responsibility Act was 
amended in 2011 to increase the powers of the Commission to enhance the execution 
of its functions. The provisions concerning the budget and debt management are not 
affected or altered by the Amendments. Also, the Fiscal Responsibility Commission 
operated until a 2014 administrative (downsizing) reform of the public sector, when its 
functions were absorbed by the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commis-
sion (Premium Times, 2014).  
3.3.3. The Fiscal Responsibility Act and Government Borrowing  
A review of the provisions reveals that the government of Nigeria sought to avoid the 
outcomes which emanated from the borrowing practices of the 1970s and 1980s. Parts 
IX (SS41-43) and X (SS44-47) of the Act stipulate the processes and purposes by which 
all tiers and arms of government may acquire and manage debt.  
1. Debt Acquisition and Use 
S41(1)(a) of the Act states as follows: “Government at all tiers shall only borrow for 
capital expenditure and human development, provided that, such borrowing shall be on 
concessional terms with low interest rate and with a reasonably long amortization peri-
od subject to the approval of the appropriate legislative body where necessary”. In 
effect, this section confines the purposes for which the Government may borrow to 
Capital Expenditure and Human Development. The introduction of human development 
as a condition for borrowing seems to compel the government to ensure that borrow-
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ing is undertaken for the betterment of the Nigerian people. This is in direct contrast to 
the approach of the 1970s and 1980s, where the government could borrow for any 
purpose it determined necessary. Importantly, the government is restricted to seeking 
concessional loans provided at low interest rates. This condition may be construed as a 
reaction to the rapid escalation of obligations which arose from the terms of commer-
cial loans of the Paris Club in the 1970s and 1980s. Should the government satisfy re-
quirements for borrowing as stated in this section, it must then secure the approval of 
the legislature, i.e., the National Assembly prior to debt acquisition. 
However, S41(2) provides a caveat to the sections above, as it allows the Federal 
Government obtain loans from the capital market, should such an undertaking receive 
approval from the National Assembly. This section suggests that State Governments and 
Government Agencies are precluded from obtaining commercial loans, and are restrict-
ed to obtaining concessional loans. Also, it would be assumed that loans obtained from 
the capital market would be subjected to the justifications of S41(1)(a), i.e., loans 
should be for the purposes of capital expenditure and human development, prior to 
approval by the National Assembly.  
The FRA 2007 requires that public sector borrowers engage in rigorous economic 
analysis in order to justify the proposed acquisition of debt. S44(1) states “Any Govern-
ment in the Federation or its agencies and corporations desirous of borrowing shall, 
specify the purpose for which the borrowing is intended and present a cost-benefit 
analysis, detailing the economic and social benefits of the purpose to which the intend-
ed borrowing is to be applied”.  
 
 
Figure 5: Debt Acquisition Process under the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 
2. Debt Limits 
S42(1) empowers the President, as advised by the Minister responsible for Finance, and 
as approved by the National Assembly to set limits of consolidated debt for all tiers of 
Government: Federal, State and Local. This section stipulates that limits are consistent 
with the provisions of the Act generally, and with the medium-term fiscal framework. 
Per S12(1) of the FRA 2007, government expenditure in each financial year is capped at 
the level of its estimated revenue, plus a maximum deficit level of 3 per cent of GDP. To 
Loan for Capital 
Expenditure and Human 
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Cost-benefit analysis +
Economic and Social
Benefits?
Concessional Loan+Low 
Interest Rate+Long 
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ensure that government borrowing is maintained within these limits, S42(3) requires 
that the Commission investigate compliance of government agencies, on a quarterly 
basis. S42(4) mandates the Commission to “publish, on a quarterly basis, a list of the 
Governments in the Federation that have exceeded the limits of consolidated debt, 
indicating the amount by which the limit was exceeded”. Where the set limits of bor-
rowing have been exceeded, S42(5) requires that the excess be reduced by a minimum 
of 25 per cent in the following quarter, and brought within stated limits in the course of 
three (3) subsequent quarters. 
 
 
Figure 6: Institutional Matrix to Govern Borrowing Limits 
The Minister responsible for Finance is empowered by S47(1) to provide guarantees on 
behalf of any Government in the Federation. S47(2) makes federal guarantees on debt 
acquired by other levels of Government contingent on a counter-guarantee in an 
amount equal to or higher than the guarantee obligation, if there are no obligations 
outstanding from the requester to the guarantor and its controlled corporations. Addi-
tionally, S47(2)(a) limits the recipients of guarantees to State and Local Governments, 
and S47(2)(b) allows the Federal Government direct access to, and use of tax receipts 
and statutory transfers of the recipient.  
Importantly, S47(3) prohibits the acquisition of external or foreign currency denomi-
nated debt by State or Local Governments, or Federal Agencies, without a federal guar-
antee. Even so, the extent of guarantees provided by the Federal Government are sub-
ject to the limits on borrowing as set by the President. S47(4) renders unlawful guaran-
tees by the Federal Government which exceed debt limits: “Any guarantee provided in 
excess of the debts limits set pursuant to section 44(1) of this Act shall be an offence”. 
However, the Act does not specify the penalties for the offence, nor does it stipulate 
processes or institutions responsible for the enforcement of this provision. It seems that 
the Act serves as a tool of risk management, and as a deterrent, in order to manage the 
overall debt profile of the government and maintain public debt at sustainable levels. 
2a. President-set limits on all 
government borrowing (in a manner 
consistent with Medium Term Fiscal 
Framework). 
1. Advice from Minister of Finance
3. Fiscal Responsibility Commission-
monitor compliance and publish 
quarterly reports to ensure compliance 
with limits set by the President
2b. National Assembly-approve 
government borrowing limits
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While the definition and level of sustainability are not prescribed, the National Assembly 
and Minister responsible for Finance are placed as the institution and official responsible 
for debt sustainability: S41(1)(c) states that “Government shall ensure that the level of 
public debt as a proportion of national income is held at a sustainable level as prescribed 
by the National Assembly from time to time on the advice of the Minister”.  
3. Enforcement of Debt Management Rules 
a) Debt Acquisition and Use: 
i. The provisions of S41 (purpose and procedure for government borrowing) create 
binding obligations on the Government, as seen in S41(3) which states “Non-
compliance with the provisions of this section shall make the action taken an of-
fence”.  
ii. S45(1) requires that Banks and Financial Institutions demand and obtain proof of 
compliance with the provisions of the Act concerning government borrowing, 
prior to the provision of debt finance to government. Failure to do so is created 
an offence by S45(2) which states “lending by banks and financial institutions in 
contravention of this Part shall be unlawful”. 
b) Debt Management: 
i. S42(6)(a) stipulates that those arms or tiers of Government which do not comply 
with the stipulations which govern the limits of borrowing (S42(1)), are preclud-
ed from further borrowing, whether from internal or external sources, unless 
such borrowing is for the refinancing of existing debt.  
ii. Also, S42(6)(b) states that violators of S42(1) are required to “bring the debt 
within the established limit by restricting funding commitments accordingly”.  
iii. Where a tier or arm of Government fails to reduce the excess in borrowing limits 
within the time-period stipulated in S42(5), i.e., 3 quarters, S42(7) stipulates that 
the offending arm of Government is prohibited from receiving grants from any 
Government in the Federation.  
c) Debt Repayment:  
i. S43(1) stipulates that the burden of loan repayments will be borne by the tier of 
Government that obtained the loan: “Servicing of external debts shall be the di-
rect responsibility of the Government that incurred the debt”. Also, S43(2) states 
that the cost of servicing loans obtained by other tiers or arms of Government 
which are guaranteed by the Federal Government, are to be taken at source 
from the federation account.   
ii. S47(2)(b) states that “the counter-guarantee required by the Federal Govern-
ment from State or Local Government or by State from Local Government, may 
consist in the appropriation of tax revenue directly collected and resulting from 
statutory transfers and the guarantor shall be authorised to retain such revenue 
and use the respective amount to repay overdue debts”. 
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3.3.4. Institutional Supervision of Fiscal Rules  
The first part of the Act deals with the establishment of the Fiscal Responsibility Com-
mission: S1(1) of the FRA 2007 creates the Fiscal Responsibility Commission, which is 
designed to operate as a hybrid think-tank, economic watchdog, investigator and rule-
making institution. S3 of the Act states the responsibilities of the Commission;  
3.-(1) The Commission shall: 
(a)  monitor and enforce the provisions of this Act and by so doing, promote the eco-
nomic objectives contained in section 16 of the Constitution; 
(b) disseminate such standard practices including international good practice that will 
result in greater efficiency in the allocation and management of public expenditure, 
revenue collection, debt control and transparency in fiscal matters; 
(c) undertake fiscal and financial studies, analysis and diagnosis and disseminate the 
result to the general public; 
(d) make rules for carrying out its, functions under this Act; and 
(e) perform any other function consistent with the promotion of the objectives of this Act. 
 
The independence of the Commission is explicitly stated in S3(2) of the Act. The compo-
sition of the governing board is prescribed in S5(1) which provides for broad represen-
tation of interest groups, including the Private Sector, Civil Society, Labour, the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, and Representatives of Geopolitical Zones. S10 implies that the 
Commission should operate as a Federal Agency supervised by the National Assembly: 
“The Commission shall prepare and submit to the National Assembly not later than 30th 
June in each financial year; a report of its activities including all cases of contravention 
investigated during the preceding financial year, and shall include in the report a copy 
of its audited accounts for the preceding financial year”. 
The work of the Fiscal Responsibility Commission in supervising the debt management 
provisions of the Fiscal Responsibility Act was to be complemented by the Debt Manage-
ment Office (DMO). Legal underpinning for the DMO is the Debt Management Establish-
ment Act of the National Assembly 2003. This Act amalgamated 7 government depart-
ments and agencies which managed external debt in Nigeria (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012).  
S6 of the DMO Act empowers the DMO to discharge the technical functions of debt 
management within the Nigerian Government, including advising the Government on 
amounts to be borrowed, as well as the terms on which loans are to be obtained. The 
DMO is also mandated to supervise the issue of guarantees by the Federal Government, 
and is responsible for the execution of loan repayments on behalf of Governments in 
Nigeria.  SS 21 and 22 of the DMO Act emphasize the function of the National Assembly 
in approving external loans, and prohibit the Minister responsible for Finance, and Fed-
eral Government Agencies from providing guarantees for external loans without the 
necessary approval of the National Assembly. The functions of the DMO, for the pur-
pose of debt management (as stated in the DMO Act) are presented in the table below.  
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The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 and the Debt Management Office Act 2003 are 
emphatic and deliberate in the restriction of the powers and abilities of the Nigerian 
Government, at all levels, to obtain debt finance. The Acts establish independent insti-
tutions, within government, to supervise, monitor and enforce legal stipulations which 
govern public debt management. Importantly, the Acts require that the government 
undertake technical, economic and social analyses, and present justifications for the 
acquisition of debt. These Acts detail the conditions, processes and circumstances 
which the government must follow, even as it disperses the decision making across 
different arms and tiers of government, in order to ensure that the acquisition, use and 
management of debt finance are prosecuted for the benefit of Nigerians; the National 
Assembly, as the arm of government which represents the Nigerian population, is des-
ignated as the final approval point for the acquisition of debt finance. In this way, the 
decision to acquire debt is decided by the Nigerian people. The Minister responsible for 
Finance is advised by the Budget Office and the Debt Management Office on the eco-
nomic factors to consider in seeking debt finance. The President sets the limits for debt 
in a manner consistent with the medium-term fiscal framework, as approved by the 
National Assembly. All of these processes are governed by law, to ensure predictability, 
accountability and transparency in the acquisition, use and management of debt fi-
nance. The effectiveness of these Acts in regulating government behaviour are evaluat-
ed in Chapter 4.  
Table 10: DMO Act- Functions of DMO for Debt Management 
Function DMO Act S6  DMO Act Other Sections 
Debt 
Acquisition 
(h) advise the Minister on the terms and 
conditions on which movies, whether in the 
currency of Nigeria or in any other currency, are 
to be borrowed;  
(i) submit to the Federal Government, for 
consideration in the annual budget, a forecast 
of borrowing capacity in local and foreign 
currencies; 
19.-(1) The Office shall annually advise the 
Federal Government on the financing gap 
for the succeeding financial year and the 
amounts to be borrowed for bridging the 
gap both internally and externally. 
(2) Any advice issued by the Office under 
subsection (1) of this section shall, among 
other things, form the basis of the national 
borrowing programme for the succeeding 
financial year as may be approved by the 
National Assembly.  
(3) The Office shall participate in the 
negotiation and acquisition of such loans 
and credit referred to in Subsection (I) of 
this Section. 
Debt 
Repayment 
(b) prepare and submit to Federal Government a 
forecast of loan service obligations for each 
financial year;  
(d) verify and service external debts guaranteed 
or directly taken by the Federal Government;  
(e) on agency basis, service external debts taken 
by State Governments and any of their 
agencies: where such debts are guaranteed by 
the Federal Government; 
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Function DMO Act S6  DMO Act Other Sections 
Debt 
Management 
(a) maintain a reliable database of all loans taken 
or guaranteed by the Federal or State 
Governments or any of their agencies;  
(c) prepare and implement a plan for the efficient 
management of Nigeria's external and domestic 
debt obligations at sustainable levels 
compatible with desired economic activities for 
growth and development; and participate in 
negotiations aimed at realising those objectives;  
 
Technical 
and Advisory 
Services to 
the 
Government 
(f) set guidelines for managing Federal 
Government financial risks and currency 
exposure with respect to all loans;  
(g) advise the Federal Government on the re-
structuring and re-financing of all debt 
obligations;  
(j) prepare a schedule of any other Federal 
Government obligations such as trade debts 
and other contingent liabilities, both explicit 
and implicit, and provide advice on policies and 
procedures for their management;  
(k) establish and maintain relationships with 
international and local financial institutions, 
creditors and institutional investors in 
Government debts;  
(l) collect, collate, disseminate information, data 
and forecasts on debt management with the 
approval of the Board  
(m) carry out such other function, which may be 
delegated to it by the Minister or by an Act of 
the National Assembly; and  
 
(n) perform such other functions which in the 
opinion of the Office are required for the effective 
implementation of its functions under this Act.  
 
3.4. Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
The Government of Rwanda attributed progress recorded after the war and genocide to 
radical reforms (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2002). Thus, the Rwanda 
PRSP of 2002 was premised on the necessity of a coherent strategy for sustainable de-
velopment and poverty reduction, which would avoid the economic stagnation the coun-
try had endured in its recent past (ibid). In this way, the PRSP can be considered as an 
expansive agenda of reforms, and an implementation approach for the country.  
The Rwanda PRSP was a 10year development strategy intended to guarantee pov-
erty reduction and economic growth. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MINEFCON), through the National Poverty Reduction Programme prepared the PRSP 
between 2000 and 2002. The development strategy presented by the Government was 
also a system for mobilization of Communities, the Private Sector, Civil Society and 
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External Donors towards rebuilding the country. Through a national consultative pro-
cess, the Government asserted that the priorities adopted addressed the needs of the 
poor, which would be tackled through actions guided by technical analysis (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, 2002). 6 areas were identified for priority interven-
tions: 
• Rural development and agricultural transformation 
• Human development 
• Economic infrastructure 
• Governance 
• Private sector development 
• Institutional capacity-building 
3.4.1. Reform Agenda and Implementation  
The Government of Rwanda attributed poverty to two main factors, firstly, the failure to 
increase productivity as the population grew. The government refers to the “massive 
terms of trade shock” caused by the crash of the price of coffee on the international mar-
ket in the 1980s (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2002, p. 6). The fallout was 
microeconomic problems which included: low agricultural productivity, low human re-
source development, limited opportunities for employment with an oversupply of un-
skilled workers, high population density and growth. Also, the country’s landlocked posi-
tion created high transport costs, even as the country suffered from environment degra-
dation, chronic decline in soil fertility, poor water management, and deforestation (ibid).  
Secondly, the war and genocide of 1994 “left a horrific legacy”, and further impover-
ished the country (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2002, p. 6). It was esti-
mated that up to 1million people were killed, and 3million fled to neighbouring coun-
tries. Infrastructure across the country was destroyed, and social links in rural and urban 
areas were damaged, which impeded internal commerce. Social problems abounded: 
107,000 people in prison awaited trial for crimes related to genocide. These people 
created a significant economic burden on the state, as well as the women and children 
who provided their upkeep. Also, health problems were rife, including the prevalence of 
HIV due to the combination of large-scale population movements, and the use of rape 
as a weapon (ibid).  
The Government embraced the challenge of rebuilding the country, and chose to 
revive and rely upon traditional social organisations, including: 
• Umuganda: the tradition of work on public projects 
• Ubudehe: the tradition of mutual assistance 
• Gacaca: communal resolution of disputes 
• Umusanzu: support for the needy and contribution to the achievement of a com-
mon goal  
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Furthermore, linguistic homogeneity and high population density were also identified 
by the government as positive features to be utilized in the implementation of the na-
tional development strategy.  
The Post-Genocide Government put forward its achievements, including stability, 
security, and a major programme of liberalisation, through which the country had rec-
orded significant growth. Decentralization of governance and popular participation had 
been fostered by the establishment of political and administrative structures.  These 
successes notwithstanding, the government highlighted challenges in the areas of shel-
ter, demobilization, the legal system and restructuring of political institutions. To tackle 
these challenges, it was imperative for the Government to provide infrastructure and 
other basic services to support sustained economic growth. Indeed, the Government 
assumed primary responsibility for economic improvement: “without energetic public 
action, growth would be likely to falter, making poverty reduction impossible. Energetic 
public action to accelerate economic growth is therefore central to the PRSP” (Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning, 2002, p. 8).  
The PRSP was coordinated by the National Poverty Reduction Programme, domiciled 
in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and implemented through the ac-
tions of Government and other parties. Actions undertaken under the PRSP were placed 
in the larger context of Rwanda’s specific goal to become a middle-income country by 
2020. In the area of public debt, the objective of the government was to maintain debt 
at sustainable levels, measured by NPV of debts-to-exports ratio of 150 per cent.  
The country’s overall long-term objectives were given in the PRSP (Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning, 2002) as: 
1. Good political and economic governance 
2. Rural economic transformation 
3. Development of services and manufacturing  
4. Human resource development 
5. Development and promotion of the private sector 
6. Regional and international economic integration and; 
7. Poverty reduction  
 
The preparation of the PRSP was central to the process of achieving debt relief. Gov-
ernment action to achieve the goals of the PRSP was directed toward 6 areas: 
1. Institutional and legal changes 
2. Resolution of regional conflict 
3. Prioritization of public Expenditure in a coherent programme, in keeping with the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
4. Development of sector strategies to define sector action plans 
5. Development of decentralized and participatory structures and capacities of prov-
ince, district and cellule level 
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6. Establishment of principles, indicators and institutional mechanisms for develop-
ment monitoring 
 
A 2005 review of progress towards achieving the goals of the PRSP showed that the 
country’s external debt profile remained high: its total obligations were projected to 
increase from US$1.336billion in 2001 to US$1.485billion in 2003 (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2005). The objective of achieving debt sustainability, particularly NPV of 
debts-to-exports ratio of 150 per cent had not been achieved. Rather, in 2003, this 
stood at 299.9 per cent. Nonetheless, the IMF noted that debt relief which should have 
been granted at the HIPC expected completion point (2004), would have released funds 
to kick-start new productive investments in the economy. Notwithstanding the coun-
try’s inability to reach the HIPC completion point, IFIs provided debt relief to the value 
of US$22.93 million in 2003 (International Monetary Fund, 2005). Note that the HIPC 
Completion was determined by successful implementation of reforms by borrower 
countries (See 3.1.1). The 2005 report notes that the country had awaited 
US$452million in relief since 1999. This position is corroborated by a 2001 report of the 
African Development Bank which states that Rwanda qualified for debt relief to the 
value of US$452million at the end of 1999 (African Development Bank, 2001). This re-
port also refers to the HIPC decision point of 2000, i.e., the point at which IFIs decided 
to provide debt relief to Rwanda. Also, the report speaks of the expected completion 
point, i.e., 2003, at which the country was expected to have implemented the PRSP for 
one year, maintained a balanced macroeconomic environment support by an IMF loan 
facility, economic reforms, including privatisation of state-owned firms, and improve-
ments in social development (ibid).  
In April 2005, upon reaching the HIPC completion point, the IMF and World Bank 
cancelled Rwanda’s external debt to the value of US$1.4billion. Pedro Alba, then World 
Bank Country Director for Rwanda stated that the completion point reflected “major 
and sustained efforts” the country had made towards implementation of reforms and 
the delivery of social services. Similarly, Kristina Kostial, then IMF Mission Chief in 
Rwanda noted that the country had largely achieved macroeconomic stability, and es-
tablished a good track record of policy implementation in 2004 (News 24, 2005). Several 
months later, in December 2005, the IMF announced debt relief under the MDRI for 
Rwanda (along with 19 other countries), i.e., a 100 per cent cancellation of the balance 
of Rwanda’s external debt, which was valued at US$76million. This was provided to 
support the country towards the achievement of the MDGs. The country qualified to 
benefit from the HIPC as a result of its “overall satisfactory recent macroeconomic per-
formance, progress in poverty reduction, and improvements in public expenditure 
management” (International Monetary Fund, 2005). Also, the IMF noted that the Or-
ganic Budget Law had been submitted to Parliament. The 2006 PRSP progress report 
notes that the country reached the HIPC completion point in 2005, and debt relief was 
expected to allow Rwanda save resources that would have been spent on debt service, 
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estimated at US$48million annually for a period of 10years (International Monetary 
Fund, 2006). Following debt relief, the country reached a sustainable debt position 
where the NPV of debt-to-exports ratio was recorded at less than 60 per cent (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2008).  
3.4.2. Budget Reform: The Organic Laws on State Finances and Property 
In 2006, the Organic Law on State Finances and Property No 37/2006 of 12/09/2006 
was enacted. This instrument was referred to in the 2002 PRSP as the forthcoming Fi-
nance Law (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2002). In 78 Articles, this legis-
lation combines procedural and quantitative rules to supervise government use and 
management of public resources. Article 3 states: “This Organic Law relates to the com-
position, preparation, adoption and implementation of the budget of central admin-
istration, local administrative entities and other public entities, which is the general 
budget of state finances”. The Organic Law provides various government offices and 
institutions with powers and responsibilities to execute its provisions. Macroeconomic 
stability is stated as the objective of government in Article 4, which stipulates that “the 
preparation and implementation of central Government and Local Administrative Enti-
ties budgets shall be made with the aim of attaining macroeconomic stability, by re-
specting budgetary and economic policies that ensure a sustainable and stable national 
economic development”. Accordingly, public debt management is governed in Chapter 
V, Articles 54 to 65.  
The Law was revised in 2013 as the Organic Law No 12/2013/OL of 12/09/2013 on 
State Finances and Property. The 2013 Law is applicable to all levels of government per 
Article 2: “This Organic Law shall relate to public financial management of Central Gov-
ernment, Local Administration, Public Institutions and Parastatal Organizations”. This 
implies the removal of the autonomy of decentralised authorities to prepare and adopt 
budgets; under Article 5 of the 2006 Law, local administrative authorities were author-
ised to implemented budgets to be approved by their respective councils. Furthermore, 
Article 5 of the 2013 Law creates an obligation on public institutions to comply with its 
general principles and provisions in the classification, preparation and approval of their 
budgets. Articles 50 to 61 of the 2013 Law govern public debt management, and are 
presented below, alongside the relevant provisions of the 2006 Law. 
1. Debt Acquisition and Use  
The Law states clearly the purposes for which the Government of Rwanda may borrow, 
i.e., economic stability and improvement. These purposes are stated in the table below: 
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Table 11: Purposes for which the Government of Rwanda may borrow under the Organic Budget Laws 
2013 Law: Article 51 2006 Law: Article 57 
51 On the basis of a funding proposal prepared and 
presented by the Minister to the Chamber of Deputies 
for approval, the Government may borrow money:  
1. to finance annual budget deficits;  
2. to refinance maturing debt or a loan paid before the 
redemption date;  
3. to boost foreign currency reserves;  
4. to maintain credit balances on a bank account of the 
consolidated Fund;  
5. to regulate monetary conditions should the necessity 
arise;  
6. for any other purpose necessary for sound fiscal policy 
and effective debt management.  
 
The Minister shall have the powers to select, after 
consultations with the National Bank of Rwanda, the 
form, terms and conditions of borrowing, with the aim of 
maintaining and improving national sovereign debt 
ratings.  
57 Upon proposal by the Minister, the Government 
may borrow loans:  
1. to finances budget deficits;  
2. to repay the maturing debt or a loan prior to its 
redemption date;  
3. for any other purpose necessary for sound fiscal 
policy and effective debt management.  
 
The Minister has authority to choose the form of 
loan and to approve the terms of borrowing in 
consultation with the National Bank of Rwanda, with 
the aim of maintaining and improving national 
sovereign ratings of debt servicing. 
 
The 2013 Law expands the purposes for which the government may borrow from 3 to 6, 
and directs the Minister responsible for Finance to consult with the National Bank on 
the nature and terms of loans to be obtained by the Government.  
1.1. Authority to borrow is vested in the Minister responsible for Finance, with other 
levels of Government requiring the approval of the Minister prior to the acquisition 
of debt. While the 2006 law allowed Local Administrative Entities to obtain loans if 
these complied with relevant laws, the 2013 Law constrains the powers of these En-
tities to acquire debt, and introduces the approval of the Minister as a condition for 
borrowing. Also, the Minister is empowered to set a limit on amounts to be bor-
rowed.  
 
Whereas the 2006 Law stipulated that approval of Parliament is required to obtain 
external loans, the 2013 law does not expressly refer to conditions or approvals neces-
sary to obtain foreign debt. The table below presents the provisions which state the 
authority of government agencies to acquire debt.  
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Table 12: Authority to Borrow under the Organic Budget Laws 
2013 Law: Article 50 2006: Article 54 
50 The Minister shall be the sole person with the 
authority to borrow or to permit borrowing for 
purpose of financing the Central Government 
budget deficit or to raise loans for other public 
entities.  
 
The Minister shall also be the sole authority to give 
and approve guarantees and security for the loans 
granted to public institutions by financial 
institutions.  
 
For decentralized entities, the Council of each entity 
may borrow loans only for development projects 
upon authorization of the Minister. However, the 
Minister shall, by use of instructions, determine the 
maximum amount that the Council may borrow 
without prior authorization from the Minister.  
 
The members of organs of decentralized entities 
shall not have powers to give guarantees but may 
pledge securities for a debt. An Order of the 
Minister shall determine the procedures for giving 
and approving guarantees and pledging securities by 
decentralised entities.  
Public institutions may borrow, but with 
authorization of the Minister.  
54 In accordance with the decisions taken by Cabinet, 
the Minister shall be the sole authority to borrow or to 
permit borrowing public money from any legal entity or 
from an individual for financing the central Government 
budget deficit, or, to raise loans, for other public bodies. 
  
The Minister shall also be the sole authority to give or 
approve securities for the borrowing, such as public 
enterprise and financial institutions. The powers may be 
delegated to other public officers. 
In local administrative entities, the local council of each 
entity may borrow loans for development projects only 
in accordance with the law establishing the source of 
finances and property of Districts and the City of Kigali 
and their use. 
As for loans from external sources, the approval shall be 
granted by Parliament. 
 
Public enterprises may borrow, but with the approval of 
the Minister.  
 
Autonomous, public entities, constitutional public 
bodies and extra budgetary institutions shall not borrow 
loans. 
2. Debt Management 
Like its precursor, the 2006 Law, the 2013 Law provides measures for the management 
of public debt, including an obligation for the Government to maintain a debt profile 
database. All levels of Government are required to keep detailed records of debt obliga-
tions and repayments. The provisions which govern debt management are presented 
the table below: 
Table 13: Debt Management under the Organic Budget Laws 
2013 Law: Article 56 2006 Law: Article 60 
56 The Minister shall, in consultation with the National 
Bank of Rwanda, maintain a detailed record of all 
public debt and Government securities or guarantees 
on third party debt, as well as the repayment plan 
under that debt.  
 
The Minister shall also maintain a detailed record of 
Government loans to public entities and repayment 
plan of such loans.  
 
Interest and principal payments to the Government 
shall be recorded in an appropriate register monitored 
and recognized as State revenues.  
60 The Minister shall, in consultation with the National 
Bank of Rwanda, maintain a detailed record of all 
public debt and Government securities on third party 
debt, as well as the schedule of payments obligated 
under that debt.  
 
The Minister shall also maintain a detailed record of 
Government loans to public enterprises, local 
administrative entities and extra budgetary funds, as 
well as the payment schedule to Government of such 
lending.  
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2013 Law: Article 56 2006 Law: Article 60 
Public entities shall maintain detailed records and 
accounts of borrowing and debt servicing, as 
prescribed by the Minister’s instructions, to enable 
disclosure of liabilities to the State and other parties.  
In the following budget year, interest and principal 
payments to the Government shall be recorded in an 
appropriate register and shall be monitored in the 
context of the annual budget revenues.  
 
Local administrative entities, public enterprises and 
extra budgetary funds shall maintain detailed records 
and accounts of borrowing and debt servicing, as 
prescribed by the Minister’s Instructions. 
 
Additionally, the Government is required to develop and publish a debt management 
strategy which specifies limits on public borrowing, as well as the types of loans which 
may be obtained by Government. Thereafter, the National Bank is mandated to execute 
the assignments necessary to implement the strategy. The relevant provisions are out-
lined in the table below:  
Table 14: Debt Management Strategy under the Organic Budget Laws 
2013 Law: Article 57 2006 Law: Articles 61 and 62 
57 The Minister shall prepare and publish each year 
the public debt management strategy. He shall enact 
instructions on any borrowing and loans the 
Government may from time to time guarantee.  
 
In formulating debt management guidelines and 
implementing the annual debt management strategy, 
the Minister shall, each year, consult with the National 
Bank of Rwanda, so as to avoid any possible conflicts 
among the objectives of fiscal, debt management, 
trade, monetary and exchange policies.  
 
In accordance with written agreement with the 
Minister, the National Bank of Rwanda shall provide all 
the services required for the execution of decisions on 
effective management of public debt.  
61The Minister shall prepare and publish a public debt 
management strategy each year. He/she shall publish 
the terms and conditions of any borrowing, as well as 
those of loans the Government may guarantee from 
time to time. 
 
62 In formulating debt management guidelines and 
implementing the annual debt management strategy, 
the Minister shall, each year, consult with the National 
Bank of Rwanda, so as to avoid any possible conflicts 
between the objectives of fiscal policy, debt 
management policy, trade policy and exchange rate 
policy.  
 
In accordance with written agreement with the 
Minister, the National Bank of Rwanda shall provide all 
the services required for the execution of decisions on 
effective management of public debt. 
3. Debt Limits 
The 2013 law introduces a mechanism to set limits on public debt. This responsibility is 
assigned to the Chamber of Deputies (lower legislative house), which is mandated to set 
the limits for Government borrowing on an annual basis. This provision dilutes the pow-
er of the Central Government to borrow, and requires the Government to review limits 
on public debt annually.  
 
Article 52 of the 2013 Law states: 
“While voting the annual budget, basing on the recommendations of the Central 
Government, the Chamber of Deputies shall set the overall general limit of the 
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source of new borrowing as well as the securities that may be given by Central 
Government. Debt of third parties to be taken over by the Central Government 
shall be included within this limit. Subject to the approval of the Chamber of 
Deputies, the Minister may recommend different limits on:  
1. total domestic borrowing, including short term overdrafts;  
2. total foreign borrowing”.  
 
Furthermore, Article 53 of the 2013 Law specifies the process for debt monitoring and 
repayment: “The Minister or the Chairperson of the Executive Committee of the decen-
tralized entity shall be the sole authorities to ensure that all payments required to meet 
debt obligations emanating from loans approved by the Chamber of Deputies or Council 
of the decentralized entity are budgeted for and payments made to creditors according 
to the repayment provisions of the loan agreements”. 
Through these provisions, the Organic Budget Law supervises and regulates the 
Government in the acquisition, use and management of public debt. The Law places the 
Minister responsible for Finance, and to a lesser degree, the National Bank of Rwanda 
as the official and institution responsible for public debt. Their functions include tech-
nical and economic analyses, as well as monitoring and reporting of other arms and 
agencies of government. The 2013 Law introduces restrictions on the powers of decen-
tralized authorities to assume debt obligations, even as it expands the reasons for which 
the central government may borrow. The effectiveness of the Organic Budget Law in 
supervising the functions of the government of Rwanda in the area of debt manage-
ment are evaluated in Chapter 4.  
3.5. Reforms: Laws and Institutions for Debt Relief 
The mechanisms and processes for debt relief necessitated the implementation of re-
forms which altered the fundamental systems for public finance management in Nigeria 
and Rwanda. These reforms reflect the influence and dominance of IFIs in the interna-
tional finance system. As seen through the case-studies of both countries, the PRSPs 
were the basis for wide-ranging reforms in borrower countries. While the World Bank 
and IMF are quick to emphasize the ‘country-driven’ nature of the reform process, a 
review of the Nigeria and Rwanda experiences reveal striking similarities in reform 
agenda and execution. Both countries state macroeconomic stability as the over-
arching objective of economic reforms (See 3.3. for Nigeria and 3.4. for Rwanda). This is 
reflective of the influence possessed and exerted by international finance institutions 
on borrower countries. During the SAPs of the 1980s, the IMF was criticized for its focus 
on short-term economic improvement, particularly with the balance of payments situa-
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tion of borrower countries. However, the PRSPs, while centred on economic indicators, 
speak to the political, institutional and social aspects of national development. In this 
regard, Harrison’s assertion that the PRSP and HIPC are upgraded versions of SAPs seem 
justified (See 3.1.2).  
Also, the governance agenda of IFIs can be observed in the roles and functions as-
signed to government in the reform agenda. In both countries, government (in consul-
tation with stakeholders) determined the goals of development, the metrics by which 
achievement would be measured, and the implementation. In this regard, the argument 
put forward by Chang is validated, i.e., that the state coordinates change, provides vi-
sion, manages conflict and builds institutions (Chang, 1999). Importantly, the institu-
tions approach is central to the reform agenda in both Nigeria and Rwanda. Both PRSPs 
articulated the institutional and governmental structures to manage the reform pro-
cess. The Ministries of Finance in the national governments were assigned functions of 
supervision, coordination and mobilization in the execution of the reform agenda (See 
3.3.3 and 3.4.2).  
Legal reforms, specifically legislations were introduced to ensure the achievement of 
macroeconomic stability. These legislations are similar to and replicate rules which exist 
in other political and economic systems, both western and emerging economies (See 
3.2). Legal instruments to guide and regulate government management of state reve-
nue and expenditure, i.e., budgetary legislation were enacted in both countries: the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 in Nigeria and the Organic Finance Laws (2006 and 2013) 
in Rwanda. The provisions of these laws are extensive, as they stipulate the roles, func-
tions and operations of government and its institutions. The laws also serve as tools to 
guide the behaviour of government in the performance of its functions and obligations: 
processes, timelines and standards for economic management are prescribed.  
For the purpose of debt management, the provisions of the laws clearly stipulate the 
importance of prudence. Mechanisms are established to ensure that the powers and 
authority to acquire debt are restricted to specific arms of government. In the case of 
external debt, the approval of national parliaments is required prior to the acquisition of 
debt obligations. Furthermore, the justifications and reasons for which debt can be 
acquired are provided: for example, in Nigeria, borrower governments are required to 
present undertakings which directly benefit the Nigerian population. In Rwanda, the 
Government is allowed to borrow for the purposes of economic improvement, as quali-
fied under the Budget Laws.  
Importantly, budgetary legislations demand that governments undertake economic 
and technical analyses to manage the economy. Both countries adopted the medium-
term expenditure framework, through which 3year forward planning is undertaken, as 
well as annual calculations/reviews of revenue and expenditure. Debt management is 
given as a central responsibility of Government, assigned to the Ministers of Finance. 
While the definitions of debt sustainability are subjective, the budgetary legislations in 
both countries speak to sustainability, which can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid 
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situations of unmanageable debt, as experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. Also, these 
legislations empower government institutions to undertake supervisory functions to 
ensure compliance with legal obligations concerning debt management. There is a clear 
connection between budgetary reforms and debt relief; the PRSPs of Nigeria and Rwan-
da referred to the necessity of legal instruments to manage public finance, and direct 
government management of public finances. The table below presents the relief ob-
tained and budget-related reforms undertaken by the Governments of Nigeria and 
Rwanda. 
Table 15: Debt Relief and Legal Reforms 
Country 
 
Creditor Amount Cancelled  Proportion of debt (cancelled) 
owed to Creditor  
Budgetary Reform 
Nigeria Paris Club US$18billion 60 per cent Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 
Rwanda Multilateral 
Institutions 
US$1.5billion • To sustainable level- as 
agreed under Enhanced HIPC 
• 100 per cent under MDRI 
Organic Budget 
Laws 
 
These reforms provide the opportunity to examine the relationship between laws and 
economic development, particularly the ways in which institutions interact with the 
processes and outcomes of economic development. The PRSPs and Public Finance Laws 
in Nigeria and Rwanda (Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 and Organic Budget Laws of 2006 
and 2013, respectively) serve as strategy and management systems, speak to specific 
goal of macroeconomic stability, and explicitly seek to supervise the behaviour and 
functions of government in the area of public finance management. As such, it is possi-
ble to evaluate whether, and to the extent that laws and institutions have served to 
regulate government behaviour. Furthermore, these reforms, as prescribed by IFIs are 
intended to create conducive policy environments in which economic development can 
be achieved. It follows that the effectiveness and adequacy of these reforms for the 
purpose of the management of the process of economic development can be exam-
ined.  
3.6. Summary 
The experiences of Nigeria and Rwanda in obtaining debt relief reveal the political 
economy of the international finance system. Both countries received relief following 
the implementation of policy and institutional reforms. It can be argued that the bor-
rower countries are in a weaker bargaining position, and as such, are constrained to 
adopt reforms, whether these are prescribed or recommended by creditors. The supe-
rior power of creditors in setting standards and measurements of economic perfor-
mance, as well as the extent of influence these have in the economic position of bor-
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rower countries is exemplified in the case of Rwanda: the country’s NPV of debts-to-
exports ratio drastically reduced as a result of debt relief granted, not necessarily as an 
outcome of economic improvement (See 3.4.1).  
Nonetheless, reforms undertaken towards the implementation of PRSPs delivered 
benefits including; the establishment of procedures and systems to manage economic 
development. Budgetary legislations require governments to engage in planning, evalu-
ations, forecasting and justifications, especially as these concern public debt manage-
ment. Also, legal instruments regulate government behaviour, and establish a frame-
work for institutional supervision of government behaviour, compliance with the stipu-
lations of legislation, and performance of government functions. These reforms under-
taken for the purpose of macroeconomic stability were intended to foster transparency, 
predictability and accountability in government, a stable policy environment, and debt 
sustainability.  The effectiveness of these policy and institutional reforms in regulating 
government behaviour, and the adequacy of the provisions of budgetary legislation for 
the management of public debt are examined in Chapter 4.  
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PRSP-led reform programs led to the enactment of budgetary legislations in Nigeria and 
Rwanda. These legal instruments regulate government management of public debt, to 
prevent the build-up of unsustainable debt portfolios. Importantly, these instruments 
stipulate the purposes for, and mechanisms by which the governments of both coun-
tries may acquire debt finance. 
This chapter addresses the third question of this thesis- To what extent, have legal 
reforms contributed to the achievement of the objectives of debt relief? To answer this 
question, this chapter evaluates the effectiveness of budgetary legislations as they su-
pervise government management of public debt, as well as the extent to which legal 
frameworks have contributed to the sustainability of debt portfolios in Nigeria and 
Rwanda. These evaluations are undertaken through the examination of the provisions 
of budgetary legislations, on the basis of two questions; firstly, have budgetary legisla-
tions affected government behaviour, and how? Secondly, have changes in government 
behaviour led to sustainable debt portfolios? 
The case-study of Nigeria and Rwanda presents three important lessons for the use 
of law as an instrument of economic development. Firstly, laws have improved institu-
tional practices in the management of public debt in both Nigeria and Rwanda. The 
examination of budgetary legislations in both countries highlight the importance of 
proper conceptualization of legal instruments which enable improved economic out-
comes. 
Secondly, the interplay of law and institutions, as considered through the evaluation 
the effectiveness of budgetary legislation in Nigeria and Rwanda portrays the reality of 
political systems as strong determinants of the success of legal reforms.  
Thirdly, the World Bank and IMF continue to influence the debt management sys-
tems, and economic development paths of borrower countries through reform pro-
grammes, as well as ownership of the tools, and frameworks by which sustainable debt, 
and economic development are measured. As a result, the World Bank/IMF agenda are 
reflected and replicated in the governance systems of Nigeria and Rwanda, which has 
led to stronger governments, as well as increased capacity of state institutions to moni-
tor and manage public debt portfolios.  
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4.1. Legal Reforms, Public Debt Management and Debt 
Sustainability  
The precarious position of borrower countries in the mid to late 1990s led to a series of 
reform initiatives within IFIs, including the debt relief mechanisms of the World Bank 
and IMF (HIPC and MDRI). These reforms provided relief on existing debt, and integrat-
ed the principle of debt sustainability into the policy and operations of governments, to 
avoid a repeat of the debt build-up of the 1970s and 1980s, and to foster the responsi-
ble use of debt finance.  
The late 1990s ushered in an emphatic drive towards global development, i.e., tan-
gible and measurable improvements in economies, social standards of living, and insti-
tutions or governance arrangements. The international development agenda was ex-
pressed through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a fifteen-year (2000-2015) 
international partnership of 189 signatory countries to achieve 8 goals (United Nations 
Millennium Project, 2006). The MDG partnership and agenda terminated in 2015, 
whereupon the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed upon by 193 coun-
tries, as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The SDGs expand the 
areas of concern to 17, with achievement to be measured against a list of indicators for 
each goal (United Nations, 2015).  
Debt sustainability is embedded into the wider international development policy and 
practice as an indicator of SDG 17, which presents the institutional, partnership and 
financing framework to support the achievement of the Goals. This framework includes 
official development assistance, debt relief, trade, capacity building, data monitoring 
and accountability, and technology. Specifically, Goal 17 seeks to “assist developing 
countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed 
at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and ad-
dress the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress” 
(United Nations, n.d.).  
Chapter 3 of this thesis presents the ways by which debt sustainability was used as 
the threshold to calculate and determine the eligibility of borrower countries for debt 
relief at international level. International institutions, particularly the World Bank and 
IMF which own the benchmarks, frameworks, metrics and tools by which debt sustaina-
bility is analysed, continue to influence the debt management systems of borrower 
countries. These analyses enable the evaluation of present financial health, calculation 
of risk of debt distress, and development of risk mitigation strategies. Some of these 
tools used for analysis of debt sustainability are presented in the table below: 
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Table 16: Tools for Debt Sustainability Analysis 
Tool Function Owner  Source 
Debt Management and 
Financial Analysis System 
Build Capacity for Government 
Management of Debt  
United Nations 
Conference on Trade 
and Development  
United Nations 
Conference on Trade and 
Development  
(United Nations 
Conference on Trade and 
Development , 2016) 
Debt Management and 
Performance Assessment 
Strengthen Capacity and 
Institutions to Manage 
Government Debt in an 
Effective and Sustainable 
Manner in the Medium to Long 
Term 
World Bank World Bank 
 
(World Bank, 2015) 
Debt Sustainability 
Framework 
Mobilize Resources for 
Borrower Countries and Reduce 
the Incidence of Excessive Debt 
Build-Up. 
 
Classify country position vis a vis 
risk of debt distress  
IMF/World Bank  International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank  
(International Monetary 
Fund, 2016) 
 
(World Bank, 2014) 
 
The Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) of the IMF has been adopted by Nigeria and 
Rwanda to monitor their debt portfolios and measure sustainability, as will be seen in 
the sections below. This Framework analyses both external and public sector debt, and 
compares debt burden indicators to indicative thresholds over a 20year period (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2016). The analysis results in 1 of 4 possible ratings, as outlined 
in the table below: 
Table 17: Ratings under the IMF Debt Sustainability Framework 
Rating Description  
Low Risk Debt burden indicators are well below the ratings 
Moderate Risk Debt burden indicators are below ratings, but are at risk of change from macroeconomic 
pressures or external shocks 
High Risk Country does not face immediate repayment difficulties, but baseline scenario and stress 
tests indicate a protracted breach of debt or debt service thresholds 
Debt Distress Country has difficulties with the repayment of external debt  
Source: (International Monetary Fund, 2016) 
 
Ighodaro Omoigui, a Strategy Officer in the Development Finance Vice-Presidency of the 
World Bank explains that Debt Sustainability Assessments (DSA) are used by the IMF 
and International Development Association to determine policies for borrower coun-
tries, and influence the final DSA ranking of a country (Omoigui, 2017). The DSF also 
evaluates the policies of countries, using the Country Policy and Institutional Assess-
ment tool of the World Bank. The IMF asserts that those countries with strong policies 
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on the CPIA index are less likely to accumulate debt (International Monetary Fund, 
2016). The DSF policy assessment is presented in the table below:    
Table 18: Debt Burden Thresholds under the DSF 
 Present Value of debt in per cent of  Debt service in percent of 
Exports GDP Revenue Export Revenue 
Weak Policy 100 30 200 15 18 
Medium Policy 150 40 250 20 20 
Strong Policy 200 50 300 25 22 
Source: (International Monetary Fund, 2016) 
 
The DSF and Debt Burden Policy Evaluation reveal that sustainability, from the perspec-
tive of the World Bank and the IMF, is examined by macroeconomic performance. At 
domestic level, the PRSP-led debt relief process introduced budgetary legislations, 
which explicitly require the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda to integrate debt sus-
tainability analyses into economic planning. These analyses are conducted at regular 
intervals, usually on an annual basis, by governments of both countries, and IFIs. The 
following sections discuss the current external debt situations, and evaluate the extent 
to which legal and institutional reforms have contributed to sustainable debt portfolios.  
4.2. Nigeria: The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 and Nigeria’s 
External Debt Portfolio 
S41(c) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 requires the Nigerian Government to ensure 
that debt is held at sustainable levels as prescribed by the National Assembly, on the 
advice of the Minister responsible for Finance. In practice, the Debt Management Office 
(DMO), located in the Presidency, is the Government Agency which performs the func-
tion of debt management through its technical and economic analyses, debt monitor-
ing, and advice to the Government. The DMO publishes the national 3year Debt Man-
agement Strategy, as well the Annual Debt Sustainability Analysis. In June 2016, the 
DMO published the Nigeria Debt Management Strategy (2016-2019), which was devel-
oped using the Debt Management Strategy Analytical Tool of the World Bank and the 
IMF (Debt Management Office, 2016). Similarly, the 2016 Annual Debt Sustainability 
Analysis was conducted using the World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for 
Low Income Countries (DSF-LIC) Analytical Tool (Debt Management Office, 2016). The 
2016 Debt Sustainability Analysis covers all public debt, i.e., debts of the Federal Gov-
ernment, State Governments (external and domestic), and the Federal Capital Territory 
(ibid).  
The evaluation of the effectiveness of legislative and institutional reforms on gov-
ernment borrowing must be preceded by a presentation of the current debt position of 
Chapter 4 
106 
Nigeria. The table and figure below outline the evolution of Nigeria’s public debt be-
tween 2011 and 2015.    
Table 19: Nigeria Public Debt: 2011-2015 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
External Debt Stock (Federal and State Governments)    
USD Millions 5,666.58 6,527.07 8,821.90 9,711.45 10,718.43 
% of total (11.47) (11.17) (13.69) (14.58) (16.75) 
% of GDP 2.36 2.50 1.73 1.84 2.18  
Domestic Debt Stock    
USD Millions 35,882.86 41,969.16 45,722.41 47,047.77 44,857.85 
% of total (72.61) (71.79) (70.98) (70.63) (70.11) 
% of GDP 14.94 16.10 8.98 8.93 9.13 
States Domestic Debt Stock    
USD Millions 7,870.42 9,961.16 9,874.58 9,852.25 8,401.92 
% of total (15.93) (17.04) (15.33) (14.79) (13.13) 
% of GDP 3.28 3.82 1.94 1.87 1.71 
Nigeria Total Debt Stock     
USD Million 49,419.86 58,457.39 64,418.89 66,611.47 63,978.20 
% of GDP 20.58 22.43 12.65 12.65 13.02 
 
 
Figure 7: Nigeria: Public Debt 2011-2015 (US$ millions) 
At first glance, it can be argued that the FRA 2007 has influenced the debt management 
system of Nigeria: while the acquisition of external debt has generally been restrained, 
the Government has accumulated large domestic debts, with the Federal Government 
holding the greater share of liabilities. Currently, the national debt portfolio is divided 
5,666.58
35,882.86
7,870.42
49,419.86
6,527.07
41,969.16
9,961.16
58,457.39
8,821.90
45,722.41
9,874.58
64,418.89
9,711.45
47,047.77
9,852.25
66,611.47
10,718.43
44,857.85
8,401.92
63,978.20
0.00
10,000.00
20,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
50,000.00
60,000.00
70,000.00
External Debt Stock
(Federal and State
Governments)
Federal
Government-
Domestic Debt
Stock
States-Domestic
Debt Stock
Total Debt Stock
Nigeria: Public Debt 2011-2015
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Legal Reforms to Regulate Government Management 
107 
between domestic and external debts on the ratio of 84:16 (Debt Management Office, 
2016).  
S41(1)(a) of the FRA directs the Government to seek concessional, rather than 
commercial external finance. Accordingly, the larger share of external debt finance has 
been acquired from concessional sources, as shown in the chart below.  
 
 
Figure 8: Nigeria: External Debt Composition in 2015 
Furthermore, the preference for long-term debts as expressed in SS 41(1)(a) and 
44(2)(b) of the FRA 2007 has guided government acquisition of debt, as the ratio of 
long-term to short-term debt stands at the ratio of 69:31 (Debt Management Office, 
2016). The DMO does not distinguish between debts acquired by the Federal Govern-
ment and State Governments in its calculation of external debt liabilities, and as such it 
is difficult to determine the proportion of debt owed by either level of government.  
In March 2017, a former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Professor Charles 
Soludo stated that the current administration (2015-2019) and previous administration 
(2011-2015) spent over 100per cent of its revenue on recurrent expenditure, and bor-
rowed all its capital expenditure (Soludo, 2017). Professor Soludo also argued that Nige-
ria’s economic problem is rooted in the ease of obtaining income from oil rents, and 
warned that imminent oil/commodity shocks will reveal, yet again, the importance of 
ending dependence on oil and commodities (ibid). In similar vein, the DMO noted in the 
2016 Debt Management Strategy that the combination of a volatile macroeconomic 
environment and uncertain global economic outlook, caused by a structural collapse in 
the international price of crude oil, places the country under severe revenue pressure 
(Debt Management Office, 2016). In 2016, for the first time since the Paris Club debt 
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relief process, the country’s debt position dropped from low risk to medium risk of 
distress (Debt Management Office, 2016). Also, the country’s debt portfolio remains 
vulnerable to shocks associated with revenue, exports and currency depreciation (ibid).   
In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to examine the factors which allowed the ac-
cumulation of debt obligations by the Nigerian Government. The FRA 2007 is designed 
to regulate and direct government management of public finance, especially debt man-
agement. Thus, it can be argued that the country’s debt portfolio can be interpreted in 
the context of this legal instrument, especially its conceptualisation and effectiveness. 
Accordingly, the next section investigates the interaction between the legal framework 
which supervises public debt management and government institutions in Nigeria.  
4.3. The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 and Public Debt 
Management 
The debt management provisions of the FRA 2007 can be organised into the following 
categories: debt acquisition and use, and debt management.  
4.3.1. Debt Acquisition and Use 
1. Economic Analyses: S44(1) of the FRA 2007 requires that Governments which seek 
to borrow must state the purpose of borrowing, and present a cost-benefit analysis 
which details the economic and social benefits of the debt acquired. Additionally, 
S45(1) requires Banks to seek and obtain confirmation of Part X of the Act (SS 44-47) 
prior to the provision of loans. According to BudgIT (2017), Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 
during her tenure as Minister of Finance (2003-2006, 2011-2015), “mandated all 
banks to seek approval before lending to State Governments. Some states were 
abusing their ability to borrow from banks”. Currently, “the banks mostly ask that 
revenue allocations be domiciled in their banks for deduction at source” (BudgIT, 
2017).   
2. External Borrowing: the FRA 2007 requires Governments to obtain the approval of 
the National Assembly prior to the acquisition of external debt. The requirement of 
parliamentary approval, as well as the obligation to prepare technical analyses has 
created an effective preventative mechanism. The National Assembly has been ef-
fective in supervising the activities of the Executive arm of Government in this re-
gard: in 2010, 5 years after debt relief was obtained from the Paris Club, and 3 years 
after the enactment of the FRA 2007, there was public outcry over the unsustaina-
bility of public debt, borrowing without due process, borrowing of non-concessional 
loans, and use of debt finance for purposes other than those for which they were 
obtained. This outcry led to the constitution of an ad-hoc committee of the House of 
Representatives (lower house), to investigate the borrowing practices of Govern-
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ments, and build the capacity of the National Assembly to effectively engage the Ex-
ecutive (Yelwa, 2010). Similarly, in 2016, the National Assembly referred to the 
procedural requirements of the FRA 2007, i.e., the requirement of economic analy-
sis per S44(1), to withhold approval for the acquisition of external debt by the Fed-
eral Government (Tadaferua, 2016). Importantly, the FRA 2007 has changed the 
composition of Nigeria’s debt stock. Prior to 2005 and debt relief, the bulk of Nige-
ria’s debt was obtained from commercial creditors (See 2.2.1). However, by 2016, 
the larger share of external public debt (over 70per cent) had been obtained on 
concessional terms (see 4.2).  
3. Borrowing by Sub-National Governments: under S47(3) of the FRA 2007, Sub-
National Governments are prohibited from the acquisition of foreign currency de-
nominated debts without a Federal Government guarantee. BudgIT (2017) states 
that there are 4 levels of approval required for State Governments to acquire exter-
nal debt: the proposed borrowing must be in accordance with the (1) multi-year 
debt plan of the Federal Executive Council and the (2) multi-year debt plan of the 
National Assembly. Also, external borrowing by State Governments must be ab-
sorbed into the (3) executive budget proposal for the fiscal year of the Federal Exec-
utive Council, as approved by (4) the National Assembly. To obtain a Federal Gov-
ernment Guarantee for external borrowing, State Governments follow a lengthy 
procedure, as outlined by BudgIT (2017): 
“The State Government sends in their proposed external debt borrowing to the 
DMO/Ministry of Finance. After approval by the Federal Executive Council, the 
approved amount in line with the external debt cap is determined.  Information 
is limited as to how the limit is reached. However, projected foreign exchange 
based revenue, existing liabilities and projected yield are considered. After the 
exit from the Paris Club of Creditors, Nigeria has turned to dipping into the do-
mestic market. It is unclear how it is calculated but recent debt is tied to capital 
projects. The Federal Government after computing government projected deficit 
size for 3 years (as contained in the medium-term expenditure framework) de-
cides based on the medium-term sector strategy whether domestic borrowing or 
external borrowing should be used. The final amount is subsequently decided 
based on series of complicated calculations, and the approval of the Federal Ex-
ecutive Council. Inputs and needs at Sub-National level are also considered and a 
final report is sent to the National Assembly for approval. After approval, the 
DMO draws out a plan to raise funds based on tranches in line with the supervis-
ing ministry, i.e. Ministry of Finance”.  
It can be argued that the FRA 2007 has limited the accumulation of external debt in 
Nigeria.  Nonetheless, Nigeria’s debt obligations, external and domestic, have steadily 
increased (See 4.2). External public debt stock was reduced from over US$20billion to 
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US$3.5billion in 2006, after debt cancellation and the buy-back process with the Paris 
Club. In 2016, external debt liability had risen to US$10billion, and is projected to rise 
further (Debt Management Office, 2016). Moreover, the domestic debt stock of the 
Government has accumulated rapidly, in part due to the ability of State Governments to 
obtain domestic loans without recourse to the Federal Government. It has been argued 
that “the high level of fiscal profligacy at sub-national level poses immense challenges 
for overall macroeconomic stability, debt management and public financial manage-
ment” (Ushie, 2010, p. 4).  The IMF corroborated this argument in its 2012 debt sus-
tainability analysis for Nigeria, in which it highlighted the risks for debt management 
which emanate from the unavailability of data for loans procured by State Govern-
ments, as well as the ability of Sub-National Governments to acquire credit in the do-
mestic market (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
Furthermore, the FRA 2007 does require the Government to account for the use of debt 
finance. According to BudgIT (2007), a civic society organisation which monitors the use 
of public funds in Nigeria, the technical analyses conducted by the DMO assess the 
ability of State Governments to meet obligations, but do not extend to supervision of 
debt finance once acquired. This approach can be described as reflective of the provi-
sions of the Act which emphasize government computation and monitoring of obliga-
tions and liabilities, as well as enforcement of the prescribed procedure for external 
debt acquisition. Thus, it is difficult to hold the government accountable for the proper 
use of debt finance, i.e., for the purposes put forward in the borrowing request.   
4.3.2. Debt Management  
The FRA 2007 stipulates procedures and documentation systems for government man-
agement of public finance, and especially public debt. These can be categorised as rules 
which govern debt limits, debt monitoring and debt repayment. 
 
1. Debt Limits: S42(1) requires the President, within 90 days of enactment of the FRA 
2007, to set annual limits on the amount of debt that the Government can acquire. 
In 2017, 10 years after the enactment of the FRA 2007, BudgIT (2017) states that the 
practical debt ceiling is informed by S12(1) of the FRA 2007 which caps Government 
expenditure for a financial year at the total amount of revenue expected by gov-
ernment, plus a deficit 3per cent of GDP. However, S12(2) allows expenditure to ex-
ceed the stated caps if deemed necessary for national security or sovereignty by the 
President. Yelwa (2010), argues that the inability of the Nigerian Government to set 
limits on borrowing, especially on amounts which can be borrowed by Sub-National 
Governments is a principal cause of debt accumulation. In practice, it is the DMO 
that attempts to place limits on government borrowing. To illustrate, the Agency, in 
compliance with S6(i) of the DMO Act 2003, which mandates it to provide a forecast 
of borrowing capacity to the Federal Government, recommended a borrowing limit 
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of US$22billion from domestic and external sources in 2017. (Debt Management Of-
fice, 2016). While S19(2) of the DMO Act states that DMO calculations of borrowing 
needs should form the basis of the national borrowing plan, DMO recommendations 
are not necessarily binding on Federal and State Governments, or on Government 
Agencies. The DMO noted in its 2016-2019 Debt Management Strategy that State 
Governments calculate financing and borrowing needs based on their particular 
contexts (Debt Management Office, 2016).  Also, State Governments have on occa-
sion, procured loans in the domestic market without providing information to the 
Ministry of Finance (BudgIT, 2017). 
2. Enforcement of Debt Limits: S42(3) of the FRA 2007 mandates the Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Commission to publish, on a quarterly basis, a list of Governments which have 
exceeded the consolidated debt limits. S42(5) requires debt to be brought within 
limits over the course of 1 year. However, these provisions cannot be enforced 
against Sub-National Governments and Agencies, as debt limits have not been set by 
the Federal Government.  Similarly, S47(4), the provision which precludes the Fed-
eral Government from the provision of guarantees which exceed debt limits, cannot 
be enforced. Also, S42(6) which precludes governments from borrowing if their 
portfolios exceed limits cannot be enforced. Furthermore, the Fiscal Responsibility 
Commission has been scrapped, and its functions absorbed into the Revenue Mobi-
lisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.  
3. Debt Monitoring: S6(a) of the DMO Act 2003 mandates and empowers the DMO to 
maintain a reliable database of all loans acquired by all Governments in the Federa-
tion. The Agency performs this function through its consolidated debt database, 
made public on its website (www.dmo.gov.ng), and updated on a quarterly basis.  
4. Debt Repayment: the Federal Government enforces S43(2) of the FRA 2007 which 
authorises the deduction of debt service amounts, i.e., external debt owed by State 
Governments and guaranteed by the Federal Government, from revenue alloca-
tions. BudgIT (2017), states that applications (from State Governments to the Minis-
try of Finance) to acquire external debts are accompanied by an Irrevocable Stand-
ing Payment Order (ISPO), which allows outstanding funds, cost of debt and capital 
repayment on all external debt payments to be deducted from source.  State alloca-
tions are generated from revenues which accrue from government receipts (sale of 
crude oil, tax, etc.), and disbursed by the Federal Government per an agreed formu-
la (See 3.3.1). Where governments borrow in the domestic market and inde-
pendently of the Federal Government, repayments are managed by the Banks. Ac-
cording to Patrick Okosodo, an officer with Diamond Bank Plc (Nigeria):  
“Commercial banks handle diverse tax collections on behalf of State Govern-
ments, some of which include personal income tax, withholding tax (individual), 
road taxes, capital gain taxes etc. Based on the average balance in government 
accounts, banks usually advance loans to State Governments to finance capital 
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projects and for their day to day expenses. Repayment of these loans are tied to 
the average minimum balances in government accounts, which can be struc-
tured for years until the principal loan sum and accrued interest have been fully 
liquidated”. (Okosodo, 2017) 
Okosodo (ibid) emphasises that loans are structured so that the minimum balance in 
the collections account is sufficient to service principal and interest due on a monthly 
basis. In this way, banks ensure repayment and avoid sub-prime loans to government.  
High debt obligations necessarily yield high debt service payments. The figure below 
presents the cost of Nigeria’s debt service between 2011 and 2015.  
 
 
Figure 9: Federal Government: Total Public Debt Service 2011-2015 (US$ millions) 
(Debt Management Office, 2016) 
 
Nigeria’s debt obligations and debt service payments are expected to rise over the near, 
medium and long term. The DMO has recommended that the government acquire addi-
tional external, long term debt, and reduce the ratio of domestic to external debt to 
60:40, from 84:16 (Debt Management Office, 2016). A decade after debt relief from the 
Paris Club, the current administration (2015-2019) sought the approval of the National 
Assembly to borrow US$29billion and increase Nigeria’s debt stock by 150per cent, and 
the external debt stock by 62per cent over 2years. These funds were to be designated 
for the prosecution of capital projects, “with special emphasis on infrastructure, agricul-
ture, health, education, water supply, growth and employment generation, poverty 
reduction through social safety net programmes and governance and financial man-
agement reforms among others” (Nwachukwu, et al., 2016). The National Assembly 
rejected the request of the government on the basis that it was not supported by a 
borrowing plan (Tadaferua, 2016). Again in 2017, the Presidency submitted to the Na-
tional Assembly a request for approval to obtain a US$5billion loan to be used to up-
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grade transport infrastructure. This loan was to be obtained from the China-Africa Fund 
through the China EXIM Bank (Opejobi, 2017). This request was still under review as at 
June 2017.  
4.4. Evaluating the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 has introduced procedures which have streamlined 
the acquisition of external debt, even as they guide government management of fi-
nance, and public debt. The measures introduced ensure that the Ministry of Finance, 
through the Debt Management Office is the sole channel for the computation, acquisi-
tion and repayment of external public debt. Also, borrowing requests are approved by 
multiple authorities, which evaluate the request against the parameters provided by the 
Act, and instituted by the DMO. These parameters include the purpose of the loan, the 
justification of the loan, and the type of finance sought. Importantly, external debt ac-
quisition is integrated into the wider economic planning/management framework, i.e., 
medium-term fiscal/expenditure frameworks and annual forecasts. This system has 
reduced the opportunity for, and incidence of external borrowing. Thus, the Act creates 
a framework which directs the Nigerian Government in economic planning and man-
agement. Ushie (2010) asserts that the FRA 2007 has introduced a planned approach to 
government spending which reduces exposure to exogenous factors. Also, she has ar-
gued that the rule-based method for revenue calculation, and the Excess Crude Account 
enabled the country weather the global economic crisis of 2010 (ibid).  
The Act supports a Government Institution, i.e., the Debt Management Office in the 
performance of its functions. The Agency fulfils its functions, as prescribed by its ena-
bling Act, as well as the FRA 2007, especially those of technical and economic analysis, 
as well as debt monitoring. Similarly, the National Assembly, which approves govern-
ment borrowing from external sources, has relied upon the provisions of the FRA 2007 
for the interpretation and discharge of its functions. Furthermore, the legal framework 
governs the relationships between institutions in the management of public finance, 
e.g., the Executive and the Legislature, Government Agencies and Government Minis-
tries, and Federal and Sub-National Governments.  
All these notwithstanding, the FRA 2007 has not effectively constrained government 
borrowing, or contributed to ensuring the sustainability of public debt. Several im-
portant realities are not addressed in or through the Act, especially as these concern 
the functions of government. These realities include: the political and administrative 
system of Nigeria, and the vulnerability of the Nigerian economy to external shocks. 
Additionally, government use of debt, particularly as it is deployed for developmental 
purposes, is not supervised by the Act. Furthermore, public debt management is made 
entirely the preserve of government, and does not incorporate other actors or institu-
tions.  
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1. Political and Administrative System of Nigeria 
S41(1) of the FRA 2007 (procedure for acquisition of external debt) is binding on all 
levels of the Nigerian Government. However, other levels of Government, including 
State Governments and Public Agencies can acquire loans from the domestic market, 
without necessarily seeking the approval of the DMO or the Ministry of Finance. Thus, in 
effect, the provisions of the Act are enforceable against the Federal Government and its 
agencies, only. Ushie (2010) notes that 20 of Nigeria’s 36 State Governments have 
adopted Fiscal Responsibility Laws. While state-level fiscal responsibility rules may serve 
to guide State Governments in their management of public finance, they do not end the 
disparate approach to overall government borrowing in Nigeria, and may not influence 
Governments to operate to common standards or objectives. In this regard, the useful-
ness of the FRA 2007 as a benchmark and guide for government borrowing is severely 
diluted. The result is a national debt stock which remains subject to the variant and 
fluctuating behaviour of different Governments.  
To enable prudent debt management in the context of Nigeria’s federal system, 
Yelwa (2010) outlines measures to improve fiscal discipline and compliance with the 
Act, e.g., the establishment of debt limits, suspension of allocations to states which do 
not comply with borrowing limits, denial of guarantees, technical assistance for State 
Government-owned FRAs, as well as prosecution for public officials who flout the provi-
sions of the Act. These measures are dependent on political will, and would likely be 
subjected to legal challenges, as they affect the autonomy of State Governments within 
the federal system. 
2. Structural Change and Economic Development 
The Nigeria PRSP, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2017 were conceived and adopted as 
instruments of economic transformation. The PRSP was presented as a home-grown 
action plan to drive economic development through structural change and institutional 
reforms (See 3.3). However, 70 per cent of government revenue in 2017, three decades 
after SAPs of the 1980s, is based on receipts from the sale of crude oil (Debt 
Management Office, 2016). Recent events, including sabotage by militant groups 
in the oil producing Niger-Delta region have significantly reduced levels of oil produc-
tion (Jannah, 2017). These occurrences reduce government revenue, and lead the 
government towards the acquisition of debt finance. Also, the Act has not contributed 
to significant improvements in accountability of public revenue, or curtailment of high 
recurrent expenditure (Ushie, 2010; See 4.2). 
This situation exposes a subtle disparity between the PRSP, which focused on futur-
istic economic, institutional and social transformation, and the budgetary legislation, 
which was developed to manage present economic and political realities. From a legal 
perspective, it raises a question- to what extent, if any, can legal instruments incentivise 
and drive economic diversification? Also, how can Nigeria’s budgetary legislation be 
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made more responsive to the dynamisms of economic change? Certainly, in the case of 
Nigeria, the exploration of these questions will contribute to the refinement of the legal 
framework which governs public finance management, to foster beneficial structural 
economic changes.  
3. Debt for Development  
While the FRA 2007 controls external borrowing through a combination of quantitative 
and procedural rules, it does not directly address the use of debt finance in Nigeria. The 
provisions of the FRA 2007 reflect the World Bank/IMF concern with debt sustainability 
from a macroeconomic perspective, and as such prescribe economic analysis and pro-
cedural tools for debt management. However, the use of debt finance, particularly as 
deployed towards developmental purposes is not addressed. The Nigeria PRSP, and 
debt relief campaign was premised on the argument that debt servicing diverted gov-
ernment resources away from social development. It followed that debt relief would 
increase resources available for government to expend on the delivery of social ser-
vices. However, borrowing patterns over the last decade have resulted in a significant 
proportion on national revenue being spent on debt service (See 4.2). Importantly, 
there is not yet established a mechanism to track government utilisation of debt fi-
nance. If the misuse of borrowed funds contributed to the build-up of debt portfolios in 
the 1970s and 1980s (See 2.2.2 and 2.4.2), then it is conceivable that legal instruments 
which stipulate justifications for government borrowing, can create mechanisms by 
which governments account for the utilisation of debt finance.  
4. Public Debt Management: A Need to Review the Functions of Government Institutions   
The Act does not create participatory roles and functions for other actors in the man-
agement of public debt. While Banks are required to ask Governments for evidence of 
compliance with S41(1)(a), i.e., the capital expenditure and human development pur-
pose of borrowing, the Act does not detail how compliance should be ascertained, and 
to whom compliance should be communicated. The burden of investigating the compli-
ance of Governments with the provisions which govern public borrowing is placed on a 
Government Agency, i.e., the Fiscal Responsibility Commission, which has been ab-
sorbed into the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (See 3.3.2). It is 
impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of these Agencies in performance of debt mon-
itoring, as debt limits are yet to be set. It may be beneficial for the Government of Nige-
ria to investigate the means by which other actors, e.g., financial institutions and civil 
society organisations, can support the monitoring of debt finance as used by Govern-
ments.  
10 years after the enactment of the FRA 2007, the Government is yet to set debt 
limits (BudgIT, 2017), which has allowed the accumulation of a large domestic debt 
stock. The Act places the greater share of debt management responsibility on the Exec-
utive Arm of Government, i.e., the President, Minister of Finance and the Debt Man-
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agement Office. However, the current state of Nigeria’s debt stock demands a review of 
the legal framework. While there are consequences for Agencies and Governments 
which fail to comply with the provisions of the Act, there is no measure, whether puni-
tive or incentive for the President to set debt limits. The Act seems to assume that the 
President will be disposed to, and capable of setting debt limits. However, this assump-
tion has been disproved, as debt limits are yet to be established.  
Interestingly, the FRA 2007 assigns the function of setting debt limits to a Person 
holding an office, not an institution. It can be argued that the political nature of this 
office creates difficulties for the performance of this function. Firstly, it is unlikely that 
other arms of Government, e.g., the National Assembly and the Judiciary will take legal 
action against the President on the matter of debt limits. The President is nominally the 
most powerful person in the Government. Secondly, it may be that the President may 
find it easier to allow, rather than prevent uninhibited borrowing by Governments with-
in the Federation. Attempts by the President to set borrowing limits may be interpreted 
by other Governments as measures to constrain their power, and reduce their effec-
tiveness. This interpretation can engineer animosity and altercations between Federal 
and State Governments. Thirdly, the President may not necessarily possess the capabili-
ties for this function, i.e., the capacity to conduct independent economic and situational 
analyses.  
Based on this situation, it would seem expedient that obligations, accompanied by 
measures to ensure compliance, are placed on institutions, not on persons within Gov-
ernment. Also, compliance should be supervised by another arm of Government im-
bued with the requisite powers and authority to enforce legal obligations. To illustrate, 
Section 4.3.1 above discusses the function of the National Assembly in public debt man-
agement, i.e., review of Government Borrowing requests against the benchmarks of the 
FRA 2007, and how this function of the Parliamentary Institution has curtailed govern-
ment borrowing (Tadaferua, 2016). 
Possible Remedy: Centralisation of Government Borrowing 
The Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) distributes revenue between Feder-
al, State and Local Governments according to an agreed formula (See 3.3.1). In the 
same vein, borrowing of Federal and State Governments can be coordinated at the 
Federal level.  A central body, such as the FAAC can adopt the overall borrowing limit 
recommended by the DMO, and allocate borrowing limits/levels between Sub-National 
Governments, depending on a number of considerations including, indebtedness, reve-
nue generation, purpose of borrowing, etc. The DMO engages in the necessary econom-
ic and technical analyses for debt management, monitors the government debt portfo-
lio, and recommends caps on government borrowing on an annual basis. Thus, the 
FAAC, or a similar body at Federal level, can develop a ratings or ranking system to de-
termine the creditworthiness of Sub-National Governments. Importantly, domestic 
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borrowing above set thresholds (amount and/or loan tenor) would be undertaken 
through central mechanisms, as done for external borrowing by the DMO.  
While the centralisation of borrowing will create political contestations, the com-
paratively lower level of Nigeria’s external debt portfolio illustrates the efficacy of legal 
and procedural constraints on Government borrowing (Tadaferua, 2016). Also, the 
centralisation of borrowing can reward good performers, and limit the liabilities created 
by poor management of debt portfolios by State Governments, as there would be ongo-
ing scrutiny of debt management against the revenue obtainable by these Govern-
ments. Furthermore, the constraints created by the centralisation of borrowing may 
well incentivise Governments to improve their economic performance and debt portfo-
lios, in order to access loans.  
In effect, this would be a ‘light-touch’ approach to qualitative monitoring of the use 
of debt finance and management of debt portfolios by the Federal and State Govern-
ments. Legal underpinning for this approach can be obtained via an amendment of the 
FRA 2007. It may be argued that the Presidency is best suited to put forward the ra-
tionale for the amendment of this legal instrument by the National Assembly.   
Note that the centralisation of borrowing is based on the premise that the bulk of 
revenue of the Nigerian Government is obtained from the FAAC distributions, which are 
financed largely by oil receipts. Should there be successful economic diversification in 
the future, it will be necessary to reform the centralised approach. In addition, in-
creased revenue generation by individual State Governments will weaken the effective-
ness of centralisation, as these Governments will have access to alternative sources of 
revenue, which would reduce their dependence of FAAC allocations.  
4.5. Rwanda: The Law on State Finances and Property 2013 and 
Rwanda’s Debt Portfolio  
In 2016, the IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis of Rwanda ranked the country at low risk 
of debt distress. This ranking resulted from an evaluation of the country’s policy envi-
ronment and good economic performance (International Monetary Fund , 2016). In 
similar vein, the 2015 Debt Sustainability Analysis conducted by the Rwanda Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning concluded that country’s debt levels were sustainable 
and well below the indicative thresholds for debt distress (Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Planning, 2015). The sustainable perception of Rwanda’s public debt stock has 
led to a change in the types of finance obtained from IFIs, i.e., the country’s favourable 
ranking has caused an increase in loans, and a decrease in grant finance (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, 2015). The proportion of loans in multilateral official 
development assistance to Rwanda increased from 20per cent between 2006 and 2013, 
to 45per cent in 2014 (Cassimon, et al., 2016). The HIPC and MDRI processes led to debt 
relief in 2005, which reduced Rwanda’s debt portfolio to sustainable levels. In monetary 
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terms, its external debt portfolio was reduced to less than US$500million from 
US$1.5billion (Murenzi, 2010). However, public debt levels began to rise as the country 
sought debt finance to drive the achievement of its developmental goals. In 2006, its 
total debt stock stood at US$750 million, of which external debt accounted for 
US$479million. In the same year, budgetary legislation was enacted to regulate gov-
ernment management of public debt. By 2015, total public debt had increased to 
US$2.4billion, with external debt obligations at US$1.8billion (Cassimon, et al., 2016). 
The sections below consider the effectiveness of the Law on State Finances and Proper-
ty 2013 in the regulation of the acquisition and management of public debt, through a 
review of the provisions which govern debt acquisition and debt management.  
4.5.1. Debt Acquisition and Use 
1. Authority to Borrow: Article 50 of the Organic Budget Law 2013 vests authority to 
borrow, and authority to approve borrowing in the Minister responsible for Finance 
– whether loans for the Central Government deficit or loans for other Public Entities. 
Also, the Minister is the sole authority to give and approve guarantees and securities 
for loans obtained by Public Institutions from Financial Institutions. Article 50 goes 
further to explicitly prohibit government borrowing without the approval of the Min-
ister: “Public institutions may borrow, but with authorization of the Minister”.  
 Furthermore, Article 50 is specific as to the powers and authorities of different 
levels of Government as these pertain to public borrowing. For example, while De-
centralised Authorities may pledge securities for a debt, they may not give guaran-
tees. This provision centralises government borrowing in the office of the Minister 
responsible for Finance, which suggests that there is a coordinated and structured 
approach to government borrowing. This suggestion is validated by Gerard Gakunzi 
of the Debt Management Unit, a department supervised by the Office of the Chief 
Economist in the Ministry of Finance.  Gakunzi (2017) also provides the multilevel 
process of approval and analysis required for the Government to seek and manage 
external debt, which is shown below: 
a) Preparation of preliminary project proposals by the line ministries which will be 
submitted to the National Investment Planning Unit (NIPU) in the Ministry of Fi-
nance. 
b) Review of the Financing Options by the Investment Committee 
c) Review of the project proposal and preparation a draft concept paper by the Ex-
ternal Finance Unit which will include loan terms and conditions that will be sent 
to the Debt Management Unit. 
d) The Debt Management Unit shall undertake a Stress Test Analysis, on the basis 
of the information contained in the concept paper drafted by the External Fi-
nance Unit. 
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e) The Debt Management Committee shall ensure that the total envelop of projects 
subject to external financing is in line with the existing Rwanda Debt Strategy 
and therefore advise the Executive Management. 
f) The Executive Management on the basis of the guidance provided by the Debt 
Management Committee will review the loan and submit it to Minister’s office 
for his approval. 
g) Minister’s Approval 
h) The External Finance Unit starts negotiation with Creditors. 
i) After the signature of any loan agreement between the Government of Rwanda 
and one of its Development Partners, the Ministry of Finance follows up the ef-
fectiveness of the signed Agreement through Ratification process. 
j) When the loan is contracted, the agreement is sent to the Debt Management 
Unit to be recorded in the debt database. 
 
 
Figure 10: Rwanda External Debt Acquisition Process 
From the foregoing, there are up to 6 levels of computation and review within the Cen-
tral Government, prior to the approval of the Minister of Finance. These processes 
combine procedural rules with economic analyses, and integrate the use of bench-
marks, e.g., the Rwanda Debt Strategy to ensure prudence in debt acquisition. Borrow-
ing by State-Owned Enterprises, e.g, RwandAir, are reflected in the debt portfolio of the 
Central Government (International Monetary Fund , 2016).  
2. Purpose of Borrowing: per Article 51 of the Law, the Government of Rwanda may 
borrow for up to 6 clearly stated objectives; to finance the annual budget deficit, to 
refinance maturing debt or a loan paid before redemption date, to boost foreign 
currency reserves, to maintain balances on a bank account of the consolidated fund, 
to regulate monetary conditions should the need arise, and for any other purpose 
necessary for sound fiscal policy and effective debt management. These conditions 
are necessarily macroeconomic in nature, and do not speak to a developmental 
purpose, as in the case of Nigeria. However, the wording of Article 51 seems to re-
quire the approval of the Parliament for all borrowing, on an annual basis: the Gov-
ernment may borrow money “on the basis of a funding proposal prepared and pre-
sented by the Minister to the Chamber of Deputies for approval”. Thus, in addition 
to a single channel, i.e., the Minister of Finance for borrowing, there is an additional 
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layer of approval, i.e., the Chamber of Deputies, for acquisition of all types of public 
debt. In this regard, the Executive and the Legislature are mandated to cooperate in 
a holistic manner to manage government debt. Additionally, per Article 51, the Min-
ister is obligated to consult with the National Bank of Rwanda to determine the form 
and terms of borrowing. Both parties are obligated to work towards “improving na-
tional sovereign debt ratings”.  
 
The Law on State Finances and Property 2013 does not require disclosure of the use of 
debt finance, and the Government does not necessarily account for the particular use of 
its borrowing. Nonetheless, significant projects, e.g., the Kigali Convention Centre, as 
well as purchase of aircrafts for RwandAir feature prominently in its Debt Sustainability 
Analyses. However, it may be surmised that debt finance is integrated primarily into 
budgetary expenditure, which is supported by the legal framework. Indeed, the Law 
seems to anticipate that the bulk of borrowed finance will be used for general budget-
ary purposes. As such, the Minister of Finance, with the approval of the Chamber of 
Deputies is provided the freedom to coordinate government borrowing. In the 2016/17 
fiscal year, 18.9per cent of the annual budget was sourced through external financing 
(Rwanda Eye, 2016). This rose from a budget deficit of 16per cent in the 2014/5 
fiscal year, sourced through domestic and external borrowing (Uwiringiyimana, 
2015).  
Following debt relief in 2005, the Government of Rwanda has steadily increased the 
country’s public debt portfolio. In 2017, the Government’s total debt stock stood at 
US$2.5billion (Gakunzi, 2017). The table and figure below present the progressive ac-
cumulation of public debt between 2006 and 2014.  
Table 20: Rwanda: Accumulation of Public Debt 2006-2014 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total (million USD) 748.0 901.0 941.2 1060.7 1168.5 1414.6 1553.2 2068.2 2398.6 
Foreign currency 
(million USD) 
479.5 569.8 665.7 736.5 777.3 984.7 1062.3 1555.7 1760.8 
Domestic currency 
(million USD) 
268.6 331.2 275.6 311.2 368.2 301.9 387.9 465.9 562.6 
Guaranteed by the 
government  
0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 23.0 128.0 103.1 46.7 75.2 
(National Bank of Rwanda, 2015) 
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Figure 11: Rwanda: Accumulation of Public Debt 2006-2014 
The IMF states that the rise in Rwanda’s public guaranteed debt is due to fleet expan-
sion of the State-Owned Airline, RwandAir (International Monetary Fund , 2016). Ac-
cording to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, government guarantees for 
borrowing are provided only to RwandAir and Rwanda Energy Group (Cassimon, et al., 
2016). The Ministry states that between 2012 and 2015, debt finance was deployed into 
transport, construction, energy, poverty reduction and rural development (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, 2015). In 2016, the Government requested a 
US$204million, 18month loan from the IMF, to be drawn under the Standby Credit 
Facility Arrangement. This loan was obtained to buffer foreign reserves (International 
Monetary Fund , 2016), and ensure the implementation of medium-term policies aimed 
at addressing external imbalances (New Times, 2016). To obtain this facility, the Gov-
ernment of Rwanda maintained macroeconomic policy performance which aligned with 
the Policy Support Instrument of the IMF up to the end of 2015, and agreed to higher 
exchange rate flexibility, a more restrained fiscal policy, and import compression (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2016).  
4.5.2. Debt Composition 
Rwanda’s debt stock is sourced mainly from external sources. Domestic debt levels 
increased between 2006 and 2007, not necessarily due to increased government bor-
rowing, but as a result of reduction of the country’s external debt obligations through 
the HIPC and MDRI processes. The composition of Rwanda’s external and domestic debt 
obligations between 2003 and 2014 are presented in the chart below.  
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Figure 12: Percentage Composition of Rwanda's External and Domestic Debt: 2003-2014 
(National Bank of Rwanda, 2015) 
 
The bulk of Rwanda’s external debt obligations are owed to multilateral creditors as 
shown in the chart below.  
 
 
Figure 13: Composition of Rwanda's External Debt 2014 
(National Bank of Rwanda, 2015) 
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While the Law is silent on the source of debt finance, the Government of Rwanda dis-
plays a preference for credit from multilateral sources. This may be due, in part, to 
historical association, as well as the concessional and long-term character of multilat-
eral debt: in 2015, the International Development Association held 57 per cent of debt, 
the African Development Bank 22 percent, and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development held 8 percent (Cassimon, et al., 2016).  
This preference for multilateral debt notwithstanding, Rwanda’s portfolio includes 
credit obtained from bilateral and commercial creditors. Bilateral credit levels increased 
from US$89million in 2006, to US$269million in 2015 (Cassimon, et al., 2016). Prior to 
the HIPC and MDRI processes, Paris Club creditors held up to 40 percent of bilateral 
claims on Rwanda. However, since 2006, bilateral credit has been sourced from non-
Paris Club creditors, such as China and Kuwait, for Government undertakings co-
financed by multilateral and bilateral donors in the infrastructure and energy sectors 
(ibid).  
In 2013, Rwanda entered the commercial debt market through its issuance of a 
10year US$400million Eurobond (Business Day, 2013). Eurobond finance was allocated 
as follows: US$120million designated to repay outstanding balances on loans, 
US$80million to settle public guaranteed debt owed by RwandAir, US$150million for 
the construction of the Kigali Convention Centre, and US$50million to co-finance a 
hydropower project. 
4.5.3. Repayments  
A 2014 review by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning presents the long-
term nature of Rwanda’s debt obligations, with the average time to maturity calculated 
at 11 years. Importantly loans contracted are those with fixed interest rates, which 
eliminates the incidence of fluctuating or variable obligations (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, 2015).  
Cassimon, et al., (2016) state that since 2006, bilateral debt service has cost Rwanda 
less than US$7million annually, expect for 2013-2014 when it cost US$10.8million. In 
the same period, multilateral debt service has been limited due to the grace period and 
low interest rates of concessional loans. Between 2017 and 2020, it is expected that 
debt service to multilateral agencies would cost, on average, US$13.6million annually, 
which would increase to US$37.8million annually between 2021 and 2030, and termi-
nate after 2040. Existing commercial (Eurobond) debt service will cost US$26.5million 
annually until 2022, and US$400million in 2023 when the bond reaches maturity. 
4.5.4. Debt Limits 
1. Limits on Borrowing: Article 52 of the Law mandates the Chamber of Deputies to set 
the annual debt limit while voting in the annual budget. During the budget approval 
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process, the Chamber shall also determine the securities that may be given by the 
Government. Notwithstanding the borrowing limit set by the Parliament of Rwanda, 
the Minister responsible for Finance may set limits for domestic and external bor-
rowing.  
In practice, borrowing limits are set triennially, dependent on the country’s debt stock, 
with reference to the Debt Sustainability Analysis, and based on agreements with the 
IMF (Gakunzi, 2017). While the Law does not specify measures to enforce government 
compliance with borrowing limits, it can be argued that the single channel for borrow-
ing (the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning), as well as the internal mechanisms 
for public finance management have contributed to the effectiveness of debt limits. 
Gakunzi (2017) confirms this proposition in stating that debt limits are integrated into 
the Government’s economic planning through the macro framework projection of 3 
years agreed with IMF in its Policy Support Instrument program. 
2. Debt Monitoring: the Minister responsible for Finance and the National Bank of 
Rwanda are obligated by Article 56 to “maintain a detailed record of all public debt 
and Government securities or guarantees on third party debt, as well as the repay-
ment plan under that debt”. Additionally, this provision requires the Minister to in-
struct Public Institutions on the manner by which details and accounts of their bor-
rowing and debt servicing are maintained.  Article 53 places the Minister or Chair-
person of a Decentralised Entity as the authorities responsible for the service of 
debt (budget and repayment), as stipulated in the relevant loan agreements. In 
practice, the Debt Management Unit in the Office of the Chief Economist manages 
the debt profile database, which is updated on a monthly basis, following consulta-
tions with project management units and creditors (Gakunzi, 2017).  
3. Debt Management: the responsibility of preparation and publication of a national 
Debt Management Strategy is given to the Minister by Article 57. This provision 
mandates the Minister to consult the National Bank of Rwanda in the performance 
of the debt management function, to avoid conflicts in fiscal, debt management, 
trade, monetary and exchange policies. The Bank is the designated service provider 
for the execution of decisions on effective management of public debt. Gakunzi 
(2017) states that the Debt Management Unit in the Ministry of Finance spearheads 
the preparation of the annual Debt Management Strategy, and confirms collabora-
tion with the National Bank.   
4.6. Evaluating the Law on State Finances and Property 2013  
The Law on State Finances and Property 2013 can be said to have introduced discipline 
and accountability into government management of public debt. The Law vests authori-
ty to borrow in a single channel, i.e., the Minister of Finance. Also, the government has 
acquired the competencies and capacity to deliver debt management functions; the 
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relevant Government Institutions, i.e., the Debt Management Unit within the Ministry 
of Finance collaborates with the National Bank of Rwanda throughout the debt man-
agement process. It seems that the centralisation of debt management functions has 
enabled the enforcement of debt management rules: the Ministry of Finance deter-
mines government finance needs, recommends debt limits to the Chamber of Deputies, 
and coordinates activities related to government borrowing. Additionally, the Ministry 
has further developed regulations and processes which support the Government’s ap-
proach to public debt management. For example, the Ministry has determined the 
types of entities and finance for which the Government will provide loan guarantees. In 
this way, indiscriminate borrowing for other levels of Government is prevented. Im-
portantly, the Government is able to account for the use of debt finance: between 2012 
and 2015, debt finance was deployed into transport, construction, energy, poverty 
reduction and rural development (See 4.5.1). However, challenges remain for Rwanda, 
particularly, exposure to exogenous shocks, surveillance/conditionalities implemented 
by creditors, and the role of government in debt management.  
1. Exogenous Shocks: the PRSP and budgetary legislation have not necessarily weak-
ened Rwanda’s dependence on primary goods for government revenue and ex-
penditure. In the late 1980s, economic contractions which led to the accumulation 
of public debt were triggered by the fall in international prices of commodity prod-
ucts, tea and coffee, the sale of which formed the larger part of government reve-
nue (See 2.2.2). Three decades later, the 2016 Debt Sustainability Analysis conduct-
ed by the IMF noted that weak mineral prices on the international market would 
lower expected government revenue (International Monetary Fund , 2016). Three 
years previously, the 2013 Debt Sustainability Analysis jointly conducted by the In-
ternational Development Association and International Monetary Fund reiterated 
risks to economic performance arising from the country’s narrow export base (In-
ternational Development Association and International Monetary Fund, 2013). Simi-
larly, a 2012 temporary suspension of aid finance by donors caused a slump in eco-
nomic growth (International Development Association and International Monetary 
Fund, 2013; The Economist, 2013).  
 Thus, while the country has made economic and developmental progress since 
the HIPC and PRSP processes, there remains a significant challenge of economic di-
versification and industrialisation. The legal framework, i.e., budgetary legislation 
does not restrict government use of debt finance, and is placed as a support instru-
ment for the formulation and prosecution of the economic ambitions of the gov-
ernment. It follows that the questions arise to whether, and to what extent, the le-
gal framework can direct, monitor and incubate the process of economic diversifica-
tion.  
2. Surveillance/Conditions of Creditors: in the 1990s, IFIs were criticised for the extent 
of control they wielded over Rwanda’s finances. To illustrate, attached to an IMF fa-
cility in the late 1980s were conditions and restrictions as to government expendi-
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ture (See 2.2.2). Similarly, Rwanda’s loan from the 2016 Standby Credit Facility from 
the IMF was accompanied by conditions on economic policy. Rwanda’s borrowing 
arrangements results in its economic arrangements closely monitored and influ-
enced by IFIs. Thus, it is necessary to question the extent to which the Government 
is able to determine and implement economic policy. Also, the issues on state sov-
ereignty and consent of the citizenry can be raised, especially as these concern pub-
lic borrowing (See 2.3 and 2.4.1).   
3. Government-Heavy Debt Management: per the Law, the institutions which perform 
debt management functions are those of the Government, and those directly con-
cerned with public finance management, i.e., the Ministry of Finance and the Na-
tional Bank of Rwanda. The role of Parliament is limited to the review and approval 
of borrowing requests. The Law does not incorporate stakeholders, e.g., communi-
ties, or the private sector into the system for public debt management. Thus, it be-
comes necessary to investigate the strategies which would allow other actors con-
tribute to functions of public debt management. It may be useful for the Ministry of 
Finance to establish a system to evaluate the impact of debt finance within sectors 
of the economy. Impact evaluation which incorporates Private Sector and Civil Soci-
ety comments on the impact, benefits and limitations of undertakings financed by 
debt, will provide useful insights on the acquisition and deployment of debt finance.   
4.7. Discussion: Legal Reforms for Debt Management and Debt 
Sustainability  
Budgetary legislations have led to the integration of transparent and systematic mecha-
nisms for the management of public debt in Nigeria and Rwanda. The legislations in 
both countries (Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 in Nigeria, and the Law on State Finances 
and Property 2013 in Rwanda) are similar in prescription, i.e., rules to govern debt ac-
quisition, and to direct government management of debt portfolios. Also, the laws place 
the Minister, and by extension, the Ministry of Finance as the ‘engine-room’ of debt 
management and economic development. Additionally, the tools and approaches for 
public debt management are identical, e.g., Debt Sustainability Analyses and debt moni-
toring databases. The similarities in the debt management systems of Nigeria and 
Rwanda are presented in the table below: 
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Table 21: Public Debt Management Provisions of Budgetary Legislation in Nigeria and Rwanda 
Rule-Type Nigeria  Rwanda 
Positive Obligations    
1. Debt Limits Yes Yes  
Establish Limits for 
Government Borrowing 
Assigned to: President (not an 
institution) 
Implemented by:  
Debt limits have not been established  
 
Debt Management Office which 
recommends limits in the annual Debt 
Sustainability Analysis. These 
recommendations are not binding.  
Assigned to: Chamber of Deputies when 
voting in annual budget 
 
Implemented by: Ministry of Finance which 
sets limits triennially 
Enforcement of 
Compliance 
Assigned to: Fiscal Responsibility 
Commission 
Not assigned 
2. Debt Monitoring Yes Yes 
Database of Government 
debt 
Assigned to: National Assembly, 
Central Bank and Debt Management 
Office  
 
Implemented by: Debt Management 
Office  
Assigned to: Ministry of Finance and 
National Bank of Rwanda 
 
Implemented by: Debt Management Unit in 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning  
3. Debt Management Yes Yes  
Debt Sustainability 
Analysis 
Silent Assigned to: Minister of Finance 
 
Implemented by: Debt Management Unit in 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  
Repayments Federal Government and Contracting 
Government 
Minister of Finance and National Bank of 
Rwanda  
Procedural Rules   
4. Authority to Borrow  Yes Yes 
 External debt: Ministry of Finance  
Domestic debt: other Governments 
All debt: Minister of Finance 
Approval of government 
borrowing 
External debt: Parliament 
 
All debt: Parliament  
Compliance Ministry of Finance and Parliament Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  
5. Purpose of Borrowing  Yes Yes 
 Capital expenditure and human 
development 
To finance the annual budget deficit, to 
refinance maturing debt or a loan paid 
before redemption date, to boost foreign 
currency reserves, to maintain balances on 
a bank account of the consolidated fund, to 
regulate monetary conditions should the 
need arise, and for any other purpose 
necessary for sound fiscal policy and 
effective debt management 
 
While it is the National Parliaments of Nigeria and Rwanda that enacted the budgetary 
legislations, the similarity of these laws, both birthed through the PRSP process gives 
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credence to claims that the World Bank and IMF prescribe uniform policies on borrower 
countries without due regard for circumstances and context (See Chapter 3). Also, these 
similarities validate a criticism of NIE-inspired legal reforms, i.e., that reforms are 
benchmarked against ‘ideal’ or ‘good’ legal systems (Milhaupt, 2009; Siems, 2011; See 
1.4). Crucially, the limitations of this approach are manifest in both countries: debt 
management is government-centric, reflective of the governance and ‘institutions mat-
ter’ perspective of IFIs. While public finance is rightly the responsibility of government, 
the legal and institutional frameworks created by the PRSP and budgetary legislations 
do not incorporate other stakeholders into the mechanisms for the management of 
public debt. All functions- debt acquisition, use, management and monitoring are to be 
performed by governments. There is the danger that this centralization of authority, 
functions and responsibility can lead to insularity in government and exclusion of other 
parties, rather than accountability and transparency, as governments do not need to 
consult or engage with stakeholders over public finance or public debt. Indeed, gov-
ernment may rely on legal instruments to ward off queries as to the use of debt finance, 
provided they satisfy the obligations arising from budgetary legislation. These obliga-
tions are procedural in nature, e.g., debt databases and parliamentary approval for debt 
acquisition, and do not necessarily require accountability or reporting on the use of 
debt finance.   
Interestingly, budgetary legislations do not consider the potential of other arms of 
government, e.g., ministries and departments responsible for the delivery of social 
services, to contribute to the management of public debt. This is somewhat contradic-
tory, as the PRSPs and debt relief were premised on the utilisation of financial resources 
for national development. The perspectives, capacities and experiences of other arms of 
government, as well as stakeholders such as communities and the private sector, direct-
ly engaged in the design and management of social development undertakings would 
improve the efficacy in the acquisition and use of debt finance.  
Economic diversification was stated as a primary objective in the PRSPs of Nigeria 
and Rwanda. The Governments of both countries pledged to undertake structural, insti-
tutional and policy reforms towards the structural changes of their economies. These 
reforms were also intended to reduce dependence on primary products for revenue 
(See 3.2). However, in 2015, a decade after debt relief was obtained by Nigeria and 
Rwanda, the economies of both countries remain vulnerable to economic shocks. Also, 
both countries continue to depend on revenue from the export of commodities/primary 
goods, for a significant proportion of government revenue (See 4.4 and 4.6). The com-
bination of structural weaknesses and debt accumulation pose very real threat of un-
sustainable debt, despite IMF rankings of the debt portfolios of both countries. Put 
simply, if the governments of both countries continue to borrow, and significant eco-
nomic transformation does not occur, then the accumulation of unsustainable debt 
portfolios is inevitable. From a legal perspective, it becomes imperative to interrogate 
the mechanisms, frameworks and rules which can effectively support the Governments 
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of Nigeria and Rwanda, towards the prevention of a repeat of the debt burden of the 
1980s and 1990s.  
The investigation of Nigeria and Rwanda reveals the interplay of law and institutions 
in economic development. At international level, IFIs have consistently enforced and 
applied their policies on countries, while country-level institutions in Nigeria and Rwan-
da have reflected and implemented the values and objectives of the overarching agen-
da of Governments. Several observations can be made in this regard; firstly, institutions 
are flexible to different purposes and amenable to utilisation by divergent schools of 
thought. Thus, institutions, i.e., organisations, require a guiding philosophy and overall 
objective to shape activities and approach. Laws and legal instruments have shown to 
be useful mechanisms for the creation of institutional agenda and formulation of work 
approaches: budgetary legislations in Nigeria and Rwanda have created thematic agen-
da and operational maps for the Governments of both countries. Secondly, institutions 
do not exist in a void; they are the product of institutions, even as they create other 
institutions. The interplay of law and institutions present a dynamic process of interac-
tion, creation and recreation. For example, the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda 
enacted laws, which create new institutions, such as organisations, e.g., Debt Manage-
ment Offices, and mental constructs, such as Debt Sustainability Analyses. In the con-
text of public debt management, and economic development, laws can better contrib-
ute to the achievement of objectives where they consider outcomes, in addition to 
procedures and behaviours. An outcome-lens will galvanise institutions towards results 
and effectiveness. For example, legal frameworks which monitor the utilisation of debt 
finance can obligate governments to pursue economic transformation through meas-
urements of the extent of economic dependence of debt finance and revenue from 
other sources on a regular basis. Also, legal frameworks can support the inclusion of 
stakeholders in debt management systems through mechanisms which consider their 
perspectives in the conceptualization and utilisation of debt finance in socially related 
undertakings.   
4.8. Summary  
Legal reforms have proved useful for the management of public debt in Nigeria and 
Rwanda. Budgetary legislations have created predictable and objective mechanisms, 
which have been adopted by the Governments of both countries. While these legal 
instruments have effectively directed government behaviour in the area of public debt, 
they have not necessarily led governments to adopt practices which would lead to sus-
tainable debt portfolios. The accumulation of an unsustainable debt burden is a real 
threat for both Nigeria and Rwanda, as the structure of their economies have not fun-
damentally changed since debt relief, even as they continue to borrow heavily to sup-
port government expenditure. 
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IFIs continue to wield significant influence in the economies, economic policies and 
governance systems of Nigeria and Rwanda. Through conditionalities, processes, tools 
for economic analyses, and templates for economic management, the ideology and 
agenda of the World Bank and IMF are manifested in the economies of borrower coun-
tries. Also, these institutions are rightly criticised for their prescriptive and uniform 
approaches, which are macroeconomic in perspective and emphasis.   
The case-study of Nigeria and Rwanda presents the gap, and opportunity for law to 
function as a driver of economic development in Africa. Legal instruments and frame-
works can direct institutions towards the conceptualization of objectives, and direct the 
operations and undertakings of government, as well as other stakeholders, for the pur-
pose of economic development. To do so, laws must carefully consider the intended 
outcomes of economic development, and directly support activities and undertakings 
through the provision of frameworks and tools, as well as results-oriented guidance for 
institutions. The next chapter expands upon this proposition, and presents strategies by 
which laws can contribute to the economic development of African countries.   
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In the preceding chapters, I discussed the political, economic and institutional contexts 
in which Nigeria and Rwanda accumulated debt burdens. Also, I presented the debt 
management policies of the World Bank and IMF between the 1970s and mid-2000s, 
and the implementation of these policies in Nigeria and Rwanda as borrower countries. 
Thereafter, I evaluated the effectiveness of legal reforms for public debt management 
in Nigeria and Rwanda.  
This chapter begins with an examination of the arguments made in the first chapter 
of this thesis, i.e., that while the NIE school of thought has had a profound influence on 
contemporary development practice, it has left important questions unanswered. In 
Section 1.4, I highlighted five gaps which limit the effectiveness of legal reforms influ-
enced by NIE: 1) the narrowness of and investor-centric approach to NIE thinking, 2) the 
lack of agreement on the definition of institutions, 3) the argument as to whether insti-
tutions drive or are derived from economic development, 4) faulty benchmarking of 
legal reforms and 5) the insufficiency of econometric indices for proper analysis of the 
effectiveness of laws (See 1.4). Thereafter, in the second part of this chapter, I review 
the three research questions which guided the investigation of this thesis. I undertake a 
comparative analysis of the reforms in Nigeria and Rwanda to test the effectiveness of 
the policy thrust which led to the use of legislation to manage public debt. In the third 
section of this chapter, I propose that evaluations of laws and legal instruments are 
undertaken from the perspective of their outcomes and effect within economies. I 
submit that the debate on causation, i.e., proving a clear link between laws and eco-
nomic performance, emanates from the ambiguity in the definition of legal terms, as 
well as the problems of benchmarking legal interventions.  I argue that evaluating law 
on the basis of outcomes, which are determined by the stated objectives of economic 
development, will enhance the conceptualisation of legal reforms, and render them 
more suitable and relevant for contexts. Also, an outcome-focused approach will ad-
dress the gaps in current assessment methods, e.g., comparative econometric indexes, 
which are yet to provide knowledge on how countries may undertake the conceptuali-
sation and application of legal instruments for economic development. Whereas the 
current approach is to evaluate legal and institutional systems against fixed bench-
marks, the outcome-based approach accepts the evidence of these constructs as a 
starting point- to observe and analyse the interactions of law and institutions in the 
pursuit of stated goals.  
5.1. Revisiting the Theoretical Point of Departure: Limitations of 
Legal Reforms Influenced by New Institutional Economics 
This thesis is premised on the assertion that laws and legal systems manage, influence 
and contribute to the developmental processes of economies. The point of departure 
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was taken from observations of the limitations and criticisms of NIE, and the legal re-
forms which emanate from its line of thinking.  
The first criticism of NIE posed in this thesis is that its perspective and concerns are 
narrow, and do not incorporate multiple perspectives or approaches (See 1.4). Davis 
and Trebilcock (2008), argue that NIE-influenced legal reforms resemble those previous-
ly promoted by modernisation theory, i.e., the creation of legal systems which aid pri-
vate commercial activities, supported by institutions which are predictable and stable in 
the delivery of their functions. To some extent, this thesis has validated this criticism: 
the case-study of Nigeria and Rwanda reflects the NIE emphasis on governance/rule of 
law/institutions, as well as the necessity of good quality laws to aid the delivery of gov-
ernance. However, NIE does not necessarily prescribe a singular route to the utilisation 
of laws and institutions for economic development. As stated in Chapters 1 and 2, IFIs 
are influenced by NIE in their implementation of the governance/rule of law agenda. 
However, the prosecution of this agenda by IFIs has been coloured by institutional 
agenda and frameworks. The case-study has shown that the IMF and World Bank, prin-
cipal lenders and guarantors of debt acquired by the Governments of Nigeria and 
Rwanda, through the PRSPs and technical assistance, sought to create procedures 
which render government borrowing predictable and transparent. The debt manage-
ment provisions of budgetary legislations adopt a macroeconomic bent, focused on the 
creation of mechanisms to regulate government borrowing, even as the provisions 
prescribe the use of quantitative tools, e.g., databases to monitor public debt portfolios. 
Debt sustainability analysis are macroeconomic and quantitative in nature, and do not 
focus on the qualitative utilisation or impact of debt finance on national economic de-
velopment (See 3.2; 3.3; 3.4). However, it can be argued that monitoring the use of 
debt finance is the responsibility of governments, rather than IFIs. In the 1980s and 
1990s, IFIs prescribed SAPs which were concerned with improvements in the economic 
performance of countries, and did not consider the effects of programs on societies, 
e.g., social dislocations caused by reduced government spending on social services. 
SAPs were criticised for their intrusive approach, by which conditionalities interfered 
with the sovereignty of national governments (See 2.2). Thereafter, the HIPC Initiative 
changed the policy approach of the World Bank and IMF, and emphasised a country-
driven approach to reforms. In the 2000s, under the HIPC Initiative, PRSPs guided much 
more wide-ranging reforms which were criticised for increasing surveillance on borrow-
er countries. Thus, while it is countries that shaped and implemented reforms, the IFIs 
determined the standards by which country-led reforms were measured and assessed 
(See 3.1.1). The World Bank and IMF are primarily international finance institutions, 
concerned with global economic stability. Both institutions have adopted and facilitated 
the global development agenda through the MDGs and SDGs, but it has been necessary 
for them to stay true to their mandates, as stated in their articles of incorporation (See 
2.12 and 2.1.3).  
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The second problem identified with the NIE approach to economic development is 
the fluidity of boundaries between institutional thought and other fields. This challenge 
was encountered in this study: Douglass North’s definition of institution is all encom-
passing (North, 1995), as laws, government agencies, social norms, dynamic relational 
mechanisms of all these, and their outcomes are all captured as institutions. However, 
in the prosecution of the study, it was necessary to distinguish between laws/legal 
frameworks/legal instruments, and institutions (organisations and mental constructs), 
treating each as separate, distinct entities, even as their interplay and outcomes are 
acknowledged and investigated. The argument made by Ulen (2011), that government 
power and political will are useful substitutes for a legal system was tested, and found 
to be accurate; in the 1980s and 1990s, the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda 
adopted and implemented SAPs and PRSPs without recourse to domestic laws. These 
programs were prosecuted by government will and intention. Importantly, this thesis 
challenges the claim made by Ulen (2011) that it is not possible to show causality, i.e., 
direct effect of law on economic performance. The reforms in Nigeria and Rwanda show 
the influence of law on government behaviour, and by extension on the sustainability of 
public debt portfolios in Nigeria and Rwanda. This study has agreed with NIE, and Law 
and Development arguments that laws can be described as institutions (North, 1995; 
Acemoglu, et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Djankov, et al., 2006; Harris-White, 
2003; World Bank, 2017), as they do frame the environments and thought processes 
which shape the pursuit and outcomes of economic development. Furthermore, laws 
operate as benchmarks and signposts, which guide the activities and functions of other 
institutions. In the case-study, budgetary legislations define the powers, responsibilities 
and functions of institutions in government for public debt management. The legisla-
tions also set the standards of operation for these government institutions, even as they 
frame the relationships between different institutions of government. Law must neces-
sarily be definitive and take a holistic perspective of its remit. In contrast, the remit of 
institutions (organisations) is narrower, and tied to the delivery or supervision of speci-
fied objectives and outcomes, pursued through fluid and dynamic activities.   
Disagreement as to whether institutions, such as they are defined, are the drivers or 
outcomes of economic development was highlighted as the third limitation of NIE. De 
Soto (1989) argued in ‘The Mystery of Capital’ that the legal system is the primary dif-
ferentiator between industrialised and developing countries. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) argued that the extractive nature of institutions in former colonies have pre-
vented economic development. In contrast Chang (2007) posited that institutional de-
velopment will occur in tandem with economic development. In this study, it was shown 
that debt relief reduced the size of government debt portfolios, which improved the 
economic positions of both countries. Through the PRSP process, budgetary legislations 
were introduced into government systems for the management of public finance. These 
legislations have improved the processes and mechanisms by which governments man-
age public debt (See 4.4 and 4.6). In this way, law- a type of institution, has enhanced 
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the functions and performance of government institutions. The interaction or workings 
of both institution types contribute to predictability in public debt management. Based 
on the investigation of Nigeria and Rwanda in the preceding chapters, it can be argued 
that institutions do influence the outcomes of economic development. It follows that 
they also can be inhibitors of economic development, as shown through the limitations 
of budgetary legislations (See 4.4 and 4.6). Thus, institutions matter. Nonetheless, it is 
perhaps more important to emphasise the suitability and effectiveness of institutions to 
the purposes for which they are deployed. Rather than focus only on whether institu-
tions are good or bad, it may prove more useful to investigate whether laws and institu-
tions do deliver outcomes which support the achievement of economic objectives.   
In this regard, the fourth problem identified with NIE, i.e., benchmarking of legal sys-
tems is pertinent for law as an instrument of economic development. This thesis has 
agreed with Milhaupt (2009) that legal reform efforts have suffered from poor bench-
marking. Budgetary legislations in Nigeria and Rwanda are near identical (See 4.7), and 
clearly are modelled on rules present in western systems, such as those found in the 
European Union (See 3.2). The debt management provisions of budgetary legislations 
do provide benefits for debt portfolio management, including predictability, improved 
portfolio management, and due process, as outlined in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Howev-
er, the legislations are limited in that they do not directly address the political-economic 
systems of both countries: for example, in Nigeria, external borrowing is more tightly 
controlled than domestic borrowing, with the result that the domestic debt portfolio 
has increased annually since 2005, and is significantly larger than the external debt 
portfolio (See 4.2). Also, in both Nigeria and Rwanda, debt management stipulations do 
not require governments to account for the use of debt finance (See 4.7), even though 
misuse of loans in the 1970s and 1980s was a factor which led to the unsustainability of 
debt (See 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). It would prove better for legal reforms to be based on thor-
ough evaluations of the problem(s) they seek to solve, as well as analyses of the politi-
cal, economic and social elements relevant to the context of intervention. Furthermore, 
legal systems do create and influence changes to relationships between institutions, 
power structures, and economic systems. Thus, legal reformers must adopt an interdis-
ciplinary perspective, and incorporate political and sociological tools of analysis in the 
conceptualisation of legal reforms, even as economists have incorporated laws and 
legal frameworks into NIE. However, the question then becomes- whose responsibility 
is it to integrate these approaches into legal reforms? In Nigeria and Rwanda, the legal 
underpinnings for public finance management were adopted as part of the PRSP-related 
reforms, and National Parliaments drafted, debated and enacted budgetary legislations. 
Thus, it would seem that it is at domestic level that the adaptation of ‘standard-form’ 
legal reforms for suitability and relevance can best be considered.  
The fifth criticism of NIE is directed to the limitations of the econometric approach 
to the measurement of laws and institutions. The investigation conducted into the debt 
management systems of Nigeria and Rwanda validates this criticism. For example, the 
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Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank states that the 
scores given by country teams reflect a variety of indicators, values and judgment, and 
“higher scores can be attained by a country that, given its stage of development, has a 
policy and institutional framework that more strongly fosters growth and poverty re-
duction” (World Bank, 2017). On the CPIA, and other indexes used by the World Bank, 
e.g., Doing Business, countries are given scores or points according to a scale, which 
measures the existence and implementation of their policies (ibid). Indeed, the World 
Bank wrongly rates Nigeria higher than Rwanda in the area of debt policy. Rwanda’s 
debt policy between 2006 and 2012 was ranked at 3.5. In 2005, prior to the enactment 
of the budgetary law in 2006, the country’s debt policy scored 3.0. Note that the budget 
law was revised in 2013, at which point the country gained the score of 4.0 (World 
Bank, 2017). Between 2013 and 2016, Rwanda’s debt policy has been ranked 4.0 (out of 
6) on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. In contrast, Nigeria’s debt policy 
was scored 3.5 in 2005, and in 2006 (ibid). Nigeria’s debt policy since 2007, has been 
ranked at 4.5 out of 6, except for scores of 4.0 in 2011 and 2012 (ibid). Note that the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act was enacted in 2007. However, the investigation of this thesis 
reveals weaknesses in the management of Nigeria’s public debt, as compared to those 
of Rwanda: State Governments in Nigeria borrow without recourse to the Federal Gov-
ernment, which has resulted in high domestic debt liabilities. Also, limits for govern-
ment borrowing have not been set. As such, the relevant authority is unable to enforce 
compliance with limits on borrowing (See 3.3.3). In contrast, government borrowing in 
Rwanda is centralised, and the Government publishes limits on borrowing on a 3year 
basis. Importantly, Decentralised Authorities are not permitted to borrow without the 
approval of the Minister responsible for Finance (See 4.5.1). Also, the Government of 
Rwanda has been better able to report on the use of debt finance: the National Airline, 
the Kigali Convention Centre and other infrastructural projects have been kick-started 
through government borrowing (See 4.5.2). Thus, I would argue that reliance on indexes 
in themselves, as indicators of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ policy, or as evidence of good institu-
tions/government performance is faulty, and does not capture accurate economic or 
policy positions. Riegner (2016) has criticised the methodology used by the World Bank 
to score and rank countries; he argued that the questionnaire is developed within the 
Bank, and does not incorporate the views of other stakeholders. As discussed in the 
investigation of Nigeria and Rwanda, ‘good’ laws and policies do not necessarily lead to 
good economic outcomes (See Chapter 4). Importantly, indexes do not enable a proper 
or holistic understanding of the context. Instead, I would posit that econometric and 
quantitative analyses are more useful when placed in the context of qualitative discus-
sion.  
However, in qualitative discussion, it is not straightforward to identify and resolve 
the gaps between policy and outcome: is the problem with NIE school of thought? Con-
versely is the gap in outcome created by interpretations of NIE by the World Bank and 
IMF, or is it implementation of IFI prescriptions within countries? 
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While the original Law and Development movement was focused on education and 
skills provision for lawyers and judges, as well as the creation of an academic field 
(Trubek, 1996), NIE further extended the discourse on the role of Law in Development 
through its assessments of the quality of laws and institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012; Acemoglu, et al., 2001; Djankov, et al., 2006; Kaufmann, et al., 1999). However, 
the governance and rule of law agenda have not specified routes for countries to suc-
cessfully acquire good laws or institutions that support economic improvement (An-
drews, 2013). Thus, it has been that NIE has spearheaded a school of thought which 
points to better performing economic systems and their legal arrangements as those 
which are supportive of growth. As such, NIE-inspired legal reforms have led to the 
transplantation of legal systems of advanced economies into developing countries.  
On the other hand, the gap between good policy and good outcomes can be consid-
ered from the perspective of IFIs. NIE provides the ideological underpinning for the 
governance and rule of law agenda, which ignited interest and debate in governance, 
and reintegrated law into the international development discourse in the 1990s. The 
World Bank and IMF have promoted governance and the rule of law as necessary ele-
ments for development, even as they have supported, conceptualised and financed 
legal reforms globally. However, it may be that the adoption and utilisation of indexes 
by IFIs contributes to the seeming disconnect between policy/laws and economic out-
comes. Indexes developed and used by the World Bank have been severely criticised: it 
has been reported that up to 85 per cent of global policy-makers utilised the World 
Bank’s Doing Business Index as a reference (Biron, 2013). Nonetheless, a review panel 
convened by the World Bank President in 2013 recommended the removal of country 
rankings, and particularly the removal of aggregate tables which “cloud crucial country-
level variations” (ibid).  
The case of Zambia illustrates the importance of qualitative context in the use of 
quantitative indices: in 2012 that Zambia had adopted reforms based on the Doing 
Business Index, which led to workers being taxed at 25 per cent, and corporations taxed 
at 16 per cent. In 2011, Zambia was ranked 8th on the access to credit indicator, even 
though 90 per cent of small and medium sized enterprises in the country reported that 
they were unable to access credit at interest rates lower than 25 per cent (The 
Guardian, 2012). In similar vein, trade unions and campaigners have lobbied for the 
Doing Business Report to be scrapped, on the basis of flaws in its methodology, particu-
larly use of “flawed and controversial indicators as the basis of its rankings” (Global 
Policy Forum, 2014 ). Labour groups have argued that the ‘employing workers indicator’ 
promotes labour reforms which deteriorate working rights, conditions and wages, even 
as the indicators for corporations are described as retrogressive (ibid). Antonio Gambini, 
a researcher at CNCD-11.11.11, the Belgian francophone umbrella organisation for 
development non-governmental organisations argued thus:  
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“Against a growing realisation by the public and international organisations such 
as the IMF and the OECD that tax systems are increasingly dysfunctional and re-
gressive, and that big corporations increasingly manage to avoid bearing their 
fair share of taxes to contribute to collective expenses, the DBR is still advocating 
massive tax cuts for corporations, based on questionable data provided by par-
tial and biased actors in the tax debate such as Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(PWC). Corporate tax payments are, alongside job creation and technology trans-
fer, one of the most important contributions to poverty eradication and fighting 
inequality that developing countries depend on. Promoting this indicator for 
corporate tax is setting us two steps back for every one we advance in the fight 
for better domestic resource mobilisation” (ibid).   
From a different perspective, the weak link between legal reforms and economic may 
be found at country-level implementation of reform programs. During the SAP era, the 
World Bank asserted that economic reforms were hindered by the poor commitment of 
national governments (World Bank, 1994). A decade later, the HIPC process transferred 
the burden of reform design and implementation to countries (International Monetary 
Fund, 1999). The intellectual and institutional influence of IFIs cannot be denied; in the 
context of debt relief, it was the World Bank and IMF that set the benchmarks of good 
policy, laws, and institutions, even as they assessed and approved reforms which quali-
fied countries for debt cancellation (See 3.1.2). Nonetheless, it is national parliaments 
and legislatures that create and amend legal instruments and institutional frameworks. 
As such, it can be argued that countries could render legal reforms more suitable to 
their contexts and developmental agenda during the law-making process. However, it is 
necessary to ask whether countries have the intellectual resources, and opportunity to 
amend orthodox reform programs; how will countries overcome resistance from the 
intellectual stature of IFIs if they choose to deviate from widely accepted norms and 
approaches to legal reform? Similarly, why would developing countries choose to devi-
ate from orthodox approaches to legal reform- the adoption of good laws and institu-
tional arrangements lead to higher scores on the indexes (Doing Business, CPIA) which 
state global economic competitiveness. Higher scores result in better and improved 
rankings, which improve opportunities for investment and access to financial resources 
from the international financial system.  
All these questions are relevant in the evaluation of the legal reforms adopted by 
Nigeria and Rwanda for debt relief. The complexity and interrelated nature of NIE, IFI 
and country-level implementation serve to complicate the evaluation of the effective-
ness of budgetary legislations. Nonetheless, the next section proposes an approach 
which is intended to enhance the effectiveness of legal reforms in African economies.    
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5.2. Proposition: Evaluate Law Against Outcomes  
In this section, I expand upon the argument that the limitations of budgetary legisla-
tions can be attributed to 1) benchmarking of legal reforms, and 2) the systems for the 
evaluation of laws as they relate to economic performance.    
5.2.1. Problems with the Benchmarking of Legal Reforms 
As discussed in the investigation of Nigeria and Rwanda, economic and legal reforms 
prescribed by IFIs to borrower countries are often similar, and modelled on the laws of 
advanced economies. Nonetheless, the concept of legal transplants is not unique to 
developing countries: Watson (1991) states that legal transplants are the most common 
form of legal change (Watson, 1991). Helen Xanthaki has explained that western legal 
draftsmen will often look to countries with a similar legal system, language and legal 
tradition as a starting point, to assess the extent to which chosen solutions blend with 
international practice (Xanthaki, 2008). Additionally, the comparison of legal systems 
and their effects on economic performance is not a novel phenomenon. While NIE can 
be described as a successor to the Law and Development movement of the 1960s, 
comparative analysis of law and economics, or law and governance has occurred for 
several centuries: in the 18th century, Adam Smith wrote ‘The Wealth of Nations’, a 
discussion of economic policies of European countries, and the implications in the in-
ternational trading system (Smith, 1776). In the same century, Montesquieu explored 
the relationship between laws and governance in his book ‘The Spirit of the Laws’, in 
which he argued against legal transplantation on the grounds of national context (Mon-
tesquieu, 1750). Two centuries later, Max Weber in his book ‘Economy and Society’ 
outlined various areas of interplay between law and economic systems. Weber argued 
that administrative actions be embodied in formal law, and enacted by the legislature. 
In his view, budgets as programs of public revenue and expenditure should thus be 
underpinned by legislation (Weber, 1968).  
In 1993, Alan Watson defined a legal transplant as “the moving of a rule or a system 
of law from one country to another or from one people to another” (Watson, 1993, p. 
21). Following this line of thinking, Nuno Garoupa and Anthony Ogus described legal 
transplants as the unilateral adoption of legal norms from other jurisdictions (Garoupa 
& Ogus, 2006). Berkowitz, et al., (2001) review historical transplantation of legal codes 
over the last two hundred years, which they organise into three waves: firstly, between 
1890 and 1914, during which French law was exported throughout Europe, and then 
British and French Law exported into colonies. Secondly, in the immediate period fol-
lowing the Second World War, many newly independent countries borrowed the legal 
systems of major western countries. In this period, laws were borrowed from the Unit-
ed States, as well as those European countries which were former colonial powers. 
Thirdly, from the 1980s, especially after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, 
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legal reforms were implemented in former Soviet countries. These reforms were mod-
elled on the legal systems of the United States and European countries.  
In their discussion of Japanese Financial Law, Hideki Kanda and Curtis J. Milhaupt 
state that legal transplants “can range from the wholesale adoption of entire systems of 
law to the copying of a single rule” (Kanda & Milhaupt, 2003, p. 887). To explain the 
proliferation of legal transplants, Kanda and Milhaupt (2003), point to the ease with 
which transplants occur, as well as the political element or impetus, which is often ex-
ternal, such as colonisation or military occupation. Also, they point to the nature of legal 
transplantation, which is the domain of the legal profession, i.e., lawyers and judges, 
who look to other sources of ‘authority’ (ibid). In Africa, from the mid-1980s, SAPs were 
accompanied by legal reforms for privatisation and institutional strengthening (See 
Chapter 2). Thereafter, the PRSP processes integrated legal and institutional reforms 
(See Chapters 3 and 4).   
According to the World Bank, “it is generally recognized that there are strong links 
between the rule of law, economic development, and poverty reduction, and that 
therefore the World Bank and organizations with comparable mandates should make 
promoting the rule of law a priority” (Legal Vice Presidency, World Bank, 2003, p. 9). 
The World Bank organises legal reforms into three categories: reforms of laws, demand-
side reforms which are concerned with the internal and systemic operations of institu-
tions, and supply-side reforms which address access to institutions, and the quality of 
their performance. Interestingly, the Legal Vice-Presidency of the World Bank has noted 
that transplantation of laws from abroad, though appealing, may be unsustainable if 
they are irrelevant to the local context: “fostering public understanding and ownership 
of the proposed laws ensures that they are suitable for the economic, social, and legal 
climate, and thereby facilitates subsequent compliance by the public at large” (Legal 
Vice Presidency, World Bank, 2003, p. 6). However, it can be argued that the extent to 
which the public can claim ownership of institutions which originate from external insti-
tutions is debatable.  
Legal transplants have provoked much discussion and debate: in 1974, Otto Kahn-
Freund was alarmed at the prospect of using foreign models as instruments of social or 
cultural change (Kahn-Freund, 1974). Countering in 1976, and advocating for legal 
transplants, Alan Watson argued that “whatever their historical origins may have been, 
rules of private law can survive without any close connection to any particular people, 
any particular period of time or any particular place” (Watson, 1976, p. 81). In more 
recent discourse, Pierre Legrand, asserted that legal transplants are ‘impossible’ on the 
basis that rules are necessarily based within a specific context (Legrand, 1997). Howev-
er, this position is challenged by current international development practice: current 
methods of economic and legal evaluation, e.g., Doing Business and CPIA, place coun-
tries in a competition or in a race to adopt ‘ideal and good’ laws. As Daphne Barak-Erez 
notes, “inspiration from foreign legislation is sometimes the result of competition, usu-
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ally economic competition, between countries. States vie with one another for invest-
ments and new economic initiatives” (Barak-Erez, 2014, p. 19). 
From the perspective of African legal and economic development, I would argue that it 
is possible to view transplants as a reality of existence, as a result of several waves of 
legal reform from the pre-colonial era. As such, the relevant question then becomes- 
how should the effectiveness of legal reforms be evaluated?   
5.2.2. Problems with the Evaluation of Laws 
Orthodox development perspectives have measured the good qualities of law against 
ideal metrics, which informs the current approach to legal reform for economic devel-
opment, i.e., to transplant laws or characteristics of ostensibly ideal legal systems into 
developing economies. These economies are then evaluated using econometric indices 
which measure the quality of their laws and institutions:  For example, the African De-
velopment Bank describes its CPIA Assessment as a: 
“diagnostic tool that annually assesses the quality of policies and the perfor-
mance of institutional frameworks in the 54 African countries. It measures the 
capacity of a country to support sustainable growth, poverty reduction, and the 
effective use of development assistance with a particular focus on the assess-
ment of key elements that are within the country's control, rather than on out-
come” (African Development Bank, 2017).  
Similarly, the United Nations states that the usefulness of the indicators used to meas-
ure the rule of law is derived from their simplicity, but notes that indicators can remove 
complexity and context, and mask important differences. To avoid these problems, the 
United Nations uses multiple data sources, focused on countries, organises institutions 
into clusters, and measures performance from the perspective of stakeholders (United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011). Albers (2007) has 
explained that the Good Governance Index (GGI) measures perceived level of govern-
ance through the subjective opinions of those who demand it, e.g., citizens and experts, 
while the Doing Business Index measures the attractiveness of countries to companies 
which invest around the globe. Both the GGI and Doing Business indexes group objec-
tive indicators into clusters, and measure the quality of laws and institutions from the 
‘demand’ side, i.e., from the perspective of stakeholders. However, perspectives are 
inherently subjective, as has been discussed by Amanda Perry in her investigation of the 
factors which colour perceptions of legal rules, e.g., power distance. She noted that 
countries with small power distance, e.g., the United Kingdom, are characterised by 
rule-based systems. In countries with large power distance systems, e.g., Philippines, 
she has suggested that the legitimacy of rules is seen as irrelevant, as might triumphs 
over right (Perry, 2002). Through Perry’s analysis, it is clear to see that rules are defined 
and interpreted by different users according to their subjective value systems and cul-
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tural contexts. This agrees with the argument made in Chapter 2 of this thesis, law is 
amenable to a variety of purposes and interpretations (See 2.6).  
After decades of legal reforms and measurements of the quality of laws and institu-
tions, there is yet to be definitive agreement on the substantive meanings or manifesta-
tions of legal rules and concepts captured by these indices. As such, the rules of west-
ern advanced countries remain as the aspirational benchmarks for other countries to 
imitate (Siems, 2011; Milhaupt, 2009).  
However, despite the implementation of ‘model’ legal reforms over several decades, 
developing economies have yet to achieve comparable improvements in their economic 
standings. I would argue that the gap between legal transplantation and economic per-
formance can be attributed to two factors, the first of which can be traced to the sec-
ond and third limitations of NIE as given in this thesis, namely that it is difficult to define 
institutions, and that it is not clear whether institutions precede or follow development 
(See 5.1).  There is an inherent difficulty and contradiction in the measurement of a 
concept which is not clearly defined. This ambiguity creates the problem of causation, 
which has yielded disagreement: in 2000, Amartya Sen undertook a review of the ‘com-
prehensive approach’ to development, and showed the causative connections between 
legal systems and economic evolution. He pointed to the rise of capitalist economic 
model to assert that “capitalism did not emerge until the evolution of law and order and 
the legal and practical acceptance of property rights had made an ownership-based 
economy feasible and operational” (Sen, 2000, p. 16). Following this line of thinking, 
indexes such as Doing Business seem to suggest that the improvement of legal rules and 
functions of institutions necessarily result in economic improvement, measured by 
attractiveness to certain types of investors. NIE scholars have consistently put forward 
evidence to show that the quality of laws and institutions directly affects economic 
performance. For example, in their paper ‘Growth without Governance’, Daniel Kauff-
man and Aart Kraay use econometric evaluations of 175 countries over a period of one 
year to argue that “per capita incomes and the quality of governance are strongly posi-
tively correlated across countries” (Kauffmann & Kraay, 2002, p. 1). Similarly, Acemoglu 
& Robinson, (2012); Acemoglu, et al., (2001); Djankov, et al., (2006); Rodrik, et al., 
(2004) have all presented evidence to show a connection between the quality of rules 
and institutions, and economic development. Secondly, the Law and Economics vision 
of private-sector led development creates a perspective in which the quality of laws is 
determined by the usefulness of laws and government institutions to investors and 
business. In the book ‘Solomon's Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations’, Hans-
Bernd Schäfer and Robert Cooter stated emphatically that the path to economic growth 
is through business ventures. It follows that the issues of law deemed necessary for 
development are those concerned with property rights, reduction of government cor-
ruption, enforcement of contracts, access to credit, etc. (Schäfer & Cooter, 2011). Recall 
that Davis and Trebilcock (2008) criticised the investor-centric focused approach of NIE-
inspired legal reforms (See 1.4).  
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Moreover, evidence linking the quality of laws to economic performance has been 
challenged on several grounds: the IMF has noted that developing countries, e.g., China, 
Botswana and Mauritius have made economic gains under institutional arrangements 
substantially different from those prescribed by IFIs (International Monetary Fund, 
2003). Also, while there seems to be evidence linking clusters of institutional types to 
growth, specific features of institutions which cause improvements in economic per-
formance have not been empirically determined (Fritz, et al., 2012; World Bank, 2012). 
Importantly, these indices have not provided a map as to how countries may acquire 
and embed the features prescribed as necessary for economic development. Thomas 
Carothers has pointed to the insufficiency of the intellectual and knowledge founda-
tions of the rule of law assistance of IFIs. Carothers (2003) held up the economic per-
formance of China as the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment globally as a 
counter-argument to show that weak rule of law (as defined by IFI indexes) was less 
important to investors than the prospect of profit. He argued that the rule of law ap-
proach suffers from a lack of knowledge at many levels of conceptualisation, operation 
and evaluation: “to start with, there is a surprising amount of uncertainty about the 
basic rationale for rule-of-law promotion. Aid agencies prescribe rule-of-law programs 
to cure a remarkably wide array of ailments in developing and post-communist coun-
tries, from corruption and surging crime to lagging foreign investment and growth” 
(Carothers, 2003, p. 10). Similarly, as stated in Section 1.4, Julian Du has argued that 
China achieved its impressive economic growth record in absence of adequate legal 
institutions; the country is rated below average on various measurements of rule of law, 
property rights protection, contracting institutions etc. (Du, 2011). It seems then that 
current indices which measure the quality of laws and institutions show correlation, 
rather than causation. 
Criticising the econometric approach to the measurements of the quality of law, 
Helland & Klick, (2011) have noted the profound impact and intellectual influence of the 
Legal Origins literature, which is the most cited paper in the economics discipline since 
its publication. They also note that subsequent studies, including those conducted by 
NIE scholars such as Acemoglu, et al., in 2001 on the Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development follow the microeconomic evaluation model of Legal Origins. Thereafter, 
they criticise the econometric model on the basis that microeconomic tools are 
unsuitable, due to the nature of legal institutions. Indeed, they assert that the 
‘’fundamental problem is one of statistical identification” (Helland & Klick, 2011, p. 100), 
by which they mean that it is not possible to account for all the factors and variables 
which lead to an outcome: 
“That is, how can one isolate the causal effect of x on y. If one knew everything 
that affected y, and had data for all of those variables, this would be a trivial 
problem to solve. In that context, a regression that included all of those variables 
would yield causal estimates that would be unbiased. Unfortunately, economic 
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theory is not nearly so well developed that any researcher could possibly know 
all of the important variables affecting the outcome of interest if that outcome is 
even moderately complex. Further, even if theory or intuition did provide a well-
developed guide, many of the important variables would be difficult to quantify 
or, at least, to get data that captured them. While proxies sometimes exist, they 
are never perfect” (Helland & Klick, 2011, p. 109).  
On the basis of this criticisms, Helland & Klick, (2011) maintain that it is problematic to 
draw policy conclusions and recommendations about the institutions to be adopted by 
developing countries. On this premise, it is imperative to ask- how then should the qual-
ity and effectiveness of legal systems be measured?  
5.2.3. Evaluate Law Against Outcomes 
I would argue that law should be measured by whether it can lead economic systems to 
achieve good outcomes. This measurement would evaluate the outcomes, intended 
and unintended, of the stipulations of legal instruments, through an interrogation of the 
interpretation and behaviour of institutions. In its discussion on the evaluation of re-
forms, the Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank recommended that evaluation of 
legal reform should first identify the economic activity that will be directly affected by 
the reform (Legal Vice Presidency, World Bank, 2003). In this regard, legal instruments 
introduced for the purpose of managing economic activities state clear objectives to be 
achieved and outcomes to be generated by institutions. Laws create mental constructs 
which guide thought systems, as well as the behaviour and functions of institutions. 
Previous chapters (See Chapters 3 and 4) discussed the ways by which the budgetary 
legislations in Nigeria and Rwanda guide the debt management functions of govern-
ment institutions through tools and activities prescribed, e.g., debt sustainability anal-
yses and medium-term expenditure analyses. It is difficult to prove causality, i.e., a link 
between legal instruments and economic outcomes, due to the multiplicity of elements 
(endogenous, exogenous, domestic, international, etc.) in economic processes. None-
theless, it is possible to evaluate the effect of law on 1) Institutional Behaviour and 
Functions, 2) Dynamics of Interaction between Institutions, and 3) the Environment 
created by Institutions. Evaluations of the effect of law on these three elements allows: 
a) Assessment of whether, and the extent to which legal frameworks and instruments 
are suitable for purpose; 
b) Observe the interplay of law and institutions to identify points of synergy, con-
flict/contestation, and ineffectiveness; and  
c) Identify opportunities for further reforms of laws and institutions  
 
The review of legal reform (budgetary legislations) in Nigeria and Rwanda highlights the 
importance of the proper conceptualisation of laws as instruments of economic devel-
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opment. Current budgetary legislations in both countries emanated from the PRSP 
process which is guided by the IMF and the World Bank. Consequently, the provisions 
which govern public debt management reflect the agenda and concerns of the era, i.e., 
debt relief to reduce heavy debt burdens, and the introduction of binding measures to 
the prevent the accumulation of debt burdens. Thus, the Governance agenda of New 
Institutional Economics as adopted by IFIs is displayed in the structures and functions of 
national governments: debt management is limited to constraints on government bor-
rowing, and monitoring of debt portfolios from a quantitative perspective. The case-
study points to the necessity of an outcome lens approach to legal reform and evalua-
tion of laws. Legal instruments, which are introduced to underpin the achievement of 
economic objectives, will require the attribute of responsiveness. In this regard, period-
ic reviews and evaluations of the effect of laws, measured against outcomes in the be-
haviour and practices of government and other stakeholders is necessary. Also, the 
extent to which laws contribute to the achievement of stated goals should be consid-
ered. Findings can then be integrated into development planning, and reforms of le-
gal/regulatory systems as necessary. The evaluation of the interaction of law and econ-
omies is imperative to ascertain the benefits and burdens created on stakeholders, the 
limitations of laws and institutions, and to close the gaps which limit the effectiveness 
of law as an instrument for economic development.  
This approach follows that of Faure, et al., (2010), who propose that legal interven-
tions in developing countries should be evaluated against outcomes. Discussing envi-
ronmental regulation, they observed that failings in regulation are not caused by en-
forcement difficulties, and argued that “forms of regulation employed have not been 
designed for application within a developing country, and, more importantly, an indi-
vidual country” (Faure, et al., 2010, p. 144). They go further to suggest ‘indicators’ to be 
used in the construction of efficient environment regulatory systems in developing 
countries: 
a) Standards of Effectiveness Should be Determined by Whether A Given Legal Reform 
Achieves the Goals as Set Within the Country;  
b) Do Not Dismiss Transplants, But Proceed Cautiously and Be Guided at All Times by 
Local Needs and Knowledge 
c) In Terms of Precision of Formulations, Consider Rule-Based Regulation Rather Than 
Vague or Flexible Standards 
d) Opt for (Environmental) Instruments That Take Account of Low Capacity as Well as 
Any Corruption Problems 
e) Choose the Level of Governance at Which Administrative Capacity Is the Strongest 
and Most Independent  
 
The indicators provided by Faure, et.al., (2010), present a subjective and contextual 
approach to the evaluation of the effectiveness of legal reforms, particularly as these 
occur in developing countries. These indicators speak to outcomes as the benchmark of 
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effectiveness, and the tools by which institutional capacity can be measured. In this 
case-study of Nigeria and Rwanda, the outcome-based evaluation of the budgetary 
legislations to improve public debt management against outcomes, is necessarily prem-
ised on an inquiry, i.e., have the budgetary legislations led to the intended outcomes of 
debt relief, i.e., reduced debt portfolios, lower debt service payments, and the devel-
opmental use of debt finance? (See 2.4; 2.5)  
The answer is that, to a limited extent, the budgetary legislations have contributed 
to the intended outcomes of legal reform for debt relief. The laws have improved gov-
ernment management of public debt, as they have fostered greater accountability, and 
established defined mechanisms for government borrowing (See 4.4; 4.6).  However, 
both countries have amassed significant debt burdens, with the attendant increase in 
debt service payments due in the short and medium term (See 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6). On the 
use of debt finance, the Government of Rwanda accounts for sectoral deployment and 
project based deployment of borrowings (See 4.5.2). In Nigeria, while specific deploy-
ment of debt finance is not reported by the Government, it is known that between 2011 
and 2016, the Government financed the entirety of its capital expenditure budget, and 
a portion of its recurrent expenditure through borrowings (See 4.2).    
The juxtaposition of the budgetary legislations and the current public debt portfolios 
of Nigeria and Rwanda provokes further interrogation. Several questions arise:  
• Developmental use of debt finance: how can developmental undertakings be given 
priority in government borrowing?  
• How would ‘developmental’ use of debt finance be determined and enforced? 
• Should the laws be extended further to require the Governments to justify the ac-
quisition of more debt to Parliaments? 
• Can the budgetary legislations specify borrowing limits on the basis of estimated 
government expenditure on national social services and debt repayments? 
• Would these types of legislations impinge on executive government power and 
authority?  
• Are laws in themselves sufficient instruments for debt management? 
 
These questions are beyond the scope of this thesis, but emphasise the argument that 
evaluating or measuring the effect of law on economic outcomes is a complex, not 
simplistic endeavour, which may generate more questions than answers. As discussed 
in this thesis, laws operate in diverse and evolving contexts, which are shaped by a plu-
rality of ideological, historical, political and institutional elements, as well as various 
stakeholders, and economic objectives.  
Thus, I would observe that the evaluation of law against outcomes would be prob-
lematic when attempted on a global comparative basis, as done by the Doing Business 
and CPIA indexes, as it is not possible to determine a single set of outcomes for diver-
gent countries and various issues. As a result, the outcome-based approach is necessari-
ly subjective and concerned with contextual achievement of economic objectives. Addi-
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tionally, it addresses the challenges associated with transplantation of laws and legal 
systems. As Carothers (2003) notes, typical legal reforms or rule of law aid programs 
follow the approach of “diagnosing the shortcomings in selected institutions—that is, 
determining in what ways selected institutions do not resemble their counterparts in 
countries that donors believe embody successful rule of law—and then attempting to 
modify or reshape those institutions to fit the desired model” (Carothers, 2003, p. 9). 
Furthermore, an outcome based approach incorporates both objective and subjective 
measurements to evaluate effect of law on institutions, and by extension, the economy, 
as explored in the table below.  
Table 22: Sample Framework for Outcome-Based Evaluation of Law 
Question Benchmark/Indicator per economic 
objectives (Legislation and Economic 
Plans) 
Evaluation 
What is the objective? Debt relief and economic 
development 
• Increase government spending on 
developmental issues 
• Reduce proportion of national 
resources spent on debt servicing 
• Maintain debt records database 
• Set and maintain limits on 
government borrowing 
• Frequency: annually, triennially  
• Evaluator: governments, international 
agencies, civil society, media, academia 
• Tools and resources: composition of 
national budgets and debt portfolios 
What are relevant legal 
instruments/legal 
underpinning? 
• Legal provision/stipulation 
• What obligation is created on 
institutions? 
• How should these obligations to be 
implemented per legislation? 
• How are these obligations 
implemented? 
• Frequency: based on obligations 
created by legal instrument, as well as 
annual reviews. 
• Evaluator: civil society, governments, 
international agencies, media, 
academia  
• Tools: legal instrument, reports of 
government activities and spending, 
economic performance reports from 
various sources (national, multilateral 
and regional institutions, etc.)  
Enforcement/Implementation 
of Law  
• What provisions are enforced? 
(positive, prohibitive) 
• What provisions are not enforced? 
• Are enforcement mechanisms 
sufficient? 
• Is there a need for review of 
provisions or obligations? 
• Frequency: based on obligations 
created by legal instrument, as well as 
periodic reviews. 
• Evaluator: civil society, governments, 
international agencies, media, 
academia  
• Tools: observation of institutional 
practices through reviews of reports, 
and perceptions of stakeholders 
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Question Benchmark/Indicator per economic 
objectives (Legislation and Economic 
Plans) 
Evaluation 
Interplay of Law and 
Institutions 
• Which institutions comply with 
obligations? 
• Which institutions do not comply 
with obligations? 
• What are the reasons for 
compliance or non-compliance? 
• Should obligations be reviewed, 
reassigned or removed? 
• What interventions are necessary 
to improve interaction of law and 
institutions? 
• Frequency: based on obligations 
created by legal instrument, as well as 
periodic reviews. 
• Evaluator: civil society, governments, 
international agencies, media, 
academia  
• Tools: observation of institutional 
practices through reviews of reports, 
and perceptions of stakeholders 
Outcomes • What progress has been made 
towards the achievement of 
economic objectives? 
• Frequency: annually, triennially  
• Evaluator: governments, international 
agencies, civil society, media, academia 
• Tools and resources: composition of 
national budgets, debt portfolios, 
economic performance evaluations 
 
Outcome based evaluations are not intended to be conducted primarily for ranking or 
comparisons of economies. Rather, the fundamental objective is to enhance the suita-
bility and effectiveness of laws and institutions for the stated purposes of economic 
development. In this case, the benchmark is the objective as adopted by the country. 
For example, Nigeria and Rwanda both implemented PRSPs to improve their economies, 
but the tangible and specific measurements of these are unique to both countries. 
Rwanda sought to achieve lower-middle income status by 2020 and to maintain its debt 
at sustainable levels, measured by the NPV of debts-to-exports ratio of 150 per cent 
(See 3.4.1; Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2002). Nigeria intended to in-
crease spending in the social sectors, particularly health, education, water and infra-
structure (Nigerian National Planning Commission, 2004). 
In various countries, the same set of questions can guide the interrogation of the 
outcomes, or responses of law on institutions, as well as effects of legal instruments on 
economic development. The data required for this method of evaluation are available in 
the public domain, and the methodologies for analysis can be adopted by stakeholders, 
whether government, private sector, IFIs, civil society or academia. This approach is 
similar and complementary to that adopted by Doing Business and CPIA in that it groups 
elements into clusters. However, while benchmarks and conditionalities are not prob-
lematic in themselves, their use is limited when they do not speak to outcomes or re-
sults (Andrews, 2013; Riegner, 2016; Milhaupt, 2009; Siems, 2011). If development 
connotes improvement and progress (See 1.1), then it should be measured from the 
perspective of tangible outcomes and changes. Current tools of evaluation of law (Doing 
Business, CPIA, GGI) are rooted in NIE thinking which promotes the idea that institutions 
matter. In the same way, outcome evaluations require intellectual underpinning and 
direction, which is sourced from a combination of movements: these are firstly, the 
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original Law and Development movement, which asserted that law is an instrument to 
drive economic development. Secondly, as the outcome-based approach takes its start-
ing point the practices of institutions, vis a vis legal frameworks, the NIE school of 
thought which is centred on the importance of institutional quality for economic im-
provement provides it with ideological basis. However, this approach takes institutional 
practices not as the outcome, but as the starting point to probe further, and interrogate 
the suitability, relevance and effectiveness of legal instruments and frameworks. The 
outcome-based approach to evaluation may be of greater benefit and use to govern-
ments and domestic stakeholder groups, than IFIs which have designed proprietary 
tools in common use. Governments and national stakeholder groups are those which 
are primarily concerned with the achievement of economic objectives. Nonetheless, 
academia and international institutions may have an interest in the observation of the 
interplay between legal instruments, institutional behaviour and economic perfor-
mance. The table below presents the similarities and differences of the outcome-
focused approach and the current system of index-based evaluation. 
Table 23: Comparative Table of Outcome-Based Evaluation and IFI Indexes 
Element  Outcome Analysis  Indexes  
Approach Observe and analyse effect of laws on institutions, and 
outcomes in economy 
Measure quality of laws and 
institutional arrangements  
Benchmark Determine and enhance suitability and effectiveness 
of legal instruments and institutions for objectives of 
economic development 
Global comparative evaluations of 
best performing economies  
Evaluation 
methodology 
Factual observations of institutional practices, 
perceptions of stakeholders, and observations of 
economic performance  
Perceptions of stakeholders  
Tools Questionnaires/surveys 
References to economic data (e.g., debt portfolios) 
Questionnaires/surveys administered 
by IFIs 
Ownership Independent evaluations conducted by governments, 
IFIs, and other interest groups 
International Finance Institutions  
 
The outcome based approach is dependent on the clarity of economic objectives within 
countries. As noted above, it is difficult to measure concepts which are not expressly 
defined. In this regard, it is necessary that the development objectives and metrics are 
subject to clear definitions, interpretations and measurement. Legal reforms create 
changes in economies, and require changes in behaviour of institutions and other 
stakeholders. Thus, as law creates new obligations, thought systems and behavioural 
patterns, I argue that it is important for legal reforms to explicitly consider and define 
the institutional behaviours and objectives which are to be effected through legal in-
struments. As an example, I review the S41(1)(a) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 
(Nigeria), which stipulates the purposes for which Governments in Nigeria may borrow:  
“Government at all tiers shall only borrow for capital expenditure and human 
development, provided that, such borrowing shall be on concessional terms with 
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low interest rate and with a reasonably long amortization period subject to the 
approval of the appropriate legislative body where necessary”.  
The majority of terms in this clause have definitive economic interpretations, including: 
capital expenditure, concessional terms, low interest rate, long amortization period, 
even as the term legislative body clearly refers to the National and State Parliaments. 
However, the term development can be contested, and may be subject to divergent 
interpretations or assessments. Thus, it would be useful for the legislation to avoid 
subjectivity surrounding definition of the term, and provide an interpretative guide. The 
questions below tackle some of the questions which arise from the obligation placed on 
the Nigerian Government by the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007:  
i. What is human development? 
ii. What are the benchmarks by which human development is measured? Single or 
multiple dimensions? Numerical? Quantitative? Target-based? 
iii. Who sets this benchmark? The executive government? Independent government 
agencies? Parliament? Multilateral agencies? 
iv. How is this benchmark reached? Independently? Is there a consultative process? 
v. Who applies these benchmarks? Are they published and located in the public do-
main? What capabilities are necessary to engage in assessment of government satis-
faction of criteria established by benchmarks? 
vi. When should benchmarks be applied and purpose measured: before, during or after 
debt acquisition? 
vii. How is compliance with purpose enforced: is there a procedural means of verifica-
tion? Approval systems? Obligation to publish purposive analysis in public domain? 
viii. How are these functions (i-vi) allocated between stakeholders, i.e., executive gov-
ernments, parliaments, citizenry, lenders and guarantors, beneficiary communities? 
 
Thus, I argue that it is imperative that legal reforms are accompanied by careful consid-
eration of obligations created, and definition of the terms, processes and responses by 
which legal instruments will be applied.  Legal reforms for economic development 
should capture and define all relevant economic activities and processes which are 
guided or directed by laws. It may be necessary for legal instruments to provide defini-
tions or refer to other instruments or institutions which will provide clarification, defini-
tion or measurement of concepts. 
5.2.4. Enhance Interplay of Law and Institutions 
The discussion of debt accumulation by the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda (See 
Chapter 2), as well as SAPs implemented in both countries show that institutions can 
function without law. However, where law is introduced as the overarching framework, 
institutions are restricted by the interpretations of objectives, roles and functions pre-
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scribed by legal instruments. Thus, legal reforms should address contexts of implemen-
tation, and enable the achievement of economic objectives. To be relevant, suitable and 
effective, law introduced as an instrument of economic management should interact 
with, and enable institutions operating in its area of remit. The interplay of laws and 
institutions is a critical component in the effectiveness of law as an instrument for eco-
nomic development. Thus, I reiterate the argument that legal reforms should be con-
cerned with the utilisation of law for outcomes, rather than the approach which places 
law as a solution in itself.  
In this regard, the role of institutions (organisations), is critical. Thus, I propose that 
the effectiveness of legal instruments can be enhanced using tools such as indexes 
which can support institutions towards the satisfaction of obligations created by legisla-
tion. Indexes are usually applied towards the measurement of the quality of law, and 
ranking of economies based on the types of laws adopted. However, I suggest that the 
methodology of indexes can be integrated into the application of legal instruments to 
facilitate the achievement of economic objectives. For example, a ‘development’ index 
can be used in conjunction with the FRA 2007 to ensure that Nigerian Governments 
satisfy the human development requirement for borrowing as discussed below:  
Sample ‘Human Development’ Borrowing Index: Categories  
a) Population segments and proportion of population to benefit from debt-financed 
undertaking? 
b) How does undertaking lie within developmental goals and progress? 
c) Developmental areas, e.g., health, education, sanitation, infrastructure, etc.? 
d) New undertaking? Upgrade of existing facility/service? Repair of existing facili-
ty/service? 
e) Justification for undertaking: what is the current state of the problem/opportunity? 
How is this justification verified? 
f) Why debt finance? Alternative sources of finance, costs and terms? 
g) Expected Outcomes? 
a. Costs to national development and beneficiary groups if debt financed undertak-
ing is not implemented? 
b. Benefits of debt financed undertaking to national development and beneficiary 
groups? 
c. Success and failure metrics? 
h) Responsible/borrowing government? 
i) Current and expected debt obligations, and credit history of borrowing govern-
ment? 
j) Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for use of debt finance? 
k) Partners? 
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As with current indexes, governments and stakeholder groups can measure the extent 
to which their purpose of borrowing satisfies the requirements of the borrowing index. 
In addition, on a comparative level, such an observatory index can be used by academia 
and other stakeholder groups to provoke meaningful discussion on the use of debt 
finance in Africa. To illustrate, developmental use of debt finance in Africa can be moni-
tored through an index-based diagnostic tool, adapted from the provisions which gov-
ern the purpose of borrowing in African countries. Firstly, this tool can identify those 
countries which explicitly direct debt finance towards developmental purposes. Second-
ly, it can attempt to articulate the meanings of development within borrower countries. 
Thirdly, as a borrowing index, it can track the purposes for which governments have 
borrowed over time, monitor borrowing trends, and categorise countries according to 
performance. Such an index used by IFIs, governments and other stakeholder groups 
would generate policy and intellectual discussion as to how to improve the utilisation of 
debt finance for development in Africa, and lead to more concretised definitions and 
indicators of development.  
Furthermore, following evaluation of outcomes, (and the review of institutional be-
haviour), incorporation of institutional practices can narrow the gaps between legal 
frameworks and the contexts in which reforms will be implemented. For example, S45 
of the FRA 2007 requires financial institutions to ensure that borrower governments 
have obtained approval for borrowing, and intend to use debt finance for capital ex-
penditure.  However, Nigerian financial institutions have adopted practices to reduce 
the risk of government default on loans (See 4.3.2). To avoid non-repayment of loans, 
the banks make lending decisions and set borrowing limits for governments on the basis 
of minimum balances maintained in government accounts (Okosodo, 2017). On occa-
sion, disparities may be observed between the stipulations of legal instruments and 
institutional practices. A thorough mapping of existing practices can identify the func-
tions, capacities and effects of institutions, whereupon beneficial practices can be inte-
grated into, codified and regulated by legal instruments.  
5.3. Summary 
Through the proposition above, I suggest that standardised legal frameworks can be 
adapted to address the developmental needs, contexts and institutional frameworks of 
divergent contexts. Also, I would argue that some of the weaknesses of NIE-influenced 
legal interventions can be overcome by the methodologies of the outcome-focused 
evaluation approach. This approach is an attempt to address the gaps between legal 
reforms and economic outcomes. The interplay of laws, institutions and economic de-
velopment is dynamic, evolutionary, subjective to context, and important to under-
stand. Economic and legal interventions prescribed by international finance institutions 
for developing economies are often criticised for their standardised and prescriptive 
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approaches which do not necessarily consider the specific elements of the contexts in 
questions. This dissertation took its point of departure from the work of scholars in law 
and development, and NIE who have argued that laws and institutions is important for 
economic development (See Chapter 1; Acemoglu, et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012; Kaufmann, et al., 1999; Kauffmann & Kraay, 2002; North, 1995, Rodrik, et al., 
2004; Sen, 2000). Through the investigation of Nigeria and Rwanda, this dissertation has 
argued that legal reforms have contributed to improvements in government manage-
ment of public debt. However, these reforms can be described as limited, as they have 
not changed borrowing practices of the governments of both countries.  
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How can law be better used as an instrument for the economic development of the 
African continent? This is the question which inspired and guided the investigation of 
this thesis. Nigeria and Rwanda were selected for the comparability and contrast in 
their political and institutional arrangements, as well as in economic performance. The 
thesis considered the relationship between law and economic development, as shaped 
by the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda, over five decades. Also, the study consid-
ered the policies, interventions and operations of the World Bank and IMF, particularly 
the influence these institutions wield in shaping development discourse and practice, as 
well as their influence upon the economies and developmental trajectories of Nigeria 
and Rwanda between the 1980s and 2000s.  
The effectiveness of law for economic development was interrogated through an 
evaluation of the outcomes from legal reforms undertaken to improve public debt 
management in Nigeria and Rwanda. Through the investigation of the evolution of debt 
portfolios of Nigeria and Rwanda between 2005 and 2015, the study concluded that 
budgetary legislations introduced discipline and accounting into systems for public debt 
management, but have yet to contribute to the sustainability of debt portfolios, or di-
rect governments to use debt for development in measurable ways. The lessons from 
the case-study undertaken in the preceding chapters are applicable for other countries 
on the African continent, especially those in similar circumstances, i.e., struggling with 
accumulating debt and working to engineer economic improvements.  
Institutional thought has pointed to the absence, functions or ineffectiveness of laws 
and institutions to explain differences in developmental outcomes (North, 1995; Ace-
moglu & Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu, et al., 2001; De Soto, 1989). The central argument 
of these is that better laws and institutions would lead to better outcomes for devel-
opment. Similarly, Legal Origins theorists rely upon legal antecedents and culture to 
explain economic performance (La Porta, et al., 2008). In development practice, multi-
lateral institutions have integrated the ‘institutions’ thinking and tools into policy and 
operations, which has yielded econometric evaluations of legal systems and their func-
tionalities. Indexes, such as Doing Business and the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) evaluate the quality of laws, and the operations of legal systems in 
diverse areas, from debt management to immigration.  
However, legal reforms based on this thinking have been criticized for being vague, 
as the concept of institutions remains undefined (Chang, 2007). Nonetheless, econo-
mists have included laws in the contemporary understanding of institutions (North, 
1995). Also, it is not yet clear what makes institutions good, or bad. Yet improvements 
to institutions are regularly prescribed and implemented, especially in developing coun-
tries. These improvements are largely modelled on the legal systems of more advanced 
economies (Mihaupt, 2009), and the interventions have yet to yield results as intended 
(Andrews, 2013; See Chapters 3 and 4). Following the heavy accumulation of debt in the 
1970s, and the economic contractions and debt crisis of the early 1980s, the Govern-
ments of Nigeria and Rwanda implemented Structural Adjustment Programs to rectify 
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structural weaknesses of their economies. By the 1990s, both countries had acquired 
unsustainable debt burdens, which were reduced through debt relief offered by credi-
tors in 2005. Criticisms of IFI interventions in borrower economies led to policy reforms 
within the World Bank and IMF, and the shift to country-led implementation of reforms 
towards the end of the 1990s. Also, the 1990s brought a global, concerted campaign for 
debt relief and the rise of the global ‘development’ agenda. Riding on the wave created 
by the debt relief and development movements, the Governments of Nigeria and 
Rwanda argued that debt burdens and debt repayments diverted necessary resources 
for development. Debt relief would thus enable increased spending on developmental 
needs. Debt relief was contingent on the satisfactory implementation of economic and 
institutional reforms captured in the Poverty Reduction and Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of 
both countries, as approved by the International Monetary Fund.  
A critical component of reforms for debt relief was the enactment of budgetary leg-
islations to regulate government management of public debt. Debt management provi-
sions of budgetary laws in both countries are similar; the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 
in Nigeria and the Organic Budget Laws 2006 and 2013 in Rwanda both stipulate the 
authority of governments to borrow, purposes for which governments may borrow, 
debt limits, and debt management systems. These laws were introduced for the pur-
pose of economic development, particularly, to prevent the build-up of debt portfolios. 
Both countries, through the PRSPs (Nigeria-2003, Rwanda-2002), expressed their im-
mediate and medium-term objectives of economic development.  
The evaluation conducted in this thesis discussed the instrumentalism of law for 
economic development: the budgetary laws in Nigeria and Rwanda have become the 
frameworks and constructs through which the Governments of both countries manage 
public borrowing. These laws direct the functions of government institutions, manage 
competing interests, and serve as tools of economic management. However, the thesis 
also highlighted the limitations of current systems for the measurement of the quality 
of laws and institutions: in Nigeria and Rwanda, there are well established systems for 
the accounting and reporting of government debt. On the CPIA index of the World 
Bank, both Nigeria and Rwanda have performed better than average: in 2016, Nigeria 
scored 4.5 out of 6, and Rwanda scored 4.0. However, these scores can be challenged 
upon closer scrutiny, as the Nigerian Government has yet to set the limits of govern-
ment borrowing, despite the obligation created by legislation. Also, while external bor-
rowing is constrained, National and Sub-National Governments can borrow in the do-
mestic market without restriction. In contrast, Government borrowing in Rwanda is 
centralised, and debt limits are set triennially. Additionally, in Rwanda there has been 
better accounting of the specific projects which have been prosecuted by debt finance. 
However, the bulk of Nigeria’s borrowing has served to finance recurrent expenditure.  
Specifically, debt relief was directed towards the reduction of external debt to sus-
tainable levels. However, budgetary legislations have not prevented the build-up of 
debt in both countries. Nigeria and Rwanda have acquired significant debt obligations, 
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which have led to high debt service payments. High levels of debt service return both 
countries to the economic situation before debt relief, where large amounts of financial 
resources were transferred to creditors, rather than being utilised within the country. In 
light of this, I argued that the index-based methodology for the evaluation of laws and 
institutions is insufficient, as these do not qualitatively and adequately evaluate the 
usefulness, suitability or relevance of legal instruments and institutional functions. In-
dexes, in effect, measure the extent to which legal systems have adopted the legal 
systems of advanced economies, typically those of western countries. It is difficult to 
rationalise that the legal constructs of a developed economy would be ideal and sup-
portive for the aspirations and contexts of developing economies, without proper con-
textual adaptation. Based on this argument, I proposed that the effectiveness of legal 
systems should be measured against outcomes, which are the expressed economic 
objectives of the country.  
Measuring legal systems against outcomes has been criticised on the basis that it is 
difficult to prove causation, i.e., direct effect of law on economic performance. Howev-
er, I argued that the problem with causation is linked to the problem of definition; if the 
objectives of institutions and laws are not expressly defined, then it would be difficult to 
show causation. Despite comparable legal reforms, the debt portfolios of Nigeria and 
Rwanda remain large, and there is the inherent risk of the build-up of unsustainable 
debt. Thus, I proposed an approach to observe the interaction of laws and institutions, 
particularly to evaluate institutional interpretation of and compliance with stipulations 
of legislation, and how these interactions enable the achievement of stated economic 
objectives. Through this approach, I argued that the gaps or weaknesses in laws and 
institutions can be more easily identified and remedied. Also, I argued that using this 
approach would render standard-form legal reforms more suitable and relevant to 
divergent contexts. 
Measuring outcomes may not necessarily be of primary interest to International Fi-
nance Institutions, but should be of importance to governments. The outcome-focused 
approach is not undertaken for comparison with other economies, but to enhance the 
instrumentalism of law for national economic development. I noted that the outcome 
approach is dependent on the clarity of the economic objective stated, and the capacity 
of institutions to function towards the achievement of economic objectives. As such, I 
considered the possibility of the utilisation of indexes in the application of law, to sup-
port government institutions in the prosecution of legal obligations, and not only in the 
measurement of laws.  
In summary, this thesis took its point of departure from the work of scholars in Law 
and Development, and Law and Economics, which have asserted that law is a necessary 
tool for economic development. Through the investigation and analysis, and the evi-
dence of the case-studies, I have argued that law is an important tool for improving 
economies. In the context of debt relief, legal reforms have improved government 
management of debt portfolios. Nonetheless, it remains necessary to enhance the ef-
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fectiveness of legal instruments, as well as the interplay of laws and institutions, in or-
der that laws direct institutions towards the achievement of developmental objectives.  
6.1. Revisiting the Research Questions 
This thesis was guided by three research questions, which are reviewed in this section:  
6.1.1. Question 1: Why Did the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda Seek and 
Obtain Debt Relief in 2005? 
Nigeria and Rwanda sought debt relief, firstly, to alleviate huge debt burdens, and sec-
ondly, to rectify the institutional weaknesses which had allowed the accumulation of 
public debt owed to international creditors. The Governments of both countries argued 
that repayments diverted resources from development spending and thus, inhibited 
development.  
The Governments of both countries acquired loans during the economic boom peri-
od of the 1970s, i.e., the period in which the prices of commodities they sold were high 
on the international market. During this time, creditors (IFIs, Governments and Private 
Financial Institutions) provided credit to developing countries, including Nigeria and 
Rwanda, on terms which often included variable interest rates and compound interest 
(See 2.2). The 1970s also witnessed the increase of government participation in African 
economies. As Okonjo-Iweala (2012) notes, African Governments pursued the economic 
model of Import Substitution Industrialisation which required heavy spending in all 
sectors of national economies. Nellis (2005) corroborates this position in his explanation 
of the rise of State Owned Enterprises in Africa, as he states that these government 
owned enterprises accounted for up to an average of 17 per cent of national GDPs. 
During this time, African Governments obtained the greater part of their revenue from 
the sale of commodities on the international market. The economic model and associ-
ated vulnerabilities to external economic shocks were discussed in the 1980 Lagos Plan 
of Action of the Organisation for African Unity. This Plan sought to reduce the over-
dependence of African Governments on the export of basic raw materials and minerals 
(Organisation of African Unity, 1980).  
The sale of crude oil formed the principal source of revenue for the Nigerian Gov-
ernment, as the sale of tea and coffee generated the greater share of revenue for the 
Government of Rwanda (See 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). By the 1980s, the prices of crude oil, tea 
and coffee had plummeted sharply, which resulted in reduced revenue for the Govern-
ments of Nigeria and Rwanda. It followed that both countries were unable to service 
debt obligations, which led to increased debt acquisitions, and frequent debt reschedul-
ings. To resolve the debt crisis, IFIs provided technical and financial assistance to bor-
rower countries. A central component of assistance was the Structural Adjustment 
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Program (SAP), which sought to reduce the role of governments in economies, place the 
private sector as the lead agent of economic development, and restructure national 
economic systems towards efficiency (See 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).   
SAPs in Nigeria and Rwanda were criticised for their prescriptive and intrusive fea-
tures, particularly privatisation and liberalisation which reduced government participa-
tion in national economies (See 2.3; Stiglitz, 2008). Similar measures were implemented 
in both countries, leading to economic contractions, social dislocations and increased 
poverty. In Rwanda, it has been argued that the SAP was a significant cause of the war 
and genocide of the 1990s - the IMF and World Bank sanctioned government spending 
on the military, but constrained state spending on education and social subsidies 
(Chossudovsky, 1995; Toussaint, 2004; See 2.3 and 2.4).   
By the 1990s, debt burdens had escalated to the point that debt repayments and 
obligations to creditors exceeded domestic spending on social services in borrower 
countries. The global Jubilee 2000 campaign consolidated the arguments put forward 
for debt relief by the scholarly community, activist groups and African Governments 
(See 2.4.1). These arguments can be organised into three categories: 
1. Odious Debt: this is based on the legal principle that debt can be repudiated when 
obtained in the name of a borrower, but without their consent (Kremer and Seema, 
2002). In this regard, governments had borrowed and deployed debt finance with-
out the consent of their citizens. Also, the debt relief campaign argued that debt re-
lief was cheap and would not adversely affect the economies of creditor countries 
(Krugman, 1990). Furthermore, debt repayments prevented the economic and social 
development of borrower countries (Watkins, 1994). Thomas Sankara, then Presi-
dent of Burkina Faso stated at a 1987 conference of the OAU that “debt cannot be 
repaid, first because if we don’t repay, lenders will not die. That is for sure. But if we 
repay, we are going to die” (Sankara, 1987).  
2. Joint Responsibility of Borrowers and Creditors: the debt relief campaign argued that 
creditors provided debt finance without proper due diligence, and thus accepted the 
implicit risk that debts would not be repaid (See 2.4.4; International Monetary Fund, 
1999). Similarly, the terms on which debt was rescheduled, poor advice by IFIs, and 
protectionist economic policies of industrialised countries served to inhibit the eco-
nomic recovery of borrower countries (Forum on Debt and Development, 1992).  
3. Development, not Debt: debt repayments often exceeded spending on developmen-
tal needs. Indeed, it was argued that borrower countries were forced to choose be-
tween spending on infrastructure and social services, or the satisfaction of debt ob-
ligations (Greenhill, 2002; See 2.5). The Millennium Development Goals, adopted by 
189 countries at the United Nations General Assembly further emphasised the glob-
al development agenda, and served as a reference point to measure and track de-
velopmental progress (United Nations Millennium Project, 2006). The debt relief 
campaign argued that borrower countries would use the savings gained from debt 
relief to achieve the global development goals agreed to at the United Nations.  
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In response to the campaign, IFIs created structured avenues for indebted countries to 
reduce their debt burdens. While debt relief measures were available from the late 
1980s (See 2.4.4.), these were essentially debt reschedulings to allow later repayments. 
In 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, and its successor En-
hanced HIPC (1999) were introduced by the World Bank and IMF as a channel for bor-
rower countries to discard debt burdens. The HIPC process required that beneficiary 
countries prepare national development plans in the form of Poverty Reduction Strate-
gy Papers (PRSPs), which would correct the structural and institutional weaknesses 
which allowed the build-up of debt. Under the Enhanced HIPC, the extent of debt relief 
was determined at the commencement of the HIPC program and acceptance of the 
PRSP by IFIs, with completion date determined by the policy or reform implementation 
performance of borrowers. 
The bulk of Nigeria’s debt was obtained from commercial creditors, particularly the 
Paris Club. Also, Nigeria did not qualify as an IDA-only country due to its economic rank-
ing. Nonetheless, it modelled its debt relief application on the processes stipulated by 
the HIPC: in 2003, the Government of Nigeria submitted a PRSP which expressed its 
4year development strategy, which incorporated economic, institutional and legal re-
forms. In 2005, halfway through implementation, Nigeria obtained debt relief worth 
US$18billion which represented 60 per cent of its total debt owed to the Paris Club 
(US$30billion).  
The greater share of Rwanda’s debt was owed to IFIs, particularly the World Bank 
and the IMF. In 2002, the country submitted a PRSP, in the form of a 10year develop-
ment strategy which articulated its economic objectives, as well as planned economic, 
institutional and legal reforms. In 2005, the country obtained debt relief worth 
US$1.4billion.  
Nigeria and Rwanda, despite their marked differences (historical, geographic, and 
institutional), shared similar experiences of heavy acquisition of external debt between 
the 1970s and mid-2000s, the build-up of unsustainable debt burdens, and debt relief 
from creditors obtained in 2005. In both countries, Governments had attempted, 
through direct intervention in their economies, to influence economic performance in 
the 1970s, which resulted in SAPs administered by the World Bank and IMF in the 
1980s. Thereafter, Governments adopted PRSPs and the associated reform agenda. In 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, following the discussion on the build-up of debt burdens, I 
made the following observations:  
1. Firstly, the experiences of both countries clearly emphasise the centrality of law to 
economic development. At a simplistic level, debt finance was obtained, and debt 
obligations created by the contractual agreements which were made between credi-
tors, and Nigeria and Rwanda. These agreements were governed by international 
law, and upheld by international institutions. In similar vein, the interventions of in-
ternational institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund were supported by the Articles of Agreement which establish both institutions. 
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Similarly, in both Nigeria and Rwanda, legal frameworks served as tools of economic 
management by both military dictatorships and civilian administrations. To illustrate, 
in Nigeria, to obtain loans from international creditors, the military dictatorships of 
General Obasanjo and General Babangida both repealed substantive legislation 
which stipulated the national debt ceiling. In Rwanda, the government was con-
strained, to some degree, by the terms of the IMF SAP which controlled the use of 
government finance.   
2. Secondly, the relationship between law and economic development is shaped by the 
vision of development, and model of governance operated by countries. Specific po-
litical-economic-social contexts determine the nature of interaction between laws, 
institutions and economic systems. The perception and deployments of laws and in-
stitutions are dependent on the fundamental ideology of the governance system. To 
illustrate, in Rwanda, the government was able to provide the military with re-
sources during a SAP which contracted economic resources and negatively impacted 
upon social conditions. Legal instruments, e.g., policies, legislations or regulations 
reflect and underpin the vision, agenda, objectives and assumptions of govern-
ments. The powers and capacities of institutions which supervise and implement the 
vision of governments, are to a significant degree determined by the ideals and pri-
orities of the governance system. 
3. Thirdly, the effectiveness of laws is dependent on the existence of strong and inde-
pendent institutions for enforcement. While it is accepted that a plurality of factors 
contributed to the economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s, it is clear that gov-
ernance systems were instrumental to the rapid economic decline suffered by both 
countries. To illustrate, IFIs deployed considerable political, intellectual and econom-
ic resources towards the enforcement of contractual agreements. It followed that 
the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda were held accountable and liable for finan-
cial obligations accrued under international law. Conversely, at national level, state 
and social institutions did not possess the requisite strength or independence to ju-
diciously utilise debt finance, manage the developmental process, or hold govern-
ments to account. While the terms of SAPs implemented by the World Bank and IMF 
attempted to control the use of funds obtained from creditors, the mechanisms of 
the domestic legal systems were not sufficiently robust to adequately govern the 
disbursement of funds. Thus, the debt problems of Nigeria and Rwanda highlight the 
critical importance of well-functioning legal systems and supporting institutions for 
economic management.  
4. Fourthly, while it is necessary to have laws and legal instruments to underpin the 
institutions which function for economic development, the political economy in 
which these institutions function is of equal importance. Political, economic, social, 
and cultural factors must be accounted for in the design or reform of institutions. 
These factors form the realities and the environment in which institutions will func-
tion. As such it is important not to rely upon assumptions, but to properly interro-
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gate the dynamics of the environment to identify challenges and opportunities 
which can determine the functions and operations of institutions.  
 
Furthermore, I would argue that the experiences of Nigeria and Rwanda highlight the 
influence of the World Bank and IMF in international development policy and practice, 
as well as the difficulties of prosecuting developmental objectives in varying contexts; 
SAPs were criticised for their prescriptive, intrusive and uniform features, as well as 
their emphasis on macroeconomic performance (Stiglitz, 2008). The PRSPs transferred 
the burden of strategy development and implementation to countries, but have been 
similarly criticised for increasing surveillance and control of countries (Harrison, 2004). 
The influence of IFIs is undeniable: these institutions set the terms and standards by 
which ‘good’ or ‘bad’ policy is determined (Riegner, 2016). In the context of debt relief, 
the World Bank and IMF approved or denied requests for debt relief to borrower coun-
tries, and influenced the policies of other creditors. To illustrate, the Paris Club provided 
relief to debtors on the condition that an IMF SAP was implemented (See 2.4.4). As 
stated by Oxfam (2003), “the Fund's view of what defines the macroeconomic stability 
of a country is the authoritative one for all development partners. Given this, the Fund 
could and should be playing a dynamic, proactive role in establishing the financing con-
ditions for achieving the Millennium Development Goals”.  
Nonetheless, the tools and approaches prescribed by the World Bank and IMF do 
support the diagnosis, analysis and forecasting of developmental challenges and solu-
tions within countries, as will be presented in the following section which discusses the 
second research question through an examination of legal reforms for public debt man-
agement in Nigeria and Rwanda. 
6.1.2. In What Ways Did the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda Deploy Laws 
and Institutions as Instruments of Debt Relief? 
Through the PRSPs, Nigeria and Rwanda embraced wide-ranging reforms intended to 
correct structural and institutional weaknesses. The PRSPs of both countries explicitly 
referred to legal reforms, especially budgetary laws (See 3.3 and 3.4). Chapters 3 and 4 
discussed the budgetary legislations introduced to manage public finance, particularly 
public debt, in both countries. In Chapter 3, the benchmarking of these legislations was 
referred to as the fiscal rules found in some industrialised countries, e.g., the European 
Union. Budgetary legislations in Nigeria and Rwanda combine procedural and numerical 
rules to regulate government acquisition and management of public debt. 
The PRSPs of both countries spoke to the necessity of debt relief to release re-
sources for national development. Thus, the budgetary laws of these countries intro-
duced systems for economic planning and government accountability. Importantly, the 
budgetary laws in Nigeria and Rwanda further present the dynamics of interaction be-
tween laws and institutions; these laws created new institutions to perform debt man-
Conclusion 
165 
agement functions, even as they changed the functions of existing institutions, and 
regulated the relationship between various institutions. Also, it should be noted that 
while the laws emanated from the PRSP process, it is the National Parliaments of both 
countries that were ultimately responsible for drafting and enactment of the laws. 
Through the investigation of Nigeria and Rwanda, it is possible to observe the manifes-
tations and dynamics of laws deployed for the express purpose of public debt manage-
ment. Laws and legal frameworks function as mental constructs, even as they manage 
relationships and competing interests:   
a)  Law as a Mental Construct 
The case-study presents law as both the creation and reflection of ideologies, beliefs 
and thought systems. As mental constructs, these laws articulate the assumptions and 
objectives of governments and IFIs that birthed legislations through the PRSPs. For 
example, the emphasis on public debt management reflects the intention of IFIs and 
governments to avoid the build-up of unsustainable debt portfolios: the provisions 
concerning public debt management reflect the concern of the era, which was to pre-
vent a repeat of high external debt burdens, and the creation of mechanisms to ensure 
that debt acquisition is regulated, controlled and monitored by the government.  
Similarly, the deployment of laws assumes well-functioning governance systems. In 
Nigeria and Rwanda, Executive Arms of Government must request approval of Parlia-
ments to borrow. In this way, Legislative Arms of Government are placed as the final 
and higher authority for government borrowing. Thus, should the Nigerian Government 
acquire external debt without the approval of the National Assembly, the act of borrow-
ing would be ultra vires, and illegal. Similarly, the FRA 2007 is enacted on the assump-
tion that Government will repay its debts. Thus, the Act does not envisage circumstanc-
es of breach, and does not prescribe punitive measures or remedies. However, consid-
ering that at the time of enactment, the country had just benefitted from debt relief, 
which became necessary after years of non-payment of debt obligations, the omission 
of provisions to counteract non-payment of debt service seems somewhat optimistic. 
Also, in 2007, democracy in Nigeria was less than a decade in implementation, with the 
relationships between Legislative and Executive Arms of Government still in the early 
stage of evolution. Furthermore, the budgetary legislations assume that governments 
will make correct decisions for economic development. In Nigeria, external debt is to be 
utilised for capital projects which speak to human development. This approach is evi-
dent also in Rwanda, where the Government may borrow for general budgetary pur-
poses. The utilisation, accounting or effective use of debt finance is not considered in 
the legislation.  
In addition, mental constructs influence the behaviour of Institutions. The mental 
construct for public debt management in Nigeria and Rwanda is concerned with debt 
portfolio management, not necessarily debt for development. This construct shapes the 
institutional systems responsible for debt management, and economic outcomes: Gov-
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ernments are not required to account for performance on previous utilisation of debt, 
or justify the choice of debt finance over other types of finance, e.g., aid or taxation 
revenue for particular undertakings. Consider Nigeria, where borrowing practices of 
Governments have been shaped by the provisions of the FRA 2007: external borrowing 
of State Governments is restrained when compared to domestic debt portfolios. Per the 
FRA 2007, debt service amounts are deducted from revenue allocations due to State 
Governments. The provision of the FRA 2007 which requires National Assembly approv-
al for external borrowing, as well as the practical consequence of reductions in revenue 
has contributed to discipline in the acquisition of external debt. On the other hand, the 
ability of State Governments to borrow in the domestic market is unregulated. As such, 
the Debt Management Office is confined to tracking government borrowing and the 
maintenance of a domestic debt database. As a result, domestic debt profiles exceed 
external debt obligations (See 4.2). In the case of Rwanda, the Law on State Finances 
and Property 2013 does not place restrictions on the purposes for which the Govern-
ment of Rwanda may borrow (See 4.5). While this unfettered approach may be reflec-
tive of the developmental needs of the country, as well as its expectations of success, 
there is the attendant risk of government dependency on debt finance: if there are no 
restrictions, whether of duration or purpose, what then is the incentive for the govern-
ment to reduce the incidence of borrowing?  
b) Law as a Relationship Manager 
The powers and functions allocated to the Ministers of Finance, and the centralisation 
of debt management functions reflect the macroeconomic approach and the lens of the 
World Bank and IMF to economic development. These laws provide a mandate, or 
terms of reference for the institutions of government responsible for enforcement and 
implementation: debt management functions, e.g., debt monitoring, debt sustainability 
analyses, approvals for borrowing, etc., are allocated between arms of government. 
These institutions look at legal instruments to define their authorities, powers and func-
tions. Laws, in this regard, provide job descriptions and performance management 
mechanisms for governments. The constraints, powers and functions stipulated by 
budgetary legislations lead to practical outcomes: in both Nigeria and Rwanda, the Min-
ister responsible for finance is authorised to acquire debt for purposes specified in the 
relevant provisions of the legal instrument. By implication, a request or an attempt by 
other Government Ministers or Agencies to borrow is rendered prima facie illegal. It 
follows that the Ministers of Finance, in both countries, are given additional levels of 
authority and power over other ministries and departments. In this way, law not only 
guides government behaviour, it shapes the political economy within government, and 
dynamics of relationships in its areas of remit.  
Also, the legal and institutional frameworks in both countries exclude other stake-
holders from the systems for the management of public debt. Public debt management 
functions, allocated between government institutions, do not engage communities, 
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financial institutions, civil society or other interest groups. Executive Arms of Govern-
ment are subject only to Parliaments which establish compliance with purpose of bor-
rowing stipulations by reference to the relevant provisions of budgetary legislation. 
Similarly, debt monitoring is domiciled within the Ministries of Finance, and does not 
incorporate perspectives on the allocation or utilisation of debt finance, whether from 
financial institutions, sectoral stakeholders or communities.  
c) Law as a Manager of Competing Interests.  
The examination of legal reforms in Nigeria and Rwanda reveals the function of laws in 
managing opposing interests of stakeholders, over issues of common concern. Laws can 
bring coherence to multiplicity of interests in economic development, and manage 
conflicting interests through stipulations of benchmarks, standards and procedures. The 
table below outlines the mechanisms of the budgetary legislations and how these ad-
dress the divergent interests of parties in public debt management.  
Table 24: Law as a Manager of Competing Interests 
Stakeholder Interest Mechanism  
1. Citizenry • Prevent unnecessary acquisition of 
debt 
• Effective and impact-oriented use of 
debt finance 
• Cheap and favourable terms of debt 
acquisition  
• Participation in decision making 
processes for debt acquisition and 
utilisation 
1. Provisions governing purpose of debt 
acquisition: (S41((1)(a) FRA 2007 and S51 
Law on State Finances and Property 2013 
2. Provisions which supervise debt 
acquisition, e.g., S41(1) (c) FRA 2007 
3. Provisions which require borrower 
governments to obtain Parliamentary 
Approval for external debt acquisition: 
S41(1)(a) FRA 2007 
2. Lenders/Guarantors: 
(Financial Institutions, 
Multilateral Agencies) 
• Repayment of debt sums 
• Provision of debt finance to 
governments on a recurrent basis  
• Prevent unsustainable debt build-up 
• Effective management of debt 
portfolios 
1. Provisions governing debt portfolio 
management: S44(5) FRA 2007 and 
Articles 53 and 56 Law on State Finances 
and Property 2013 
2. Provisions stipulating sustainable debt 
levels: S41(1)(c) FRA 2007 
3. Governments 
(Executive) 
• Alternative source of revenue  
• Easy access to credit 
• Good terms/cheap credit 
1 Provisions governing Authority to Borrow: 
S41(1)(a) FRA 2007 and Article 50 Law on 
State Finances and Property 2013 
4. Parliaments • Ensure government compliance with 
procedural and substantive rules 
 
1. Provisions which require borrower 
governments to obtain Parliamentary 
Approval for borrowing: S41(1)(a) FRA 
2007 and Article 52 Law on State 
Finances and Property 2013 
 
Thus, Legal instruments serve to balance interests, manage expectations, guide interac-
tions of interest groups towards achievement of a common objective. In Chapter 3, I 
presented some of the benefits of budgetary legislation in Nigeria and Rwanda:  
1. Legal reforms, specifically legislations were introduced to ensure the achievement of 
macroeconomic stability. These legislations are similar to and replicate rules which 
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exist in other political and economic systems, both western and emerging econo-
mies (see 3.2). Legal instruments to guide and regulate government management of 
state revenue and expenditure, i.e., budgetary legislation was enacted in both coun-
tries: the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 in Nigeria and the Organic Finance Laws 
(2006 and 2013) in Rwanda. The provisions of these laws are extensive, as they stip-
ulate the roles, functions and operations of government and its institutions. The 
laws also serve as tools to guide the behaviour of government in the performance of 
its functions and obligations: processes, timelines and standards for economic man-
agement are prescribed.  
2. For the purpose of debt management, the provisions of the laws clearly stipulate the 
importance of prudence. Mechanisms are established to ensure that powers and au-
thority to acquire debt are restricted to specific arms of government. In the case of 
external debt, the approval of national parliaments is required prior to the acquisi-
tion of debt obligations. Furthermore, the justifications and reasons for which debt 
can be acquired are provided: for example, in Nigeria, borrower governments are 
required to present undertakings which directly benefit the Nigerian population. In 
Rwanda, the government is allowed to borrow for the purposes of economic im-
provement, as qualified under the Budget Laws.  
3. Importantly, budgetary legislations demand that governments undertake economic 
and technical analyses to manage the economy. Both countries adopted the medi-
um-term expenditure framework, through which 3year forward planning is under-
taken, as well as annual calculations/reviews of revenue and expenditure. Debt 
management is given as a central responsibility of government, assigned to the Min-
isters of Finance. While the definitions of debt sustainability are subjective, the 
budgetary legislations in both countries speak to sustainability, which can be inter-
preted as an attempt to avoid situations of unmanageable debt, as experienced in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Also, these legislations empower government institutions to 
undertake supervisory functions to ensure compliance with legal obligations con-
cerning debt management. 
 
These benefits notwithstanding, in the decade since debt relief was obtained in 2005, 
the debt portfolios of Nigeria and Rwanda have risen steadily. Furthermore, the main 
argument for debt relief was that governments would have increased resources to 
spend within national economies, particularly for national development (See 2.5). The 
next section discusses the debt portfolios of Nigeria and Rwanda, and examines the 
extent to which the Governments of both countries have achieved the objectives of 
debt relief.  
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6.1.3. To What Extent, Have Legal Reforms Contributed to the Achievement of 
the Objectives of Debt Relief? 
In their pursuit of debt relief, the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda argued that debt 
repayments inhibited government investment in national development. In 2005, credi-
tors cancelled significant proportions of debt obligations owed by both countries. By 
implication, debt relief was intended to herald increases in developmental spending and 
improvements in social conditions. However, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
the debt obligations of Nigeria and Rwanda have increased steadily since 2005, thereby 
creating the risk of the build-up of unsustainable debt portfolios. Naturally, debt re-
payments have risen, which increases the proportion of financial resources transferred 
away from both countries (See 4.2; 4.3; 4.5.3).  
National and Sub-National Governments in Nigeria are authorised to, and have bor-
rowed extensively, from a variety of sources. These loans are yet to be linked empirical-
ly to the prosecution of capital and infrastructure projects. In mid-2017, several Nigeri-
an economists advised the Nigerian Government against further borrowing, and em-
phasised the dangers of the high cost of debt repayments to the country. Professor 
Sherrifdeen Tella said “it is not healthy to continue to increase our debts. In fact, the 
growth in the last two years has been quite alarming, and so there is a need for us to 
slow down on it. It is not the debt itself that is important, but the interest rates that you 
pay on such debt and the usage of the debt” (Amaefule & Asu, 2017). Corroborating this 
argument, Dr. Mike Omotosho argued that “borrowing in itself is not the main problem 
but what we spent the money on. In the last two years, I doubt if we have spent up to 
N2.5 trillion on infrastructure and other key policies that can help the economy and the 
people” (ibid). Dr Omotosho went further to note that 40 per cent of Nigeria’s 2016 
budget of N4.2trillion went to debt servicing (ibid). Similarly, Mr. Bismarck Rewane, a 
Nigerian economist and public affairs commentator noted that “we need to move away 
from debts for recurrent expenditure to debts for capital expenditure, which is projects-
specific. The debt level itself is not dangerous, but the debt service level-the debt bur-
den is very high. We are using 66 per cent of our independent revenue to pay interest. 
So, interest rates must come down substantially, or else, we are in trouble” (Amaefule 
& Asu, 2017).  
The debt management provisions of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 would benefit 
from explicit measures to manage breach of obligations, and stipulation of remedies. To 
illustrate, public borrowing has been restrained where the law stipulates corrective 
measures, i.e., S43(2) of the FRA 2007 which stipulates that loan repayments of Sub-
National Governments are deducted from federal allocations. However, S42(1) of the 
FRA 2007, which mandates the President to set debt limits for all levels of Government 
has not been implemented. Thus, S42(6) of the FRA 2007 which prohibits borrowing by 
Governments which have exceeded borrowing limits cannot be enforced. Similarly, 
S45(1) requires Financial Institutions to validate compliance of borrower Governments 
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with S44(1), and S45(2) goes further to make it unlawful for Financial Institutions to 
lend to Governments without validation of compliance with the provisions of S44 (cost-
benefit analysis, necessary authorisation for borrowing, and purpose of borrowing). 
Even so, the law does not detail the mechanisms, benchmarks or criteria by which Fi-
nancial Institutions should confirm that Governments intend to utilise debt finance for 
capital projects. The law does not specify a mechanism or institution to monitor the 
performance of functions imposed upon lender financial institutions, nor does it state 
punitive measures or remedies in the event of breach of the obligations placed upon 
Financial Institutions. Thus, I would argue that where legal reforms create obligations 
upon institutions or persons, these obligations should be accompanied by definitive 
corrective or remedial measures.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis discusses the debt portfolios of Nigeria and Rwanda, particu-
larly the tendency, in both countries, to utilise debt financing on recurrent and regular 
expenditure purposes. To some extent, borrowing by the Government of Rwanda has 
been better reported and utilised: recent borrowing has been linked to specific projects, 
such as the expansion of RwandAir (the state-owned airline) and the construction of the 
Kigali Convention Centre. Also, the Government guarantees only those loans obtained 
by RwandAir and the Rwanda Energy Group (See 4.5). Importantly, government borrow-
ing is centralised through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (See 4.5). Per 
Article 51 of the Law on State Finances and Property 2013, the government may borrow 
for general budgetary purposes. In this approach, there is the risk of creating a depend-
ency on debt finance, especially as the Law does not provide tools by which to measure 
the effectiveness of government borrowing. Thus, all types of government expenditure 
can be sourced by debt finance, subject only to debt limits.  
Chapter 4 also notes that despite PRSPs, fundamental economic problems have not 
been addressed, with the economies of both countries as vulnerable in 2017 to external 
shocks as they were in the 1970s.  Thus, it can be argued that is it necessary for the 
legal instruments introduced to manage public finance to better direct government use 
of public finance, particularly debt finance towards developmental purposes. A review 
of government borrowing from the post-independence era will validate that in Nigeria 
and Rwanda, government deployment of finance is directed by the prevailing economic 
theory of the era: during the 1970s, governments prosecuted the Import Substitution 
Industrialisation economic model, and state funds were used to expand the role of 
government in national economies (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012). In the 1980s, reductions in 
government revenue, and SAPs directed by the IFIs introduced the notion of private 
sector led development, and constrained government participation in economic devel-
opment (See 2.2). 
Thus, if the ideology of this era is country-led economic development, underpinned 
by legislation and implemented through institutions, then it becomes logical to expect 
budgetary legislation to direct government use of debt finance towards developmental 
purposes. In Nigeria and Rwanda, budgetary legislations were introduced in the context 
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of wider economic and institutional reforms to improve economic performance and 
management, as organised through the PRSP process. While it is acknowledged that the 
issue of utilisation of debt finance is part of the wider debate on institutional effective-
ness, it is possible to consider the elements of conceptualisation and implementation 
which would improve the effectiveness of the debt management provisions of budget-
ary legislations in Nigeria and Rwanda.   
I would argue that the limitations of the effectiveness of budgetary legislations in 
the area of debt management, can be attributed to the benchmarking of legal reforms, 
and the evaluation of laws. On benchmarking, the introduction of budgetary legislations 
in Nigeria and Rwanda followed the orthodox approach, i.e., conceptualisation and 
effectiveness of legal reforms are benchmarked against ideal notions of good law (See 
3.2). However, they do not directly support the achievement of a central objective of 
debt relief, i.e., to increase government spending on developmental objectives. Thus, 
the changes intended by legal reforms are not explicitly expressed. As stated above, 
laws serve as mental constructs, capable of creating thought systems and influencing 
institutional practices. It can be argued that the borrowing practices of government 
have not fundamentally changed because the laws do not drive and direct a shift in 
intellectual and behavioural approaches of government institutions. On evaluation, 
typical assessments of law measure the quality of law, as well as the quality of imple-
mentation, on a reflective basis. However, if benchmarking and conceptualisation of 
legal reforms are problematic, it follows that evaluation will be based on a faulty prem-
ise, as discussed in the wrong classification of Nigeria and Rwanda (See 5.1).  
6.2. Contributions to Field of Study  
Asserting a contribution to a field of study is rather an audacious endeavour. Nonethe-
less, mapping the economic and political trajectory of Nigeria and Rwanda since the 
1960s, I have shown that law has served as an instrument to drive economic develop-
ment in Africa for several decades. Law is an instrument, capable of utilization in any 
number of contexts, for a broad range of purposes. For African countries, law can work 
for the achievement of economic objectives, divergent as these may well be across 54 
countries. There have been several waves of legal reform in Africa; from the 1960s until 
the current era. Through these waves, a consistent feature of laws is that they 1) reflect 
an ideological stance, e.g., private sector or government-led development, and 2) are 
deployed as a 'missing component', which, when inserted will enable the engine of the 
economy operate in an optimal manner. The main contribution of this study is thus: 
effective laws must, of necessity, be responsive to the needs and changes within the 
economy, and political economy. Importantly, laws should be subjected to periodic 
evaluation against the stated outcomes or stated intentions which underpin their intro-
duction, utilization, and operation in relevant areas of remit.  
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Rather than asking whether law or institutions are good or bad, I would argue that 
the perspective should shift to good or bad outcomes from law and institutions. Fur-
thermore, the evaluation of effectiveness of legal systems should move from the recre-
ation of ideal features, or checking compliance with established benchmarks, towards 
the incorporation of practical evaluations of effects, outcomes and results. Nigeria and 
Rwanda have enacted budgetary legislations. The Governments of both countries have 
also, to significant extent, complied with the provisions of the legislation. However, gaps 
in the design of laws, or the narrow conception of the debt management provisions of 
the relevant laws have not prevented the build-up of debt obligations.  
What do these findings imply for legal reformers? Firstly, there is an opportunity to 
enhance the way legal systems work in, and for African economies. However, the prob-
lem of benchmarking of laws must be addressed squarely and definitively. While there 
are lessons to be learned from looking at the way laws work in other systems, the ap-
proach to legal reform should shift from recreation of idealized legal systems, to crea-
tion of legal frameworks suited to, and effective for purpose. Legal reforms must holisti-
cally define problems, conceptualise interventions for economic effectiveness, and 
carefully consider the changes and outcomes to be created, even as they acknowledge 
and account for the existence and influence of the factors which will determine the 
extent of success.  
Secondly, law, through legal reforms, reshapes institutional and relational dynamics, 
even as it frames opportunities and outcomes. In this light, legal reformers must adopt 
an approach which is both responsible and aware of the power structures, capabilities, 
and economic changes created by legal systems. Laws create mental constructs, which 
direct behaviours and functions which create economic outcomes. Thus, effective legal 
reforms will explicitly state and define the changes in thought systems and institutional 
functions.  
Thirdly, in the context of institutional thought, laws can certainly be described as in-
stitutions. However, law-institutions operate in the climate created by other institu-
tions, such as mental constructs. Also, law creates climatic conditions in which other 
institutions function. Laws and other types of institutions (organizations, mental con-
structs, and relationships, etc.) are inter-dependent, interacting in a dynamic manner. 
However, it is important to consider laws and legal systems, as distinct from other types 
of institutions. The characteristics of law, i.e., binding, non-negotiable, and benchmark-
setting render it as an instrument to which other types of institutions look to for guid-
ance. Thus, it is crucial that laws are relevant and suitable for the purposes to which 
they are deployed.  
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6.3. Limitations of Study 
Nigeria and Rwanda are but two of the fifty-four countries on the African continent. It 
cannot be claimed that their experiences are in any way representative of all, or even 
some countries in Africa. Also, within the study, it may be that the investigation of Nige-
ria would on occasion, seem deeper than that of Rwanda. Nigeria is my country of 
origin, and I am more familiar with its history and political arrangements, than I am with 
those of Rwanda.  
The field of Law and Development is vast and uncharted in many areas. In this study, 
I have concentrated on the interaction of law and institutions in the economic sphere, 
and even then, a narrow analysis of the use of law by governments and international 
finance institutions in the public finance management systems of two countries. It is 
likely that different findings will be generated in other fields of study, e.g., private law, 
or in social development, as well as other regions. 
Also, I have not presumed to delve into the arguments over primacy of institutional 
development, or engage in the question of what institutions matter for development. 
Instead, I have centred on the review of legal and institutional reforms undertaken for 
debt relief, and debt management, in Nigeria and Rwanda.  
In addition, I have deliberately refrained from engaging in evaluations of economic 
policy or economic outcomes, and confined myself to interpretations of economic data. 
Firstly, evaluations of economic policy would have rendered the scope of investigation 
wide, and ultimately cumbersome. Secondly, legal education equips me to utilise the 
case-study model of investigation, interrogation and argument. Economic evaluation 
would have taken the study into the realm of econometric analysis, which is currently 
beyond the scope of my abilities.  
Furthermore, I do not consider the process of law-making, e.g., the negotiations be-
tween governments and the IMF/World Bank during debt relief negotiations. The thesis 
follows the premise that National Parliaments enacted budgetary legislations, which are 
applied by government institutions. Perhaps a different study can scrutinise the mecha-
nisms by which legislations were enacted during the PRSP process.  
6.4. Opportunities for Further Research 
The effect of law on economic development can be further studied from several per-
spectives. The study of laws as they influence government behaviour in public finance 
can be expanded to include more countries, particularly in public debt management, 
which is prescient for many African countries.  
Also, following the methodology used in this thesis, i.e., a comparative study of the 
interactions of law and economies in public and private spheres would be interesting. 
The differences in context are bound to yield interesting insights on the effect of laws 
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on behaviours of various types of actors, and the outcomes in relationships, percep-
tions/use of law, and economic systems at micro and macro levels.  
Furthermore, the proposition of this thesis, i.e., that the effectiveness of legal re-
forms should be evaluated against outcomes can be attempted from academic and 
policy perspectives. Diagnosis of contexts can be conducted in the areas of public or 
private law, in order to map strategies which would direct the workings of legal systems 
towards intended outcomes.   
6.5. Concluding Statement  
This thesis has highlighted the multidimensional capacities of law including; legal in-
struments as the creators of mental constructs and patterns of thinking, the arbiters of 
institutional relations, the benchmarks for the measurement of institutional behaviour 
and tools for economic management. Contemporary African development has been 
accompanied by several generations of legal reforms to aid the prosecution of econom-
ic development agenda. Law can, and does serve as an instrument of economic devel-
opment on the African continent. However, the quality and impact of law, are made 
evident not only in its existence, but through the interplay of laws and institutions, con-
gruent towards the achievement of economic objectives.    
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Pursuant to the Regulations of Maastricht University, I am required to include a piece 
on Valorisation, or a brief discussion on the application of this thesis for so-
cial/economic use.  Thus, in this section, I attempt to answer the five questions pre-
sented in the Maastricht University PhD Regulations: 
1. Relevance: What is the social (and/or economic) relevance of your research 
results (i.e. in addition to the scientific relevance)? 
The central question- ‘how can law drive economic development in Africa?’ guided the 
study towards the observation and analysis of the interplay of law, institutions and 
economic performance. Specifically, the thesis evaluated the effectiveness of law in 
directing the behaviour of the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda in the management 
of public debt.  
How are the results of my research relevant?  
In October 2017, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria requested permission 
from the National Assembly to increase the country’s external debt portfolio by 
US$5billion, to finance infrastructure projects. US$3billion is to be sourced through a 
Eurobond, and US$2billion on the International Capital Market (Umoru, 2017). At the 
time of writing this Valorisation addendum, the National Assembly has yet to provide a 
response to the Presidency. The Debt Management Office estimates that this borrowing 
will be repaid over a period of between 5 to 30 years (Baiyewu, 2017). It is interesting to 
note that in July 2017, the Minister of Finance warned that Nigeria should no longer 
finance her budget through debt finance. Her words: “we cannot borrow anymore, we 
just have to generate funds domestically to fund our budget. Mobilise revenue to fund 
the necessary budget increase” (Ogunmade & Chima, 2017).  
For myself, (and I would imagine, millions of young Nigerians of working age), this 
sounds like the Government plans to borrow more money at my expense. To be fair, 
successive governments have borrowed extensively on behalf of the country and her 
people. However, writing a thesis on debt finance at a time of heavy national borrowing 
renders the borrowing numbers vivid and personal. Indeed, the questions asked in the 
thesis, particularly those relating to the monitoring and use of debt finance become 
compelling and important.  
Since the 1990s, governance and the rule of law have been presented by NIE and In-
ternational Finance Institutions as critical elements for the achievement of develop-
mental goals. Over the last two decades, legal reforms in Africa have attempted to use 
laws as tools to structure societies and create beneficial results. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of 
this thesis discuss the application and effectiveness of laws in regulating the behaviour 
of the Governments of Nigeria and Rwanda in the area of debt management.  
Law is important, and law is powerful. Also, governments do shape the trajectory 
and quality of life for their citizens and residents. I argued in this thesis that laws should 
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be evaluated against outcomes within the relevant context. Thus, measuring law against 
outcomes (intended and unintended), would support not only the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of laws. Importantly, it allows the observation of the effect of legal stipula-
tions on institutional behaviour, and by extension economic and societal results. Where 
law has been deployed as a tool of economic management, it is important for all stake-
holders, whether citizens, governments, development partners, and in the context of 
this thesis, creditors, to evaluate its usefulness, effectiveness for the purposes de-
ployed.  
Also, where law is the tool of economic management, it is placed as the location for 
negotiation and disputation for all interest groups. It follows that the discourse on the 
rule of law needs to extend beyond the application of laws, to the analysis of the effect 
and suitability of laws. The quality of laws, and their effectiveness for achieving devel-
opmental goals would be improved through regular evaluation and critical reflection of 
the interaction of laws, institutions and economic outcomes, by all stakeholders.  
2. (Target groups) To whom, in addition to the academic community, are your 
research results of interest and why? 
The widespread acceptance of governance, institutions, and the rule of law for devel-
opment lies in the adoption of the governance agenda by International Finance Institu-
tions, particularly the World Bank, itself influenced by the work of economist-
academics. In addition, governments, whether willingly or unwillingly, have pursued the 
governance agenda. Similarly, civil society organisations have championed the govern-
ance agenda, and attempt to hold governments accountable.  
It may be that the approach and tools discussed in this thesis, particularly evaluating 
law against outcomes, would be useful to all the stakeholders mentioned in the para-
graph above. Also, within the legal profession and academic community, it may be pos-
sible to explore the development of tools, such as indexes, and platforms, such as dia-
logues to examine the quality, suitability and effectiveness of laws in different spheres. 
This would be interesting, I believe, to see how laws interact with institutions at micro-
level, e.g., public debt, public spending, property rights. Also, it might be intriguing to 
conduct such an evaluation on a comparative basis within countries, to observe the 
interplay, and (perhaps) conflicts of legal regimes within national economies.   
Furthermore, public officials and law makers might consider the questions asked in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis relevant in the law-making process. Where law is introduced as 
tool to drive development, it is critical to state clearly the objectives of development, 
and the metrics by which these objectives will be measured. In Chapter 4 of the thesis, I 
outlined some of the limitations of legal reforms, e.g., political/administrative systems. 
The importance of ‘localising’ laws cannot be overstated. As I observed in Chapter 5, 
legal transplantation is often the easiest way of law-making. Nonetheless, it is important 
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for law-makers to thoroughly scope the political, administrative and intellectual con-
texts in which laws will be applied, and then render laws fit for purpose.   
3. Activities/Products: Into which concrete products, services, processes, activities 
or commercial activities will your results be translated and shaped? 
There are several opportunities to translate the arguments and insights of this thesis 
into products and activities. Firstly, the ‘assessment tool’ presented in Chapter 5, by 
which law can be measured against outcomes can be further developed for use by dif-
ferent stakeholders. Thereafter, the tool can be deployed by myself and other re-
searchers/research institutes to conduct evaluations of legal frameworks within specific 
economic contexts. Thereafter, with the findings of these evaluations, it would be pos-
sible to engage with academia, the legal profession and International Finance Institu-
tions. These engagements can occur through research programmes, conferences, work-
shops and other opportunities as may be explored.  
4. Innovation: To what degree can your results be called innovative in respect to 
the existing range of products, services, processes, activities and commercial 
activities? 
It has been said, by no less than authority than Scripture, that there is nothing new 
under the sun (Ecclesiastes 1:9). However, I hope that in this thesis, on a practical level, 
I have submitted simple and actionable proposals by which law can be used as an in-
strument of development, especially on the African continent.  
Existing tools for the evaluation of law, for example, the Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment and the Doing Business Index, are applied on a global, comparative 
basis. I have argued that it is also necessary to evaluate laws against outcomes within 
national economies. Also, provided in Chapter 5 are sample tools by which this may be 
prosecuted. While these tools will be further refined in application, they are different to 
existing tools in several respects: 
a) Purpose: the popular indexes (CPIA, DB) are owned and populated by the Staff of 
International Finance Institutions for the purposes of assessing econom-
ic/institutional performance, and for resource allocation. The tools for outcome-
based evaluation are intended to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of laws 
for the achievement of developmental objectives.  
b) Approach: the outcome-based approach of the evaluation of laws uses as a bench-
mark the stated objectives of legal instruments, rather than ‘ideal law’ benchmarks. 
Also, the outcome based approach is different in that it considers both intended and 
unintended outcomes of the application of legal instruments.  
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 Ownership: I will claim copyright of these tools. However, the tools used for the 
evaluation law against outcomes can be adapted and used within different con-
texts. 
5. Schedule & Implementation: How will this/these plan(s) for valorisation be 
shaped? What is the schedule, are there risks involved, what market opportunities 
are there and what are the costs involved? 
In the immediate future, these tools can be applied within research and policy initiatives 
within the fields of law and economic development. There are plentiful opportunities 
within rule of law and governance programs to undertake practical evaluation of the 
effect of laws within economies. As the tools have been presented in this thesis, they 
can be deployed without further significant cost, applied in their current state, and 
refined as they are utilised.  
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